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YEARS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
TAKING SEX DISCRIMINATION SERIOUSLY
VICKI SCHULTZ f
ABSTRACT
The fiftieth anniversary of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination
provides an occasion to reflect on its successes and failures in achieving
workplace sex equality. Although considerable progress has occurred,
advances have been both uneven and unsteady. This Article shows that a
primary limit on legal reform has been attitudinal. Before and after Title
VII's enactment, private and public officials have defended sex discrimi-
nation and inequality by appealing to naturalized conceptions of sex
difference. Persistent stereotypes portray women as more devoted to
family roles than work roles and, consequently, less committed to their
jobs than men. Similar stereotypes portray women as primarily interested
in female-typed jobs said to reward feminine traits and values. Viewed
through the lens of such assumptions, sex-based disparities in employ-
ment are not inequalities: They are the inevitable expression of innate
and cultural sex differences.
t © Vicki Schultz, Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Science, Yale Law School. I
would like to thank the members of the Denver University Law Review for inviting me to participate
in this symposium honoring the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination.
Working on this piece deepened my understanding of the law and enabled me to learn from
extraordinary people who shared a desire to get it right; I am indebted to all of them. Fellow
symposium participants asked thought-provoking questions when I presented the piece as a keynote
lecture. Colleagues Bill Eskridge, Noah Zatz, Adam Romero, Jessica Clarke, Tracey Meares, and
Doug NeJaime made helpful comments on later drafts. Students in Yale Law School's Ph.D. seminar
on legal scholarship probed the piece's broader implications; YLS librarian Michael VanderHeijden
tracked down sources near and far. The Law Review's staff offered expert editorial assistance;
Lindsey Dunn worked tirelessly to perfect the Article's form, thus permitting a clearer read of the
substance. The greatest level of support came from my capable, caring YLS research assistants.
Zachary Herz and Marcus Curtis supplied superb aid with research and editing; Herz helped clarify
arguments and craft nomenclature for new ideas. More than anyone else, Selin Akkan performed
brilliant, indispensable work to help formulate, research, support, and refine the arguments presented
here; she also organized and edited countless drafts and sources. Without her steadfast, intelligent
presence this Article could not have been completed. I dedicate the piece to David Fukumoto, who
for better and worse inspired me in more ways than he can imagine. Any and all errors are, of
course, mine alone.
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How, then, has progress occurred under Title VII? The answer lay
in reformers challenging essentialist claims about sex difference.
During Title VII's first decade, this Article shows, agencies and
courts adopted an expansive reading of Title VII only because the leaders
of the emerging women's rights movement pulled activists together to
mount a strong, clear, concerted challenge to the existence and relevance
of sex difference. Crafting a new conception of equality that captured
American women's growing sense of discontent while promising greater
freedom to both women and men, early feminists overcame governmen-
tal resistance and achieved genuine legal progress. By the mid-1970s,
they secured favorable rulings from the agencies, the Supreme Court, and
the lower courts under both Title VII and the Constitution and consoli-
dated these gains in Congress.
Yet progress was not universal and the initial momentum did not
last. Rather, this Article argues, in areas of the law where feminist groups
failed to establish a significant presence, or where they began to take a
divided or less decisive stance as the women's movement fractured and
faded, the absence of activist demands and oversight permitted courts to
retain or revert back to older views attributing workplace inequality to
women's difference. Two areas of law illustrate these dynamics. In cases
raising women's lack of interest as a defense to sex discrimination,
women's rights groups' failure to regularly contest this arcane defense in
the courts and agencies, coupled with resurfaced internal division over
questions of difference that conveyed a mixed message about women's
work preferences, freed conservative judges to accept this defense and
legitimate the underlying stereotypes in a wide swath of cases. Preg-
nancy discrimination law provides a second example, showing how
courts stalled, and later backpedaled, as feminists initially wavered and
later split over whether to characterize pregnancy as a uniquely female
reproductive experience unlike other medical conditions or as a tempo-
rary disability similar to others that may affect an employee's ability to
work. Despite federal laws and agency rulings adopting the latter
approach, images of pregnancy as unique and distinct from other
disabilities have continued to resurface, limiting the law's capacity to
address this persistent form of discrimination.
Progress under anti-discrimination law is thus difficult to achieve
and sustain: It requires continuing, cohesive efforts to challenge differ-
ence as a rationale for inequality and renew public support for change.
This Article suggests that, going forward, equality advocates can make
further headway by disputing not only the existence and relevance of
alleged group-based differences, but also their presumed stability and
sources. New evidence reveals that many sex, race, and other group-
based differences typically said to explain and justify inequalities at work
are actually produced there through institutional practices that foster an
unnecessary, negative sense of difference and division among employ-
[Vol. 91:5
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ees. The hope is that, by contesting such practices and exposing their
self-reinforcing quality, reformers can further erode both enduring
workplace inequalities and the persistent stereotypes cited to justify
them.
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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, American women and men won the right to be free
from discrimination at work when Congress inserted one word into the
text of Title VII of the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act. That word was
"sex."1 With the addition of that one word, the world changed forever.2
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2012)).
2015]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
In this Article, I use Title VII's fiftieth anniversary as an occasion to
reflect on what has transpired in the wake of its ban on sex discrimina-
tion. I must confess that I am a little intimidated by the task before me.
How do I sum up the accomplishments and shortcomings of this historic
statute? Of the lawyers and judges, legislators and policymakers,
activists and ordinary people who have breathed life into it since its
inception? How can I convey how much this law has meant, not only to
American women, but to the entire nation and even the world, while
noting how much work remains to realize its promise? Space limitations
require me to make broad generalizations based on limited evidence, and
to inevitably shortchange nuance, in portraying the lessons and limits of
the law.
This Article is entitled Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously. Origi-
nally, however, I considered calling it Taking Sex Seriously. By that
phrase, I meant to refer to the project of taking Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination seriously. When I first conceived the title, I
ran a Google search as a quick preemption check, expecting to find
scores of books and articles that addressed sex discrimination in some
way. Instead, the top result from my search was a book called Taking Sex
Differences Seriously,3 described on the author's website as follows:
In his new book, Taking Sex Differences Seriously, Dr. Steven
Rhoads assembles a wealth of scientific evidence showing that sex
distinctions are "hardwired" into our biology. They range from the
subtle (men get a chemical high from winning while women get one
from nursing) to the profound (women with high testosterone levels
are more promiscuous, more competitive, and more conflicted about
having children than those with average levels).
4
Humorous as it seems, the results of my search reveal a key insight
about what stands in the way of eliminating sex discrimination at work.
Taking sex discrimination seriously requires taking women seriously-
not simply as mothers and daughters, friends and neighbors, lovers and
spouses, consumers and community volunteers, but also and primarily as
employees and independent contractors, day laborers and domestic
workers, managers and professionals, entrepreneurs and owners, and
others who work for a living, to use common parlance. Taking women
seriously in these work roles demands questioning precisely the notion of
static sex differences implied in the book quote above, for, all too often,
American society and institutions have assumed that women have funda-
mentally different natures, priorities, and preferences about work than
2. For a moving history revealing the centrality of Title VII to the development of the
Second Wave women's rights movement, see RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN: How THE
MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 70-81 (2000).
3. STEVEN E. RHOADS, TAKING SEX DIFFERENCES SERIOUSLY (2004).
4. TAKING SEX DIFFERENCES SERIOUSLY, http://www.faculty.virginia.edu/sexdifferences
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
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men. Thus, making progress under Title VII has required successive
waves of reformers to resist, anew, the age-old impulse to explain away
workplace inequality as the expression of women's own deepest desires
and truest selves. Advancing workplace equality has meant taking on
common sense assumptions about who "women" are, what they want,
and what they should do (while implicitly disputing parallel assumptions
about men). More than anything, it has meant challenging difference.
This Article examines the critical link between challenging sex dif-
ference and achieving greater equality under Title VII. Over the past
three decades, a vibrant literature has explored the critical role of the
twentieth century movements for civil rights, women's rights, and gay
rights in advancing laws to eliminate discrimination and promote
equality.5 Newer work emphasizes how a wide array of social actors,
including public officials, the press, social activists, lawyers, employers,
workers, and ordinary citizens, shape the law's content and development;
officials and staff within multiple governmental entities, including
executive offices, agencies, courts, and legislatures, participate in the
6process. Over time, these diverse actors all help elaborate the meaning
of these laws and entrench the underlying constitutional values.7 Some
5. Civil rights history has emphasized the influence of social movements on the law. For a
recent review of developments in civil rights history over the past three decades, see Risa Goluboff,
Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2317-27 (2013)
(reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWYER (2012) [hereinafter MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE]), where Goluboff collects sources
and describes the general trends. For a somewhat different characterization of those trends, see
Kenneth W. Mack, Civil Rights History: The Old and the New, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 258, 258-60
(2013) [hereinafter Mack, Civil Rights History], and Kenneth W. Mack, Bringing the Law Back into
the History of the Civil Rights Movement, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 657, 658-61 (2009) [hereinafter
Mack, Bringing the Law Back]. For an early, influential article that called on legal historians to take
up new methods and perspectives, including a bottom-up study of how social actors shaped the
content and meaning of constitutional law, see Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and
"The Rights That Belong to Us All, " 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1032-33 (1987).
Legal scholarship has also highlighted the importance of social movements to legal
change. For analyses of how twentieth century social movements created a shared constitutional
vision that shaped the law, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2194-2353
(2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Some Effects], and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-
Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 491-509 (2001) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Channeling].
6. For a review of work in civil rights history examining the contribution of various social
and governmental actors, see Goluboff, supra note 5, at 2319-22. Goluboff concludes that, overall,
the literature portrays "law creation as a dynamic and multidimensional process that involves both
conflict and collaboration" between multiple actors, including judges, government officials, social
movement activists, lawyers, and laypeople. Id. at 2320-21. For sociological work emphasizing the
role of employers in elaborating the meaning of Title VII, see FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY 220-21 (2009). For legal scholarship melding history, political science, and legal
theory to analyze the role of multiple governmental actors in effectuating civil rights reforms, see 3
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 174-99 (2014), and WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 29-74, 209-53, 349-86 (2010).
7. For recent theoretical accounts of how constitutional values are given life not primarily
through Supreme Court cases interpreting the text of the Constitution, but instead through the actions
of executive officials, agency administrators, lower federal court judges, and federal and state
2015]
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research specifically examines how women's rights activists inside and
outside the government actively influenced and were influenced by the
development of sex discrimination law, including Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination.
8
Historians and social scientists have told the story of how women's
rights activists in the 1960s and 1970s launched a concerted challenge to
commonly held stereotypes about women's difference.9 Before Title VII,
American employers shared widespread social assumptions about the
existence, content, and enduring quality of fundamental sex differences
between men and women. In the eyes of employers, women naturally
prioritized family caregiving over paid jobs; thus, women were not as
serious about employment as their male counterparts and not suited for
or interested in the same types of work. Citing these essential differ-
ences, employers routinely restricted women's employment prospects,
relegating them to lower paying, less secure positions regarded as fitting
for their sex.10 Title VII's sex amendment sparked a social transfor-
mation, prompting women's rights groups to abandon an older, protec-
tionist view that defended such restrictions as a means of recognizing
and accommodating women's special reproductive roles. Emerging
leaders successfully refrained the women's movement around a new,
anti-essentialist view that disavowed arguments rooted in sex difference
and demanded that women receive the same rights and opportunities as
men.l" Building on the successes of the civil rights movement, early
legislators who dynamically engage with social movements and other popular constituencies to
produce interpretations that are later consolidated by Congress and entrenched in the legal and social
orders, see ACKERMAN, supra note 6, and ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6.
8. For examples of work examining the relationship between the women's rights movement
and Title VII in the 1960s and 1970s, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 205-54 (1990); CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON
ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 138-221 (1988); ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 203-96 (2001); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM Is NOT
ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 117-54 (2006); SERENA MAYERI,
REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 29-58 (2011);
ROSEN, supra note 2, at 70-94; JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 111-19
(2002); and Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2129-38.
9. See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 8, at 199-200, 217-21; MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 119,
129-30, 134, 148-49; MAYERI, supra note 8, at 32-33; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 119.
10. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 123-26; see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 45-53
(tracing such attitudes and discriminatory practices back to the era before World War I).
11. See Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes
and Transformation of the Women's Movement in the 1960s, I I AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1735-47 (2006)
(discussing this transformation, and specifically showing how conflicts with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) over Title VII's enforcement spurred women's rights activists, led
by the nascent National Organization for Women (NOW), to abandon an older, protective cultural
frame that stressed respecting women's special biological and social roles in favor of a new one that
disavowed sex difference and demanded that women be granted the same opportunities and privi-
leges as men in the workplace and throughout society). For a discussion of the sociological concept
of cultural framing, the process through which activists mobilize cultural and legal symbols to create
an "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and
campaigns of a social movement organization," see id. at 1720-21 (internal quotation marks
omitted). For a similar but more top-down approach that stresses how governmental officials'
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feminists insisted that sex discrimination was no different from race
discrimination; they urged an end to sex-segregated employment as part
of a larger attack on an increasingly obsolete male-breadwinner, female-
caregiver family wage system that specified separate roles for men and
women at work and at home.'2 By insisting that women were not
fundamentally different from men in ways that mattered to employment,
movement leaders articulated a clear, coherent feminist philosophy that
demanded respect for women as equal wage earners and citizens and
transformed the meaning of gender in society.'
3
Although legal scholarship has begun to explore these insights, the
literature has not fully acknowledged how crucial the frontal assault on
sex difference was to the successful development of sex discrimination
law or how important such an effort remains today. Not only has legal
scholarship traditionally underestimated the influence of employment on
women's social, economic, and political status and personal self-
perception;'4 earlier work also minimized the degree of progress made in
sex discrimination law by overlooking the complexity, depth, and
understandings of different social groups' meanings influence official views of policy relating to
those groups, see SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 9-16.
12. See, e.g., KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 246 (noting that the alliance between race and
sex discrimination "relocated disparate treatment because of sex from the venue of tradition to that
of discrimination"); MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 147 (observing that NOW, using reasoning
pioneered by civil rights lawyer and feminist Pauli Murray, argued that "'[t]he excuses used by
employers practicing sex-based discrimination are not substantially different from excuses regarding
racial bias' and 'can best be met by the same laws, agencies, investigators and government
officials'); SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 110-19 (showing that women's rights advocates inside and
outside the government pressed the similarities between race and sex discrimination in an effort to
secure equal access to all jobs for women and eventually persuaded the EEOC to support their
position); Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2128-30 (explaining how Pauli Murray's work
analogizing sex discrimination to race discrimination influenced Congress in enacting Title VII and
shaped subsequent arguments made by NOW and other early women's rights advocates); see also
MAYERt, supra note 8, at 2-8 (reviewing the ways in which feminist advocates in the 1960s and
1970s compared sex discrimination to race discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, Title
VII, and other laws).
13. See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 8, at 200 (emphasizing that NOW's separation of
childbearing from childrearing, and insistence that both men and women could care for children and
thus could be equally committed to work, permitted early feminists to demand an expansive equality
no earlier group could claim); MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 149 (concluding that early feminists'
demands for equal access to all jobs and the right to be treated as equals led to changes recognizing
women as earners and rights-bearing citizens); ROSEN, supra note 2, at 75-78 (showing that NOW's
founders rejected sexual difference and advocated giving women equal opportunity and freedom of
choice, which required fundamentally transforming the workplace and the home and expanding
democracy).
14. For a discussion of how feminist legal scholarship traditionally emphasized the role of
heterosexual sexual relations and family arrangements in generating gender inequality, and neglected
the influence of paid work, see Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1899 (2000)
[hereinafter Schultz, Life's Work]. For an attempt to describe the potentially positive effects of paid
work on women's status and identity, see id. at 1891-92, 1909-11. Historian Nancy MacLean also
emphasizes the importance of job-holding for women's economic, political, social, and personal
empowerment, particularly for women of color, and stresses that Black women, including early
feminist leaders such as Pauli Murray and Eleanor Holmes Norton, understood this point particularly
well. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 6-7, 122-23, 127-28. MacLean laments that, outside of labor
history, scholarship on race and gender has neglected studying employment as a central component
of equality and inclusion. Id. at 342-43.
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transformative quality of feminist challenges to difference. During the
1980s, for example, an influential body of feminist legal scholarship
charged early women's rights activists with overemphasizing liberal
rights to formal equality that merely opened traditionally male roles to
women, while allegedly neglecting the interests of women of color,
poorer women, and other women who could not or would not take on
such roles.'5 This older body of criticism has itself come under recent
challenge, as newer legal scholarship has begun to reexamine and
rehabilitate the work of early feminists. Contrary to the anti-liberal
critique, the newer legal histories suggest that early activists were a
racially diverse group who pursued a rich agenda of economic and social
independence for women that included equal employment, reproductive
choice, and subsidized childcare as part of a larger project of upending
the family wage system.'6 Such broader, more accurate portrayals of
early feminists' aims and contributions are critically important to future
reform efforts, because perceptions of the past inevitably shape evalua-
tions of present circumstances and future possibilities. Overall, however,
this promising new line of work reaches no consensus about such
contemporary implications, nor does it emphasize the crucial contribu-
tion or continuing necessity of challenging difference. 17
15. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 221, 225 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (criticizing early feminists for
pursuing formal equality strategies that harmed ordinary wives and mothers); Martha L. Fineman,
Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 25, 36 n.38 (1990) (stating that "[equal treatment also has contributed to the oppression of
women, particularly poor, nonprofessional women"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1290-91, 1296-97 (1991) (criticizing liberal feminists for
seeking reforms that did not benefit women of color and only helped women who conform to
traditionally male life plans); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375,
427 (1981) (arguing that the early feminist focus on formal equality advantaged elite women and
neglected the effects of socioeconomic class). See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:
WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 208-10, 217-26 (2000) (providing
an overview of such feminist criticisms). For further discussion of this body of work that emerged in
the 1980s, see infra note 444.
16. For older examples of legal scholarship defending early women's rights reformers against
later anti-liberal feminist critics' charges, see WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 205-42 (disputing that
early feminists ignored the needs of average women who take care of families); Eskridge, Some
Effects, supra note 5, at 2130-31 (arguing that early feminists sought not only formal equality, but
also an end to separate spheres as a system and ideology). For more recent examples of this work,
see MAYERI, supra note 8, at 45-50 (recognizing that early women's rights advocates were a racially
diverse group who attempted to address the problems faced by women from all walks of life, not
only elite women); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction
of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 419 (2011) (showing that early feminists pursued
not only formally equal treatment, but also "the redistribution of the costs of pregnancy, childbirth,
and childrearing"); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimi-
nation Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 83, 88 (2010) (reiterating that Ruth Bader Ginsburg's goal in
bringing the early equal protection cases was to prevent legal and other institutions from prescribing
sex roles for both women and men, not simply to end formal legal classifications based on sex).
17. Serena Mayeri's important book, for example, focuses on how women's rights activists
deployed the analogy between race and sex discrimination to strategic advantage in the 1960s and
1970s, only to have it limit advances beginning in the 1980s. MAYERI, supra note 8, at 45-46, 187.
She does not, however, emphasize the lasting contribution that activists' challenge to sex difference
made to the law's development. Scholars outside of the law have come closer to doing so, see supra
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This Article contributes to and extends this newer literature by
demonstrating the original and ongoing importance of challenging
essentialist ideas about sex difference in order to advance equality under
Title VII. Specifically, I offer evidence that the presence or absence of
visible, cohesive feminist efforts to challenge sex difference as a ra-
tionale for inequality helps explain Title VII's successes and failures. In
the first decade of enforcement, my analyses show, agencies and courts
adopted expansive readings of Title VII largely because the leaders of
the women's rights movement conveyed a clear, concerted demand for
the law to stop relying on outdated assumptions about sex difference and
start treating women as equal earners and citizens entitled to the same
rights and responsibilities as men. This message captured growing public
sentiment and created pressure for change that led to many important
reforms under Title VII. Yet my case studies suggest that this effect was
not universal. In areas of law where early feminists did not campaign to
challenge difference, or where they later took a less decisive or divided
stance as the women's movement began to fade and fracture, the absence
of visible, unified feminist pressure permitted judges to retain or retreat
back to older, biased views attributing workplace inequality to women's
own preferences.
Although case studies alone cannot support general conclusions
about the reasons for stalled progress, the analyses here generate im-
portant observations that merit further examination in future research.
Methodologically, I suggest, it is crucial for scholars to consider not only
the influence of a social movement overall, but also the rise of internal
divisions within the movement and changes in its presence, visibility, and
strength over time, in shaping legal developments.'8 Substantively,
note 13 and accompanying text, but they have not analyzed in detail how the legal system sometimes
accepted and sometimes rejected feminist challenges to difference and have not theorized those
trends, as I do here.
18. In highlighting these previously neglected factors, I do not mean to suggest they are the
only ones that can weaken a social movement's influence on courts and policy makers. For example,
scholars have also shown the impact of counter-movements, or social movements that arise to resist
or roll back initial reforms. See, e.g., Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 5, at 467-78; Tahi L. Mottl,
The Analysis of Countermovemenis, 27 SOC. PROBS. 620, 620-24, 628-29 (1980); Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1362-66 (2006).
In addition, forces other than social movements, including broad economic, political,
ideological, and cultural transformations, also contribute significantly to the law's development;
scholars too numerous to cite have discussed the influence of such changes on civil rights law. See,
e.g., MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 336-47 (explaining how the economic downturn and the rise of
conservative politics and ideology stalled Title VII reforms); MAYERI, supra note 8, at 78-86, 187-
91, 199-200, 227 (describing how the rise of political conservatism halted progress under sex
discrimination law). But such macro-level changes also affect, and are affected by, the trajectory and
strength of social movements and the counter-movements that arise in response. See, e.g.,
MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 337 (explaining how economic recessions in the 1970s severely
impacted the industries in which the civil rights movement had made the most progress, reducing the
public's perception of the strength of the movement); Cynthia Harrison, Creating a National
Feminist Agenda: Coalition Building in the 1970s, in FEMINIST COALITIONS: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES 19, 42 (Stephanie Gilmore d.,
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moreover, it is important to expose and analyze the taken-for-granted
cultural assumptions that activists sought to challenge as part of the law
reform process. Those assumptions reveal not only the progressive
pressure points, but also the conservative baselines to which legal
decision makers may retreat in the absence of ongoing, concerted
demands for change. In considering how the women's rights movement's
shifting strength and visibility, internal conflicts, and substantive
demands affected Title VII's reach, and in supplementing the historical
analysis with newer legal theories and social science evidence, my
approach aligns with recent scholarship that draws eclectically from
diverse scholarly traditions to understand the law's history and suggest a
way forward.
19
The Article begins with a look backward to analyze the lessons and
limits of the law. Part I shows that Title VII has facilitated major ad-
vances toward eliminating sex discrimination in the workplace, but
progress has been uneven and difficult to achieve. From the beginning,
reform has been threatened by widely shared, biased assumptions about
women's work priorities that deny the very need for legal intervention.
Persistent stereotypes hold that, due to innate and cultural sex differ-
ences, women are naturally more devoted to family roles, and less
committed to and capable at careers or jobs, than men. Similar stereo-
types depict women who do work as primarily interested in female-typed
jobs said to reward feminine traits and values. Viewed through the lens
of such biases, sex-segregated employment and unequal pay do not
reflect illegal workplace discrimination-only women's inevitable
preferences.
Part II analyzes the conflicts surrounding Title VII's enactment and
early enforcement, showing that early women's rights activists continu-
ally confronted public and private expressions of such bias, promoted
even by officials at the agencies responsible for implementing Title VII's
ban on sex discrimination. Ironically, these officials' refusal to take sex
discrimination seriously brought once-divided women's groups together
to challenge prevailing stereotypes, galvanizing public support and
persuading agencies, courts, and Congress to adopt expansive interpreta-
tions of the law.
Part III demonstrates that these early advances were neither univer-
sal nor unstoppable, showing how progress stalled or reversed where the
women's movement failed to exert or sustain a significant, cohesive
presence challenging arguments rooted in women's difference. In cases
2008) (discussing the challenges faced by feminist groups and the changing agendas they adopted in
response to the rise of conservatism in the Reagan era).
19. Cf Mack, Civil Rights History, supra note 5, at 261 (discussing how newer legal histories
feel free to draw on recent intellectual currents to deploy tools and methodologies considered outside
the traditional law and society repertoire).
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alleging women's so-called lack of interest as a defense to sex discrimi-
nation, feminist groups' failure to systematically contest this obscure
defense in the courts and agencies, followed by renewed internal division
over questions of sex difference that signaled disagreement about
women's priorities, freed conservative judges to apply sex-biased
assumptions and evidentiary standards that uncritically ascribed unequal
employment patterns to women's own preferences. Similarly, in preg-
nancy discrimination cases, after initial waffling and hard-won victories
the feminist consensus in favor of comparing pregnancy to disability for
job-related purposes broke down, permitting courts to return to older
views of pregnancy as unique and unlike other disabilities to uphold
decisions denying pregnant women the same protections as similarly
disabled employees. These case studies highlight that Title VII setbacks
do not always arise from structural changes in employment, employment
discrimination, or the economy. Important legal reversals also result
from underlying continuities in conventional social attitudes. When
reformers fail to exert clear, strong, concerted pressure on legal institu-
tions to renounce stereotyped assumptions, the resulting void of informa-
tional accuracy and public accountability makes it possible for courts and
policymakers to resurrect the very biases the law was meant to eradicate.
Part IV looks ahead, asking what can be done. For the foreseeable
future, I argue, further progress will require continuing to challenge
difference as a rationale for inequality-this time contesting not only the
existence and relevance of alleged group-based differences, but also their
presumed stability and sources. Recent research confirms that many of
the very sex- and race-based differences cited to explain inequality at
work are instead actually created there through practices that elicit and
exaggerate the expected group-based behaviors, thus confirming negative
stereotypes and rationalizing further discrimination. This Part suggests
how such new evidence might be used to launch a renewed challenge to
workplace discrimination, one that seeks to change practices that foster a
negative sense of difference and division and ultimately aims to unite
employees across perceived boundaries of preexisting difference.
Ultimately, I conclude, taking employment discrimination seriously
requires taking sex difference seriously, continually confronting outdated
perceptions with emerging facts, overcoming preexisting divisions
through new connections, and clarifying that men and women from all
walks of life stand to gain from greater freedom to forge their own
identities and lives, as feminist reformers taught from the beginning.
I. TITLE VII'S IMPORTANT BUT LIMITED REACH
Each time I teach employment discrimination law, I begin the same
way. Conscious that most of my students have gone straight through
school without spending any real time in the working world, I tell them
that this body of law is important because work is important. In our
society, work not only provides the means to live; it also confers social
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status, dignity, and a sense of self.20 I read to my students testimonials to
work's significance by diverse thinkers: Adam Smith, Karl Marx,
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Herbert Hill.
21
To place the study of employment discrimination law into some
social and historical context, I describe the severe race- and sex-based
disparities that characterized the American labor force at the time of Title
VII's passage. I then quote Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1960s statement
about how inequality in employment profoundly affects everything else:
The principal measure of progress toward equality [is] that of em-
ployment. It is the primary source of individual or group identity. In
America what you do is what you are: to do nothing is to be nothing;
to do little is to be little. The equations are implacable and blunt, and
ruthlessly public.
22
Title VII is America's major achievement in acknowledging and
addressing these harsh realities. Recognizing work's significance and its
inequalities reminds us of why it is important to understand the lessons
and limits of the law. With these observations in mind, I assess below the
past fifty years, examining the overall advances that have occurred since
Title VII's passage, while also noting the areas of stalled progress, and
explicating the biased assumptions that undermine the law's promise.
A. Uneven Progress Toward Workplace Sex Equality
Title VII has catalyzed profound changes in the American work-
force. These changes have created possibilities for many women and
men that could scarcely be imagined before its enactment. The educa-
tional and employment opportunities available to me, for example, were
vastly different from and superior to the ones open to my mother.
Married as a teenager and unable to afford college, she worked her whole
life in pink-collar jobs, struggling for respect, decent pay, job security,
and ultimately the right to draw unemployment compensation when,
despite her successful performance, she was fired for having the temerity
20. For my own attempt to capture the meaning of work in people's lives, see Schultz, Life's
Work, supra note 14. For an illuminating discussion of this issue, see also MACLEAN, supra note 8,
at 6-7 (discussing how employment is "a key site in determining personal well-being and communal
power" and that American society has an "entrenched culture of exclusion that long restricted to
white men ... [the] most desirable jobs at all class levels").
21. Rosabeth Moss Kanter begins her classic book, Men and Women of the Corporation, by
observing:
The most distinguished advocate and the most distinguished critic of modem capitalism
were in agreement on one essential point: the job makes the person. Adam Smith and
Karl Marx both recognized the extent to which people's attitudes and behaviors take
shape out of the experiences they have in their work.
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 3 (1977); see also HERBERT
HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK, AND THE LAW 34 (1977)
(observing that "the most significant source of identity for western men and women" is work).
22. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 124 (1968) (quoting Daniel P. Moynihan).
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to challenge her superiors. By the time I came of age, the social land-
scape had changed enough to allow an upwardly mobile girl to move
away from home to attend a state university and to dare to become a
lawyer. My own teenage daughter inherits a world that is even more
open than her grandmother's or her mother's. In her first year of college,
she aspires to have a career in science or architecture, or both, undaunted
by the fact that these fields remain almost entirely populated by men.2
3
These generational changes reflect nothing short of a revolution.
My family's narrative provides a window into some of the
achievements and limits of the civil rights revolution for women.
24
Evidence suggests that today girls and women participate more fully and
25
perform better in school, at all levels, than boys and men. The gender
gap in employment and wages has declined significantly since the 1960s;
women now graduate from college at higher rates than men and have
made substantial gains in many professions.2 6 That said, overall trends in
occupational segregation by sex are telling, as they are an important
27
indicator of workplace inequality. In the 1970s, sex segregation
23. Evidence from extensive surveys and interviews suggests that sex and race discrimination
permeate the architectural profession. See, e.g., KATHRYN H. ANTHONY, DESIGNING FOR DIVERSITY:
GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN THE ARCHITECTURAL PROFESSION I-2, 133-65 (2001).
According to a 2012 American Institute of Architects survey, women make up 49% of architecture
students and 39% of interns, but only 17% of firm principals and partners. Amanda Kolson Hurley,
Double Whammy: Would There Be More Women in Architecture If There Were More Women in
Development?, ARCHITECT, Sept. 17, 2012, http://www.architectmagazine.com/architects/would-
there-be-more-women-architects-if-there-wer.aspx. Women are similarly underrepresented in the
sciences, comprising, according to a 2013 National Science Foundation report, only about 28% of
employed scientists and engineers, in a workforce that remains "largely white and male." NAT'L
CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG'G STATISTICS, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING: 2013, at 8 (2013), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ wmpd/2013/pdf/nsfl3304_full.pdf. Recent research suggests that sex
discrimination continues to plague the hard sciences. See, e.g., Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al.,
Science Faculty's Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16474,
16474 (2012), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/109/41/16474.full.pdf; Emesto Reuben,
Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, How Stereotypes Impair Women's Careers in Science, Ill PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 4403, 4403 (2014), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/Ill/
12/4403.full.pdf+html.
24. For the trends and sources cited in this paragraph and the next, I am indebted to a recent
summary by sociologist William Bielby. See generally William T. Bielby, The Challenge of
Effective Interventions: Alternative Paths to Minimizing Workplace Gender Bias, in GENDER &
WORK: CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM (2013), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/
conferences/2013-w50-research-symposium/Documents/bielby.pdf.
25. See THOMAS A. DIPRETE & CLAUDIA BUCHMANN, THE RISE OF WOMEN: THE GROWING
GENDER GAP IN EDUCATION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICAN SCHOOLS 27-29, 51, 79-81
(2013) (documenting female gains).
26. Id. at 27; David A. Cotter, Joan M. Hermsen & Reeve Vanneman, Gender Inequality at
Work, in THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: CENSUS 2000, at 107, 109 fig. 1, 116, tbl.5 (Reynolds Farley &
John Haaga, eds., 2005).
27. Occupational segregation deprives women of access to the typically higher paying
positions occupied mostly by men, reduces women's wages as compared to men, and robs them of
upward mobility and freedom of occupational choice. David A. Cotter, Joan M. Hermsen & Reeve
Vanneman, Still Stalled? Occupational Gender Desegregation 1950-2010, 3 (Aug. 2012) [herein-
after Cotter, Still Stalled] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (listing studies linking
segregation to pay differences, access to authority, and opportunities for advancement); Schultz,
Life's Work, supra note 14, at 1894 n.40 (citing studies explaining that occupational sex segregation
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declined dramatically for the first time, as women moved into fields
formerly populated by men.28 Integration continued, but he rate declined
in the 1980s, slowed in the 1990s, and stalled completely by 2000.29
These early gains occurred mainly because women moved into
formerly male middle-class jobs, and because integrated sectors of the
economy expanded more than male-dominated sectors such as manufac-
turing.30  Overall, more progress has occurred for college-educated
women than for less educated women,3' and more for white women than
for Black women, whose progress began to stall in the 1980s.32 Future
strides in achieving integration and deriving the associated benefits will
require making more progress for these women, as well as moving
substantial numbers of men into traditionally female jobs.33 Not only do
women in blue- and pink-collar fields continue to face barriers: Well-
educated women still have difficulty moving into the top echelons of the
corporate and professional worlds,34 and mothers face wage penalties and
promotional limits that fathers do not.
35
is the largest reason for the male-female wage gap); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1757 n.394 (1998) [hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing]
(same); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work. Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1749, 1751 n.2 (1990) [hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories] (same). Part of this wage gap is
due to overcrowding, even in the jobs traditionally held by women. See David A. Cotter et al., All
Women Benefit: The Macro-Level Effect of Occupational Integration on Gender Earnings Equality,
62 AM. Soc. REV. 714, 715, 726, 728 (1997). Being relegated to different forms of employment also
negatively affects women's social status and creates a sense that they are second-class citizens.
MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 6-7 (explaining the sense of stigma and ostracism that people who are
confined to a restricted range of less desirable jobs feel); Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra, at
1756-61 (explaining the link between occupational sex segregation and hostile work environment
harassment); Schultz, Telling Stories, supra, at 1751 n.2 (explaining how jobs done predominantly
by women tend to have less prestige than those done by men).
28. Cotter, Still Stalled, supra note 27, at 11.
29. See id at 14.
30. Bielby, supra note 24, at 6; Cotter, Still Stalled, supra note 27, at 11-13, 15.
31. KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, DOCUMENTING DESEGREGATION:
RACIAL AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT 224 (2012) (finding that "industries that require a higher proportion of their employees to hold
college degrees tend to exhibit lower levels of segregation and higher employment of white women,
black women, and black men in good-quality jobs").
32. Id. at 167-69, 245 (showing that progress toward gender integration stalled for Black
women in the 1980s, and that occupational segregation by race between white and Black women
increased in 43% of industrial categories from 1990 to 2005).
33. Bielby, supra note 24, at 6 (citing Cotter, Still Stalled, supra note 27, at 15).
34. For recent evidence, see Douglas M. Branson, Pathways for Women to Senior Manage-
ment Positions and Board Seats: An A to Z List, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1555, 1555, which showed
that
[a]lthough women have been graduated from law, graduate business (MBA), and medical
schools since the mid-1970s at a 30% rate, escalating to well over 40% in the 1990s,
women constitute only 3.5% of the corporate CEOs, 14% of the executive managers, and
12.5% of the corporate directors, holding approximately 16% of the board seats in the
Fortune 500.
For an earlier federal government report investigating the low number of women and minorities in
executive positions, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE 6
(1991), which found in a three-year study of Fortune 1000 companies that women represented 37.2%
of employees, 16.9% of management, and 6.6% of executive-level management. This report used the
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Despite these uneven gains, a broad snapshot of Title VII law's
achievements taken today would reveal a far different picture than one
taken in 1964: Congress, courts, agencies, state governments, employers,
and labor unions have assembled a vast and impressive set of regulatory
protections against sex discrimination. These laws and policies prohibit
forms of discrimination that had not been conceived, let alone articu-
lated, when Title VII was enacted. Who would have imagined the law
addressing single-sex hiring, sex-plus discrimination, disparate impact
discrimination, sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination, intersec-
tional discrimination, affirmative action, sex stereotyping, same-sex
harassment, caregiver discrimination, discrimination based on gender
identity, and, within the foreseeable future, sexual orientation?36 Or
predicted that these rulings would be extended to men as well as
women,37 creating possibilities for greater movement and understanding
across previously settled boundaries of sex and gender?
As important as it is to acknowledge the overall progress, such a
snapshot view obscures the difficult process of achieving change under
Title VII-the resistance, defeats, and sheer struggle that preceded and
often accompanied its hard-won safeguards.
B. Persistent Bias About Sex Difference
From the beginning, those who sought to eliminate workplace sex
discrimination have had to confront society's widespread failure to take
term "glass ceiling" to refer to "those artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias
that prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward in their organization into management
level positions." Id. at 1.
35. See, e.g., Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM.
Soc. REV. 204, 219 (2001) (finding a motherhood wage penalty of about 7% per child for young
American women); Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrier to
Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (using the term "matemal wall" to describe
the discrimination that mothers, as opposed to women generally, face in the labor market).
36. For examples of these developments roughly in the order in which they occurred, see Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (single-sex hiring); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (sex-plus discrimination); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (disparate impact discrimination); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
990-92 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quid pro quo harassment); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)) (pregnancy discrimination);
Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-35 (5th Cir. 1980) (intersectional
discrimination); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 52 (1989) (sex stereotyping); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-81 (1998) (same-sex harassment); EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES (2007) (caregiver discrimination); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293,
307-08 (D.D.C. 2008) (gender identity discrimination); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (sexual orientation discrimination).
37. For an early example, see Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386-88, where the court invalidated female-
only hiring for flight attendants in a challenge brought by a male plaintiff. For a more recent case,
see Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-81, where the Court held that Title VII permits male plaintiffs to sue for
hostile work environment perpetrated by male supervisors and coworkers. For a discussion of the
importance to men of challenging occupational sex segregation and other prescribed gender roles,
see infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
2015] 1009
1010 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 91:5
women as seriously as men in the realm of employment. Historically,
workplace inequalities between men and women have been based on a
biased set of attitudes and assumptions casting women as secondary
workersa-reluctant entrants to the world of work who are not as
serious, or to be taken as seriously, in their career or job roles. Women
may work for a living, according to this view, but that does not make
them equal to their male counterparts. Even when they are employed,
women remain fundamentally creatures of the family and not of the
workplace. Thus, when they work, women will naturally be found in jobs
that reflect their differences and befit their status as secondary, less
skilled, less stable workers.39
Underlying this view is a complex set of overgeneralized assump-
tions-or stereotypes 4-about sex differences between women and men.Oversimplified, the key assumptions include the following:
1. Women are different from men in fundamental ways that affect
their work preferences, commitments, and capacities. Women are
emotional, men are logical; women are cooperative, men are competi-
tive; women are weak, men are strong; women are passive, men are
active; women are caring, men are competent; and so on.4' Women's
distinctive attributes suit them for allegedly more nurturing family roles,
while men are better suited for more competitive work roles.42
38. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 3-15 (giving a historical overview of how such
sex-biased assumptions led to and legitimated women's lack of economic citizenship and second-
class status as workers); see also Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 14, at 1892-94, 1898. In earlier
work, I used the term "inauthentic workers" to refer to the ongoing, biased view of women as
earners, see, e.g., id at 1892, even though I was acutely aware of its inadequacies. For one thing, the
term "workers" is both over- and under-inclusive of the many types of formal and informal
arrangements under which people work for pay; the word also has a blue-collar ring that does not
begin to capture the diversity of people's work experiences. The term "inauthentic" is similarly
problematic. The reference to authenticity was not meant to imply that there is a set of subjective or
objective experiences that somehow defines the essence of being a genuine or "real" worker. Rather,
it was meant to suggest that, whatever the traits or qualities thought to define being a competent,
capable, committed worker, women are often regarded as lacking them.
39. See generally KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 241 (explaining that, as late as the eve of
Title VII, "[m]any continued to view women's marginal places in the workforce as natural, even
positive, corollaries to prevailing family roles rather than as products of prejudice, bias, or
discrimination").
40. Social psychologists define stereotypes as "associations and beliefs about the characteris-
tics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people think about and respond to the
group." John F. Dovidio et al., Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and
Empirical Overview, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND
DISCRIMINATION 3, 8 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter SAGE HANDBOOK].
41. See, e.g., Peter Glick & Laurie A. Rudman, Sexism, in SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 40,
at 328, 330, 332-33 (collecting studies showing that across many cultures men are assigned traits
associated with power, status, activity, and competence, while women are assigned the opposite
ones); CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY GENDER: How GENDER INEQUALITY PERSISTS IN THE
MODERN WORLD 58 (2011) ("Men are rated more highly than women on agentic qualities such as
instrumental competence, assertiveness, confidence, independence, forcefulness, and dominance.
Women are rated more highly than men on communal attributes such as emotional expressiveness,
nurturance, interpersonal sensitivity, kindness, and responsiveness.").
42. See, e.g., Glick & Rudman, supra note 41, at 334 (citing research finding that women are
valued for being "warm, kind, interested in children, loyal, and sensitive-traits that most directly
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2. Women are committed first and foremost to their domestic roles,
most importantly to their roles as mothers. As a result, women automati-
cally prioritize family life over paid work and prefer jobs that more
readily accommodate their family responsibilities or attach greater
reward to their distinctively feminine attributes or values.
4 3
3. As a result of their distinctive attributes, women do not have the
same level of commitment to paid work as men, nor do they develop the
same level of work competence,"4 particularly in fields that reward and
rely on what are seen as distinctively masculine traits.45
4. These sex differences are fundamental and relatively fixed.
Rooted in women's nature or psychology or deep-seated social
conditioning, these early preferences persist over time and drive
women's job choices and behavior throughout their lives.46
5. Thus, according to this view, patterns that appear to reflect dis-
crimination or inequality at work are actually a manifestation of
women's basic differences from men-sex differences that make women
less interested in and less qualified for the jobs typically held by men.
suit them to their prescribed role as doting mothers and loyal wives," while men are valued for
"business sense, athleticism, leadership ability, and self-reliance-traits that fit their traditional role
as protectors... and providers"); Amy J. C. Cuddy & Susan T. Fiske, When Professionals Become
Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 706 (2004) (observing that "[t]he
belief that women should be the primary caregivers and men the primary breadwinners is a long-
standing part of traditional American culture. To view working moms as more motherly than
professional, as more nurturing than task-oriented, upholds the social structure that advances this
caregiver/breadwinner ideology" (citation omitted)).
43. Sociologist Mary Blair-Loy calls this key assumption the "family devotion schema"-the
idea that "[w]omen's devotion to the family trumps all other commitments" and that "[e]ven if they
also do paid work, their primary duty lies in giving their children absorbing and time-consuming
care." MARY BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY AMONG WOMEN
EXECUTIVES 52 (2003). She defines schemas as "frameworks for viewing, filtering, understanding,
and evaluating what we know as reality." Id. at 5. She concludes that even though this schema was
challenged by women's rights activists in the 1970s, "[n]onetheless, the family devotion schema
maintains a strong grip on many people's hearts and minds." Id. at 52. Psychologists, as early as the
1970s, confirmed the existence of this schema. See, e.g., Nancy Felipe Russo, The Motherhood
Mandate, 32 J. SOC. ISSUES 143, 144 (1976). Modem studies in both experimental and real-world
settings confirm the perceived tension between mothers' devotion to family and dedication to work.
See, e.g., Shelly J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood
Penalty?, 112 AM. J. Soc. 1297, 1298, 1306-07, 1326 (2007).
44. See, e.g., Monica Biemat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-Based Standards of
Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for Devalued Groups, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 544, 544 (1997) (showing women were perceived to be less
competent than men and thus given lower minimum competency standards); see also Cuddy &
Fiske, supra note 42, at 711, 715 (reporting that when working women become mothers, they are
viewed as more warm but less competent and less committed to their jobs, whereas when men
become fathers, they are viewed as more warm, yet still just as competent).
45. See, e.g., Glick & Rudman, supra note 41, at 331 (collecting research finding that women
are not viewed more negatively or treated less favorably than men in all contexts, but rather only
selectively so when they occupy allegedly masculine domains, including occupational and other
powerful social roles typically associated with males).
46. See Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 14, at 1892-98 (discussing this presumption and
related social science research).
1012 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:5
I have stated these assumptions in descriptive terms, but stereotypes
have both descriptive and prescriptive elements, simultaneously project-
ing a set of distinctive group-based characteristics onto a group of people
and implicitly conveying expectations about how members of that group
should behave.47 Restating the assertions prescriptively goes something
like this: Women are better suited for domestic roles, so they should
prioritize and perform them. Women should sacrifice or cut back on their
work roles, ceding workplace supremacy to men. When women do work
for pay, they should stick to jobs that honor their femininity and family
roles and not pursue jobs for which men are better suited. And so on.
Three important points bear emphasizing here. First, this view of
women and work is race-biased, and undoubtedly biased along other
axes of inequality, as social expectations and assumptions vary for
different women and in different contexts. Black women, for example,
are subject to different pressures and stereotypes concerning work than
white women.4 8 Black women are expected to work for pay, often at the
most difficult, low-paying jobs, regardless of their status as mothers.49
There is evidence that Black mothers themselves are more likely to
consider maternal employment ideal for children and are more likely to
be employed, than other groups.50 Despite these patterns, persistent
stereotypes still portray Black women as less committed to and less
capable in their jobs.51 Latina women, especially the foreign born, are
47. Dovidio et al., supra note 40, at 7-8; see also Glick & Rudman, supra note 41, at 334,
336-40 (discussing descriptive and prescriptive dimensions of stereotypes).
48. See, e.g., Irene Browne & Ivy Kennelly, Stereotypes and Realities: Images of Black
Women in the Labor Market, in LATINAS AND AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AT WORK: RACE,
GENDER, AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 302, 302-26 (Irene Browne ed., 1999) (finding that
employers hold negative stereotypes that re specific to Black women); Judith A. Winston, Mirror,
Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 775, 784-86 (1991) (concluding that race and sex stereotyping
"ha[ve] deeply affected the employment experience of women of color" and providing a brief
historical overview of the experiences of Black women in the United States and the associated
stereotypes).
49. See, e.g., Amy J. C. Cuddy & Elizabeth Baily Wolf, Prescriptions and Punishments for
Working Moms: How Race and Work Status Affect Judgments of Mothers, in GENDER & WORK:
CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, supra note 24, at 4 (observing that, "dating back to
slavery, Black mothers have been [and continue to be] expected to participate in the labor force,"
while "white mothers are expected to stay home with their children"); cf id. at 7-9 (finding in
experiments that white mothers were viewed as more hard-working if they stayed home with their
children than if they worked for pay, whereas Black mothers were viewed as more hard-working if
they worked for pay than if they stayed home with their children).
50. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, FROM 1997 TO 2007: FEWER MOTHERS PREFER FULL-TIME
WORK 5 (2007), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/WomenWorking.pdf
(finding that "African-American mothers ... are more likely than white or Hispanic mothers to
consider employed moms-especially full-time working moms-ideal for children"); U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 18-19 (2014), available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cpslwomenlaborforce 2013.pdf (reporting that 75.3% of all Black
women with children under the age of 18 were in the labor force, compared with 70.6% of similar
white women, 63.6% of similar Asian women and 64.0% of similar Hispanic women).
51. See, e.g., Browne & Kennelly, supra note 48, at 319-20 (finding that white employers
assumed Black female employees were single parents even though a majority were not, and also
assumed that their status as single parents would lead to poor job performance); Ashleigh Shelby
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also subjected to negative stereotypes, assumed to be undocumented
immigrants who are not only working, but also reproducing irresponsibly
and depleting public resources.52 Lesbians, by contrast, frequently are
assumed to be childless by choice and thus may be perceived as more
committed to their jobs and less negatively affected by motherhood, than
most other women.53
Second, and relatedly, then, the overarching cultural schema does
not presume that women do not or should not ever work for pay; it
acknowledges that many do so. The understanding is, rather, that women
who work will prefer and prepare for different jobs than men-typically,
traditionally female jobs believed to be especially fitting for the particu-
lar women based on applicable stereotypes. For some women, the
imagined job fit will turn on the perceived constraints of family roles; for
others, it will turn on constraints attributed to physical or cultural
differences. Ultimately, however, although the specific content of the
stereotypes may vary by race, class, and other social characteristics, the
overarching view of women as secondary workers remains, rationalizing
not primarily women's total exclusion from, but instead their subordinate
position within, the world of work.
Finally, it is worth underscoring that this biased view of women has
important implications for men, as well as women. Overall, assumptions
about sex differences justify a system of occupational segregation by sex
(stratified by race, class, and so on) that relegates different groups of
women to separate and unequal jobs, while reserving many superior
opportunities for men. This set of arrangements benefits men unevenly,
just as it does women. Furthermore, the same biased system that assigns
certain preconceived attributes and roles to women assigns other corre-
sponding ones to men. Thus, ultimately, these biases limit equality and
freedom for both sexes in the name of sex difference, as discussed more
fully below.
Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expectations orEmphasize
Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 407, 409 & n.15 (2007) (stating that "traditional
American culture views Black women . . . as less intelligent, competent, and dependable in their
professional positions than their White counterparts" and citing studies to support this point).
52. See, e.g., ALEJANDRA MARCHEVSKY & JEANNE THEOHARIS, NOT WORKING: LATINA
IMMIGRANTS, LoW-WAGE JOBS, AND THE FAILURE OF WELFARE REFORM 16-17 (2006).
53. Unlike other women, lesbians are frequently assumed not to wish to bear or raise children.
See, e.g., Letitia Anne Peplau & Adam Fingerhut, The Paradox of the Lesbian Worker, 60 J. Soc.
ISSUES 719, 727 (2004) (citing Mary E. Kite & Kay Deaux, Gender Belief Systems: Homosexuality
and the Implicit Inversion Theory, II PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 83, 88 (1987)). However, a significant
number of lesbians do have or want children. See DAVID M. BRODZINSKY & ADAM PERTMAN,
ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: A NEW DIMENSION IN FAMILY DIVERSITY 13 (2011)
(stating that one in three lesbian women in the United States are raising children and 41% of
childless lesbians expressed a desire to parent a child). Studies reveal that lesbians may be
stereotyped as being more committed to employment than heterosexual women, particularly when
they become mothers, and that other people may assume heterosexual women have male bread-
winners to support them while lesbian mothers are the breadwinners who now have additional
financial responsibilities. See, e.g., Peplau & Fingerhut, supra, at 728-33.
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II. EARLY STRUGGLES OVER THE MEANING OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
The image of women as secondary workers is deeply embedded in
our nation's history, culture, and institutions; it is therefore unsurprising
that this image has influenced interpretations of the law. From Title VII's
inception, politicians, policymakers, the press, and even the agency
officials charged with enforcing the statute endorsed these old stereo-
types, exhibiting many of the same discriminatory attitudes that women
faced from their employers and coworkers. Women's rights activists
resisted, appealing to public support to secure interpretations that would
promote equality on many levels: interpretations of Title VII as a
genuine response to a social problem, not a fluke; interpretations of
women workers as serious, not secondary; interpretations of sex-
segregated employment as a reflection of discrimination, not choice; and
so on. Congress, the agencies, and the courts responded. Over time,
genuine legal innovation and social change occurred.
This Part examines the conflicts over interpretation that surrounded
Title VII's passage, when activists struggled to rescue the statute from
readings that would drain its transformative power. Scholars have
highlighted the role of administrative agencies in implementing broad
statutes like Title VII as a crucial part of the process of establishing
constitutional norms.54 The account here draws on such analyses, but
isolates key factors not emphasized in earlier work, including the
importance of visible unity of the action and advocacy within a social
movement that aspires to influence the law. This Part shows that, when
feminists were able to come together and convey a single, clear demand
for the same rights as men, they succeeded in persuading the enforce-
ment agencies, Congress, and the courts to take sex discrimination
seriously. Conversely, Part III will show how retrenchment occurred in
areas where women's rights advocates took conflicting stances or had
little or no presence.
A. The Storied Enactment of the Sex Amendment as a Joke
Title VII's adoption sparked an ongoing debate over how to con-
strue the origins and purpose of the sex discrimination provision. Almost
immediately, diverse sources coalesced to create a story of origins that
disparaged women's right, and even need, to be protected from work-
place discrimination.55 In this standard story, the amendment banning sex
discrimination was a ploy, introduced by southern Congressman Howard
54. William Eskridge, for example, has done important work in this vein. See ESKRIDGE &
FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 263-90; supra notes 6-8, 18.
55. For an early discussion of the biased nature of the conventional account, see Schultz,
Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1788 & n.149 (criticizing the conventional account of Title VII's
sex provision as a joke and using the term "story of origins" to refer to it as one of "the constitutive
myths and ideals we ascribe both to [T]itle VII's ban on sex discrimination, and to ourselves as a
nation and as a people in having enacted the legislation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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W. Smith in a last-ditch effort to defeat the Civil Rights Act and not to
address any serious problem.56 From the beginning, the news media
promoted this view, belittling the problems faced by working women.
57
Popular accounts of the day disseminated the story of Title VII's ban on
sex discrimination as a joke, spreading it into everyday culture.58
Ironically, it was officials at the new agency charged with enforcing
the provision, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
who may have done the most to publicize the standard story, lending its
biased assumptions an official stamp of approval.59 The first chair of the
EEOC, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., told the news media that civil rights
opponent Congressman Smith added the sex amendment at the last
minute to create "ridicule and confusion."60 Herman Edelsberg, Execu-
tive Director of the EEOC from 1 965 to 1967, called the sex discrimina-
tion provision "a fluke . . . conceived out of wedlock," that "doesn't
carry the same moral overtones as race."6' EEOC staff attorney David
Zugschwerdt stated that sex discrimination was not even on the EEOC's
radar because it had come into Title VII "as essentially a ploy by the
opponents to try to derail the legislation."62 EEOC Executive Director N.
Thompson Powers stated that "the Commission [was] very much aware
of the importance of not becoming known as the 'sex commission."
63
Over the years, the conventional account of the sex provision as a
joke was repeated so often, by so many sources, that it achieved a kind of
mythical status, becoming the standard legislative history.64 Law review
articles and treatises on employment discrimination law picked up on the
narrative and promoted it in legal circles,65  and judicial decisions
56. Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History
of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137-42
(1997); Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1788.
57. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 72; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 111-12. For additional examples,
see Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think
Title VIls Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 417-19
(2009) (collecting newspaper articles).
58. See, e.g., CAROLINE BIRD WITH SARA WELLES BRILLER, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST
OF KEEPING WOMEN DOWN 1- 19 (1968).
59. For criticism of the EEOC's stance, see GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 205-32; HARRISON,
supra note 8, at 187-91; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 111-19; Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson,
Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII
Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1084-85 (1992).
60. Osterman, supra note 57, at 416 (quoting Edith Evans Asbury, Protest Proposed on
Women's Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1965, at 32) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 248
(quoting a comment from Aileen C. Hemandez, the only female EEOC Commissioner, that she had
"found no humor in the frequently repeated statement that 'sex' had found its way into Title VII as a
'fluke'-that it was a 'joke'-that it did not need to be enforced-that the 'real' discrimination in
society was on the basis of race and ethnic origin and that's where the emphasis of the commission
should be directed" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
62. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 113.
63. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1085 n.33.
65. See, e.g., ARTHUR B. SMITH, JR., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 327 (1978);
Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil
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followed suit. Supreme Court opinions reiterated that Congressman
Smith proposed the sex amendment o Title VII "at the last minute on the
floor of the House'66 "as an attempt to thwart [its] passage.,67 Lower
court judges across the country repeated this account of the "notorious
civil rights opponent" whose attempt to add the sex provision as a joke
"backfired.,68 Even non-legal academic accounts adopted this conven-
tional interpretation, portraying the sex amendment as "the result of a
deliberate ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle it",69 that was enacted only as
an "[a]ccidental [b]reakthrough.,70 To this day, the EEOC's website still
reflects that view.7'
This stock story about Title VII's origins has not gone unchal-
lenged. From the beginning, commentators offered more complex
explanations. Numerous scholarly accounts acknowledge that Congress-
man Smith was an opponent of the civil rights bill and that he introduced
the sex amendment in a mocking tone that hardly suggests an earnest
support for women's rights.72 But they deny that these events tell the
whole story.
One body of work places the passage of the sex amendment in a
feminist context, emphasizing efforts by the National Women's Party
(NWP) and its leader Alice Paul to add the sex provision and the group's
long history of activism to secure equal rights for women,73 the important
Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 917 (1978); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 441-42 (1966); Developments in the Law: Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971)
[hereinafter, Developments in the Law].
66. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
67. Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 190 n.4 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); see Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1381 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976);
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2001); see also Bird, supra
note 56, at 137, 140-41 (collecting Supreme Court and lower court cases).
69. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 234 (1985).
70. GARY ORFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL POWER: CONGRESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 299 (1975);
see also ROBERT M. GUION, ASSESSMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND PREDICTION FOR PERSONNEL
DECISIONS 166 (1998) (stating that sex was added to Title VII by an opponent of the Civil Rights
Act "in a misguided and unsuccessful effort to derail support for the proposed Act").
71. Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html (last visited July 5, 2015) (noting that
the EEOC was surprised to receive so many charges of sex discrimination because "[a]fter all, the
prohibition against sex discrimination had been added as a last minute amendment by Congressman
Howard Smith of Virginia who opposed the civil rights legislation and thought that Congress would
reject a bill that mandated equal rights for women").
72. Indeed, Smith's remarks prompted a patronizing debate that came to be known as "Ladies
Day in the House." Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII Persistent Opportunism as a Maker
of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 163, 176-77 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. The National Women's Party (NWP) was a women's rights group founded in 1913 by
Alice Paul in a suffragist campaign. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 136. The NWP had been lobbying for
the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) since 1923 and "represented the views of elite,
white, affluent, professional, and highly educated women." Id. When the President's Commission on
the Status of Women, see infra note 75, rejected the ERA, the NWP decided to focus on the passage
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work of lawyer-activist Pauli Murray to persuade other groups to join the
NWP in supporting the sex provision,74 the earlier attention to workplace
sex discrimination generated by the report of the President's Commission
on the Status of Women75 and hearings on the Equal Pay Act, 76 and the
strong support and passionate speeches given by women who were in
Congress at the time, led by Representative Margaret Griffiths.77 The
publication in 1963 of Betty Friedan's best-selling book, The Feminine
Mystique,8 had captured and catalyzed a growing sense of discontent
about traditional sex roles among American women.79 Although some
of Title VII. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 137; Bird, supra note 56, at 148-50. Alice Paul and the NWP
saw a connection between Black rights and women's rights and reached out to Congressman Smith
to work on adding sex to Title VII. Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and
the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37, 39-
43 (1983).
74. Pauli Murray was a Black civil rights lawyer who attended law school to become a civil
rights lawyer. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE, supra note 5, at 207. While law school "equipped
[Murray] for effective struggle against Jim Crow," it was also the place where she "first became
conscious of the twin evil of discriminatory sex bias, which [she] quickly labeled Jane Crow." Id. at
227 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Jane Crow idea, that sex discrimination and race
discrimination rested upon the same rationalizations, was key for progressive women in the 1950s
and 1960s. See id. at 233; MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 120; MAYERI, supra note 8, at 3-4, 14-23.
Pauli Murray's memorandum demonstrating the similarities between race and sex discrimination and
emphasizing the importance of adding sex to Title VII for Black women played an important role in
persuading Congress to add the sex provision. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 121; MAYERI, supra note
8, at 22; Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2128-29. Murray's writings, ideas, participation in
early women's rights groups such as the President's Commission on the Status of Women, and
active role in founding the National Organization for Women all made important contributions to the
formation of modem feminism and the development of legal protections against sex discrimination.
See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 8, at 126-34; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 229-34, 245, 258-
59, 287-88; MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 119-22. For more on Murray's life and influence, see
MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE, supra note 5, at 207-33.
75. In 1961, President Kennedy established the President's Commission on the Status of
Women (PCSW), which "served as a consciousness-raising and idea-sharing forum for feminist
lawyers." Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2128-29. Although the PCSW rejected the idea
that race and sex discrimination were similar and eventually opposed the inclusion of sex in Title
VII, Bird, supra note 56, at 153-54; Freeman, supra note 72, at 172, the PCSW's 1963 report was a
bestseller that drew the nation's attention to sex discrimination. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 134-36;
Freeman, supra note 72, at 168-69.
76. One of the PCSW's primary initiatives was passage of the Equal Pay Act in 1963.
GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 207; Osterman, supra note 57, at 419. Congress held three public hearings
in connection with the bill, such that, "by the time President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act into
law on June 10, 1963, both Houses had heard ample testimony on the problems faced by women in
the labor force." Freeman, supra note 72, at 168.
77. Bird, supra note 56, at 155-56 (noting that the five congresswomen, led by Martha
Griffiths, who spoke in favor of the sex amendment "revitalized the debate" and "represented a
larger alliance committed to adding sex protections to Title VII"); Brauer, supra note 73, at 49-50
(stating that Congresswoman Griffiths argued that a vote by a white man against the sex amendment
was "a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daughter, or his sister" and that her argument
influenced nine southern congressmen, who "supported their cause on grounds of chivalry, equity,
practicality, and emotion" (internal quotation mark omitted)); Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two
Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of
Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453, 463-65 (1981) (explaining that Martha Griffiths'
testimony "planted fresh seeds or fertilized dormant ones in [the] minds [of] all subsequent speakers
in favor of the amendment"). Eleven of the twelve women in the House voted in favor of the sex
amendment. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 178-79.
78. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
79. Friedan's best-selling book discussed the harms experienced by women who were
consigned to the status of homemakers and expected to live through their husbands and children
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older, protectionist women's groups opposed Title VII for fear the statute
would invalidate state laws that placed limits on women's employment in
the name of protecting their special reproductive roles,80 that position did
not prevail. These laws and their supporters would soon be overtaken by
a revitalized, new egalitarian women's movement that would aim to give
women the same rights and opportunities as male workers, rather than
special protections.8
A second body of work stresses the complexity of the political con-
text at the time, concluding that Congress's motivation for passing the
sex amendment could not have been exclusively or primarily to defeat
the civil rights bill.8 2 As this research points out, the House of Repre-
sentatives rejected other amendments that would have similarly "clut-
tered up" the bill with unpopular provisions, including sex amendments
rather than having independent work of their own. The book became a popular manifesto,
encouraging women to challenge their lot and "destroying, single-handedly and almost overnight,
the 1950s consensus that women's place was in the home." STEPHANIE COONTZ, A STRANGE
STIRRING: THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE AND AMERICAN WOMEN AT THE DAWN OF THE 1960S, at xv
(2011); ROSEN, supra note 2, at 4-8 (noting that The Feminine Mystique "was not without
shortcomings" but "broke[] the silence and... beg[a]n unmasking the reality of women's lives").
80. Since the 1920s, most states had laws that limited women's employment by restricting
their hours of work, imposing weight lifting limits, prescribing rest periods, or denying them access
to occupations considered dangerous for women. Commonly known as protective labor legislation,
these laws required all women to be treated differently from men in the name of protecting their
"special responsibilities as mothers and home-makers" and their unique "physical qualities."
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 259-60 (internal quotation marks omitted). For decades, these
protective labor laws had been hotly debated among women. Groups who supported the Equal
Rights Amendment, such as the NWP and the National Federation of Business and Professional
Women, had declared that such laws discriminated against women by limiting their employment
options and preventing them from competing with men. In contrast, more traditional women's
groups and organized labor considered these laws a great achievement because th y afforded crucial
protections to less skilled female workers, who lacked the bargaining power to secure them on their
own. See GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 205-06; HARRISON, supra note 8, at 7-15; KESSLER-HARRIS,
supra note 8, at 261-62; see also LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS
AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 53-56 (1998) (showing that a prominent strand of
women's rights leaders from the 1890s to the 1930s were "matemalist[s]" who supported protective
labor legislation recognizing the special reproductive roles of working mothers (internal quotation
marks omitted)). These latter, protectionist groups found a base in the Department of Labor's
Women's Bureau, created in 1920 and directed in the early 1960s by Esther Peterson, who also led
the PCSW in the Kennedy Administration and went on to become Assistant Secretary of Labor in
the Johnson Administration. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 206; HARRISON, supra note 8, at 109-65.
Under Peterson, the Women's Bureau worked with Representatives Emanuel Cellar and Edith Green
to try to defeat the sex amendment to Title VII. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 207; HARRISON, supra
note 8, at 177-78. Green was the sole female member of Congress who opposed the amendment. Id.
at 179. Both Peterson and Green later came to support Title VII. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at
262-63; Freeman, supra note 72, at 179.
81. Opposition to sex-specific labor protections was building, as part of a growing sense of
discontent among American women that the Second Wave women's movement would capture and
articulate, ultimately, challenging the entire socioeconomic system of separate roles for men and
women, sometimes known as the sexual division of labor or the family wage system. See MACLEAN,
supra note 8, at 149 (describing the women's movement's awakening resistance to this system);
ROSEN, supra note 2, at 63-140 (same).
82. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 56, at 138, 158-60; Brauer, supra note 73, at 53-55; Freeman,
supra note 72, at 164-65, 177-79; Gold, supra note 77, at 460-63, 467-69.
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to other titles.83 Many members showed up to vote only in favor of Title
VII's sex amendment, leading to the largest count of votes that day.84 In
fact, the House approved Title VII's sex amendment not once but twice,
the second time knowing the civil rights bill would pass and thus the
amendment would not defeat the legislation.85 The Johnson administra-
tion did not oppose the amendment once it passed the House, and
women's rights groups worked with Senator Margaret Chase Smith to
overcome resistance in the Senate, where opponents eventually bowed to
"the wrath of the women."
86
A related line of research emphasizes the multi-faceted motivations
and arguments of the amendment's supporters, some of whom saw no
contradiction between opposing civil rights and supporting women's
rights.87 Some leaders of the NWP, for example, harbored racist views.
88
Other leaders, such as Representative Martha Griffiths, supported civil
rights, but defended the sex amendment by appealing to race and arguing
(fallaciously, from today's perspective) that if Congress banned race
discrimination and did not similarly ban sex discrimination, white
women would lose out to Black women and Black men.89 Prominent
African-American lawyer Pauli Murray contended, more accurately, that
without the sex amendment, Black women would lose out to Black
men.90 Martha Griffiths also appealed to class, arguing that the laws
allegedly protecting women from unpleasant jobs enabled men to
unfairly monopolize higher paying jobs at the expense of working-class
women.
9 1
Although the history of Title VII's sex amendment is complicated
and subject to more than one interpretation, the overall conclusion that
83. Freeman, supra note 72, at 177-78; see also GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 138 (noting that
Congressman Dowdy tried to add an amendment making age a protected category in order to derail
the bill, but was defeated by a standing vote of 94 to 123).
84. Freeman, supra note 72, at 178.
85. Gold, supra note 77, at 461. According to Gold, the House of Representatives first voted
on the Smith amendment alone on February 8. Id. The vote was informal and non-binding because
the House was sitting as a committee of the whole. The count on this first vote was 168 to 133.
Freeman, supra note 72, at 177. Before the House voted on the entire amended bill, a revote was
taken on the Smith amendment. The House thus ended up approving the amendment twice, ulti-
mately passing the entire bill by a vote of 290 to 130. Gold, supra note 77, at 461.
86. Brauer, supra note 73, at 54-55 (internal quotation mark omitted); Freeman, supra note
72, at 179.
87. See, e.g., KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 239-46; Brauer, supra note 73, at 42-56.
88. During the House debate, a Republican congresswoman read into the record a letter from
the chair of the NWP that "implored Congress to 'prevent a mongrel race in the United States,"'
MAYERI, supra note 8, at 21, and stated that civil rights statutes excluding sex could be interpreted
"in a way that has discriminated against the white, native bom American woman of Christian
religion." KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). Not all NWP
members were racist, however, and many supported the civil rights movement. MAYERI, supra note
8, at 21-22.
89. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 179; MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 118; Brauer, supra note 73,
at 49-50.
90. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 121; MAYER, supra note 8, at 21-22.
91. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 179.
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emerges from this research is that the sex amendment was neither a
strategic error by civil rights opponents nor an accident, but rather the
result of "a small but dedicated group of women, in and out of Congress,
who knew how to take advantage of the momentum generated by a larger
social movement to promote their own goals, and a larger group of
Congressmen willing to make an affirmative statement in favor of
women's rights."
92
In light of the sex amendment's complex legislative and social
history, it is misleading and harmful to reduce the ban on sex discrimina-
tion to a joke, as a new generation of scholars interested in women's
rights reiterates.93 This mythical reading reinforces the idea of women as
secondary workers, depicting women's interests as so far outside the
realm of employment that it is inconceivable that Congress would redress
workplace sex discrimination as a serious social problem. Even at the
time of Title VII's enactment, women's rights groups and their allies
understood the threat posed by the patronizing account of the sex
provision as a joke. Activists tried to counter this misconception with a
public relations campaign that included sending letters to media outlets
and top officials at the EEOC, as well as statements of support from
labor unions.94 Representative Martha Griffiths even returned to the floor
of the House of Representatives in 1966 to criticize the EEOC's reading
of the sex amendment as a joke.95 Despite their protests, the weight of
authorities buried the truth and espoused the popular version of the story.
The inaccurate interpretation found favor with some news media. At
the time of Title VII's enactment, the New Republic asked, "Why should
a mischievous joke perpetrated on the floor of the House of Representa-
tives be treated by a responsible administrative body with this kind of
seriousness?'96 The New York Times trivialized the sex amendment by
calling it the "Bunny Law" after hearing that someone at a White House
conference on equal opportunity had wondered if Title VII would require
Playboy to employ male bunnies.9 7 The Wall Street Journal responded
by declaring that "the 'Bunny' is safe" because the "boos from lady fans"
92. Freeman, supra note 72, at 183; see also Bird, supra note 56, at 161 (making a similar
point); Brauer, supra note 73, at 38 (same); Osterman, supra note 57, at 410 (same).
93. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2012) (concluding that the legislative debates over the sex amendment
reveal that it was not a joke but a referendum on "conventional sex and family roles"); Osterman,
supra note 57, at 411 (explaining how the incorrect story of the sex amendment as a joke became
conventional wisdom).
94. Osterman, supra note 57, at 419-20 (describing efforts by the NWP and the newly created
National Organization for Women).
95. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 223-25; Osterman, supra note 57, at 420.
96. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 249 (quoting Sex and Nonsense, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
4, 1965, at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. (citing De-Sexing the Job Market, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1965, at 20); ROSEN, supra
note 2, at 72 (same); SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 111-12 (same).
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would lead the EEOC to have an "open mind" and be more lax on
enforcement of the sex provision.
98
These comments belittlingly portrayed workplace sex discrimina-
tion as a phenomenon primarily involving male exclusion from sexual-
ized, female-only jobs, while ridiculing the idea that men would ever
want such jobs. Not only did such a focus obscure discrimination's harm
to women by overlooking that many women might aspire to be some-
thing other than Playboy Bunnies or might protest the job's female-only
sexual objectification: By sensationally exploiting the Bunny as an
example, these news articles also rendered invisible the more common
forms of sex bias built into typical female-only jobs.99 Similarly, by
mocking the idea that men would ever want to be Bunnies, the stories
reinforced stereotypical notions of masculinity that prevented men from
pursuing jobs assigned to women and downplayed the resultant harms to
men's occupational freedom. At a more basic level, the stories operated
to obscure the larger system of occupational sex-segregation and pre-
scribed gender roles that limited options for men and women alike.
Such narratives may appear to be consigned to the past, but con-
temporary events suggest that they continue to fuel current attitudes and
behaviors. When the EEOC investigated the Hooters restaurant chain in
1995 for hiring only attractive young women as servers, for example, the
restaurant launched a high-profile protest, sending scantily clad Hooters
girls to march outside the White House carrying signs proclaiming
"Hooters Guys? Washington-Get a Grip!"' 0 0 Thirty years after the news
media first trivialized Title VII by making jocular references to how it
could lead to men as Playboy Bunnies, the press made similar mocking
comments about the Hooters case,01 disparagingly depicting large, hairy
98. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Monroe W.
Karmin, Battling Job Bias: New US. Commission Plans Big Push to Open More Posts to Negroes,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1965, at 1).
99. For examples of how traditionally female jobs both incorporated and invoked stereotypi-
cally feminine behavior, see SUSAN PORTER BENSON, COUNTER CULTURES: SALESWOMEN,
MANAGERS, AND CUSTOMERS IN AMERICAN DEPARTMENT STORES, 1890-1940, at 130 (1986)
(describing how department store executives trained saleswomen to act as hostesses and treat
customers as personal houseguests in a commercial environment); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD,
THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 104-05 (1983) (describing how
female flight attendants were trained to smile at all times regardless of how badly customers
behaved); KANTER, supra note 21, at 82-89 (describing how female secretaries were rewarded for
personal devotion to one male boss and taught to accept personal praise and flattery instead of
money).
100. James Bovard, The EEOC's War on Hooters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1995, at A18
(internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See, e.g., id (commenting that the script for the EEOC's latest civil rights triumph may
be, "Hi there. My name is Bruce and I'll be your Hooters Girl tonight" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Laura Myers, Hooters Howling at Hiring Demand-Told to Sign Up 'Hooter Guys,' THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995, at A3 (describing Hooters' rally in Washington D.C. with about 100
Hooters Girls marching with signs saying "Men as Hooter Guys - What a Drag" and quoting Hooters
vice president Mike McNeil as saying "A lot of places serve good burgers. The Hooters Girls, with
their charm and All-American sex appeal, are what our customers come for" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Dan Rodricks, EEOC Fights for Hunks to Join Hooters Attractions, THE
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men as servers102 and ignoring how not only men, but also women, are
harmed by sex-segregated hiring of the type the restaurant still practices.
Pressured by Congress in response to public opinion, the Commission
eventually dropped the Hooters lawsuit,0 3 bowing to older ideas that
denied single-sex hiring was sex discrimination and returning, ironically,
to the segregation-approving stance it had taken earlier in its history.
B. The Emergence of Movement-Inspired Enforcement
The struggles over how to interpret Title VII's sex discrimination
provision extended far beyond the debates about i s origin and purpose.
These conflicts carried over into the enforcement arena, where women's
rights advocates outside and inside the federal government confronted
additional bias in the attitudes and actions of leading public officials
charged with enforcing the law. 04 Title VII entrusted the newly created
EEOC, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Labor
(DOL) with different enforcement powers.'0 5 Although these agencies
BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 15, 1995 (wondering whether the EEOC expects men to "wear orange shorts
and bend provocatively while serving shooters" and seeks to change the restaurant's name to "Guys
in Orange Shorts" or "Hooters and Hunks"); see also Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and
Popular Discourse About Sex Discrimination, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 551, 611-32 (1997) (noting that
many editorials about the EEOC's investigation were written after Hooters began its public relations
campaign and analyzing two such editorials in detail).
102. See, e.g., Photograph of Hooters Guy, in Day in Sports Photo Gallery, USA TODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/gallery/hooters/contenttemplate4.htm (last visited Nov. 29,
2014) (depicting a "virile and scruffy" "Hooters Guy" concocted by Hooters in response to the
EEOC's charge (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. Angela D. Morrison, Duke-Ing Out Pattern or Practice After Wal-Mart: The EEOC as
Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 137 (2013).
104. Scholars have emphasized that the early women's rights movement included both women
outside the government and inside it. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 192-93; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra
note 8, at 258-59; ROSEN, supra note 2, at 74; Sonia Pressman Fuentes, The Legal Revolution in
American Women's Rights-And the Problems that Remain, Address at Cornell University 6-8
(Oct. 24, 2012) (transcript available at http://scholarship.law.comell.edu/avon-clarke/3); see also
HARRISON, supra note 8, at 213 (describing the influence of Esther Peterson, director of the
Women's Bureau at the Department of Labor and later Assistant Secretary of Labor); id at 11- 13
(discussing the women who served on the President's Commission on the Status of Women);
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 284-88 (discussing Congresswoman Edith Green); MACLEAN,
supra note 8, at 127-28 (discussing EEOC attorney Sonia Pressman Fuentes); MAYERI, supra note
8, at 55 (discussing EEOC attorneys Sonia Pressman Fuentes and Susan Deller Ross); SKRENTNY,
supra note 8, at 115-17 (discussing Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, Aileen Hernandez from the
EEOC, Mary Eastwood from the Department of Justice, Catherine East from the Citizens' Advisory
Counsel, and Kathryn Clarenbach from the Wisconsin Commission on the Status of Women).
105. The 1964 Act gave the EEOC very limited powers. The EEOC could not bring lawsuits or
initiate its own investigations, but could only investigate discrimination claims filed by individuals,
refer cases to the Attorney General, and advise and attempt to conciliate claims upon the request of
an employer or labor organization. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705(g), 78 Stat.
241, 258-59. The Attorney General, who is the head of the Department of Justice, was given
authority to initiate pattern or practice actions against private employers. Id. § 707. In 1972,
Congress extended Title VII's coverage to public employers and consolidated future substantial
enforcement authority in the EEOC. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, §§ 2, 4(a), 86 Stat. 103, 103-07 (1972). Beginning in 1974, the Attorney General's authority
over private employers transferred to the EEOC, while the Attorney General retained authority over
cases involving state and local governmental entities and litigation in which the EEOC is a party in
the Supreme Court. Id. §§ 4, 5, 8(e)(1). Although Title VII formally did not bestow any enforcement
authority on the Department of Labor, the agency's role in enforcing the executive orders that were
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understandably focused their limited resources primarily on eliminating
race discrimination in the first few years after Title VII passed, their
failure to make any substantial efforts to address sex discrimination
harmed the early development of this field of law.'0 6 However, this
reluctance by government officials inspired popular counter-resistance
that catalyzed organizing in the fledgling women's rights movement. The
resulting feminist pressure led the agencies and courts to adopt innova-
tive reforms in the first decade of Title VII's enforcement, as described
below.
1. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidance
Women's rights activists' early skirmishes with the EEOC reveal
how difficult it was to secure expansive readings of the sex discrimina-
tion provision from the federal enforcement agencies. Numerous scholars
have documented the EEOC's early resistance to safeguarding women's
rights.107 Charged with enforcing Title VII but stripped of the usual
agency powers, the EEOC had only limited authority under the 1964
Civil Rights Act to advise, investigate, and conciliate discrimination
claims filed by individuals, and if conciliation failed, the EEOC lacked
the ability to sue or impose sanctions on employers.10 8 Despite its weak
powers and inadequate budget, the EEOC from its inception marshaled
its resources in highly creative ways to document and publicize patterns
of race discrimination and pressure employers to eliminate them.19 In
the parallel to Title VII for government contractors is discussed in Part II.B.3 below. See infra note
194 (discussing the Department of Labor's authority).
106. In fact, Alfred Blumrosen, a legal scholar and consultant to the EEOC and the Department
of Labor during this era, argues that "[t]he law of sex discrimination lags at least five to eight years
behind where it would have been had the administrators of the EEOC in 1965 been as cognizant of
the problems of sex discrimination as they became later." ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW:
THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 141 (1993).
107. Major sources consulted for information about the EEOC's early stance include GRAHAM,
supra note 8, at 205-32; HARRISON, supra note 8, at 187-209; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at
246-67; MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 124-36; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 85-90, 110-19, 124 28;
Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, The Strength of a Weak Agency: Enforcement of Title VI! of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Expansion of State Capacity, 1965-1971, 110 AM. J. Soc. 709, 710-
22, 724-37 (2004); Fuentes, supra note 104, at 4 9; Kevin Schwartz, Equalizing Pregnancy: The
Birth of a Super-Statute 11-32 (May 7, 2005) (unpublished student prize paper, Yale Law School),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylssppsjpapers/41.
108. See supra note 105; see also GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 189 (noting that compromises
within both the House and Senate changed the EEOC from the quasi-judicial agency modeled after
the National Labor Relations Board that liberals originally envisioned into what they feared would
be a "largely toothless agency [with] a reactive posture"); Pedriana & Stryker, supra note 107, at 712
(noting that "[a] sequence of compromises between liberals and moderate Republicans left the
EEOC with no formal adjudicative or prosecutorial powers" and "[tlhe final bill authorized the
EEOC to do no more than investigate and engage in conciliation talks with discriminatory
employers").
109. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 186-87 (explaining that the early EEOC was over-
whelmed with work and had few resources, but adapted by adopting a sophisticated technocratic
strategy that targeted the worst offenders based on statistics and mobilized professional expertise
against suspect practices); Pedriana & Stryker, supra note 107, at 747-48 (noting that Congress left
the EEOC "toothless, unorganized, and broke," yet the agency creatively expanded the concept of
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contrast, the agency initially declined to vigorously enforce Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination.
The reasons for the EEOC's early stance were undoubtedly com-
plex. Like most Americans, early EEOC leaders were focused on
securing civil rights for Black Americans. The EEOC's one hundred or
so permanent employees had come to Washington to fight race discrimi-
nation, and most did not want to see the agency's resources diverted to
sex discrimination." 0 The sense of exigency created by the civil rights
movement supported such a focus,"' while women's groups had not yet
produced similar pressure to move forward in a clear direction. Indeed,
when Title VII passed, "American women were neither united, effec-
tively organized, nor psychologically prepared to press . . . for its
enforcement."' 12 Official resistance also reflected a failure to take
women's employment seriously that rested on biased assumptions that
the women's movement had not yet challenged."
3
At the time, women's groups remained visibly split over whether
Title VII permitted female-specific labor laws that restricted women's
employment in the name of protecting their distinctive biological and
social reproductive roles as mothers."14 After Title VII passed, a number
of protectionist groups lobbied the EEOC to permit such laws, even
though a growing number of activists within those groups were begin-
ning to doubt their wisdom."5 Similarly, in the years following Title
VII's enactment, some women's groups continued to characterize
pregnancy as a uniquely female condition that warranted special legal
consideration for mother and child," 6 while other feminists would begin
race discrimination through its interpretation of Title VII in the areas of seniority systems,
employment tests, and other forms of disparate impact discrimination).
110. Pedriana & Stryker, supra note 107, at 721; Fuentes, supra note 104, at 4; see also
GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 212 (noting that "the commission's dominant constituency was
overwhelmingly concerned with black civil rights, not with sex discrimination"); SKRENTNY, supra
note 8, at 113 (quoting EEOC staff attorney Susan Deller Ross as recalling that EEOC employees
"viewed it as an agency whose only serious mission was really to work on black civil rights").
111. Pedriana & Stryker, supra note 107, at 721.
112. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 207.
113. See, e.g., KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 250-51 (noting that most EEOC staff
members "believed in the salience of sex differences for economic decision making"); SKRENTNY,
supra note 8, at 262 (reporting that government officials believed working women's problems were
not serious and those attitudes guided policy).
114. For a description of the historic split among women's rights groups, see supra notes 80-
81 and accompanying text. For a breakdown of the state protective laws that existed when Title VII
was enacted, see Gola E. Waters, Sex, State Protective Laws, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1967
INS. L.J. 341, 345 & nn.21-22 (1967).
115. For example, Esther Peterson, Director of the Women's Bureau and the PCSW under
President Kennedy, began to doubt and eventually opposed protective labor laws out of concern that
the laws actually discriminated against women and would prevent them from taking full advantage
of Title VII. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 186-87; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 262-63.
Similarly, although the AFL-CIO initially continued to endorse protective labor laws for women,
some individual labor unions and many female officials and members within the AFL-CIO began to
disagree with the official line. Id. at 263-64.
116. See Schwartz, supra note 107, at 21, 23.
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to question whether that position best served working women's inter-
ests. " 7
These divisions prevented women's groups from sending the EEOC
a clear, unified message about how Title VII should be interpreted. As a
result, EEOC officials felt little sense of urgency to take aggressive steps
to fight sex discrimination.1 8 In the summer of 1965, for example,
women's groups missed an opportunity to influence the agency's first set
of interpretive guidelines on sex discrimination. Because there had been
no congressional hearings on the sex amendment, the EEOC particularly
needed input from women's rights groups.] 9 But disagreement over
protective labor laws left women's groups, such as the new Interdepart-
mental Committee on the Status of Women (ICSW), paralyzed and
unable to take a collective stance, 12 thus depriving the EEOC of con-
sistent advice on sex discrimination policy from the affected constitu-
ency during this formative period. Bowing to pressure from business
interests and a letter on behalf of the Department of Labor (led by the
Women's Bureau) asking the EEOC to proceed slowly and preserve the
status quo, 12 the EEOC announced that Title VII did not invalidate state
protective labor laws that restricted women's (but not men's) employ-
ment. Instead, the EEOC's 1965 guidelines treated a restriction imposed
by such a law as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) that
exempted employers subject to the law from liability under Title VII. 1
22
The absence of concerted social movement pressure and scrutiny
not only permitted the EEOC to issue these status quo-preserving
rulings-it also enabled agency leaders to be guided by sex stereotypes.
Early EEOC officials did not simply ignore or delay implementation of
117. See infra notes 412-17.
118. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 207, 213.
119. Id. at 212.
120. In 1965 the Women's Bureau urged the ICSW, appointed by President Kennedy to follow
through on the work of the original PCSW, to lobby the EEOC "on behalf of women's rights," but
the ICSW was unable to do so due to deadlock over "the irrepressible issue of state protective
legislation." Id. at 212-13. The Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women (Citizens'
Advisory Council), a second governmental follow-up committee established by President Kennedy,
was similarly unable to reach consensus. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 186-87.
121. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 213. When the EEOC was called to interpret how Title VII
applied to state protective legislation, the ICSW remained split over how to approach the issues. Its
chairman, Willard Wirtz, wrote to President Roosevelt on behalf of the Labor Department and the
Women's Bureau, urging the EEOC to preserve women's protective laws. Id.
122. Title VII provides employers with a defense commonly known as the "BFOQ" defense.
Section 703(e)(1) provides that "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees . .. on the basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... " Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 241, 256 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012)).
Under the EEOC's initial guidelines, a state law that barred women from holding an allegedly
dangerous job likely would have constituted as a BFOQ defense, thus excusing employers who
refuse to hire women into such jobs. See Part 1604-Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
30 Fed. Reg. 14, 926-28 (Dec. 2, 1965). The EEOC reserved the right to evaluate complaints about
particular laws on a case-by-case basis. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 218.
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the sex discrimination provision or carefully weigh the likely effects of
different approaches: They made highly publicized, derogatory remarks
that disparaged the problem of sex discrimination and undermined the
legitimacy of efforts to eradicate it. These actions suggested that agency
officials were moved as much by sex-biased attitudes as by desires to
prioritize civil rights or protect women's perceived vulnerabilities. The
tone was set at the EEOC's July 1965 kick-off press conference, when its
first Chair, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., played the sex discrimination
provision for laughs. When asked by a reporter, "What about sex?"
Roosevelt jokingly replied, "Don't get me started .... I'm all for it."',
23
Following suit, the agency's first Executive Director, Herman Edelsberg,
joked that protection against sex discrimination "didn't spring from
Congressman Howard Smith's brow; it all began with Adam's rib."
124
Less humorously, agency officials publicly defended sex segrega-
tion. Edelsberg told a Washington Post reporter, for example, that "there
are people on this Commission who think that no man should be required
to have a male secretary-and I am one of them."1 25 Edelsberg and Vice
Chairman Luther Holcomb similarly approved of airlines' practice of
hiring female flight attendants into different jobs than men at lower pay
and firing the women when they got married or reached the age of thirty-
two. 126 According to Holcomb, "Congress did not seek to abolish the
differences between the male and [the] female sex," so if an employer
acknowledged those differences by restricting jobs to one sex, he could
see no "discriminatory purpose" in such an action. 127 After all,
"'[c]ommon sense' dictated that women could better please passengers
and make them 'feel well cared for."'' 128 When the lone female EEOC
Commissioner Aileen Hernandez and the agency's first female staff
attorney, Sonia Pressman Fuentes, protested such statements and spoke
out in favor of more expansive enforcement, they were ridiculed in harsh
and often sexist terms.
129
The bias of these EEOC officials is clear not only from their will-
ingness to make such sexist remarks openly and without embarrassment,
but also from the sense of amusement and hilarity they expressed toward
123. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Osterman, supra note 57, at 421 (internal quotation mark omitted).
125. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 125.
127. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. (emphasis removed). The airlines relied on similar sex stereotypes to defend policies
limiting flight attendant jobs to women only in subsequent lawsuits challenging the validity of those
policies under Title VII. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387-89 (5th
Cir. 1971), discussed infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
129. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 187 (quoting Hernandez as stating "that the subject of sex
discrimination elicited either 'boredom' or 'virulent hostility' from her fellow EEOC commis-
sioners); SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 113 (detailing Hernandez's frustration and noting that EEOC
General Counsel Charlie Duncan called Fuentes a "sex maniac" for advocating enforcement of the
sex provision (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fuentes, upra note 104, at 3 (noting that the
response was laughter when she tried to speak about women's rights).
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the entire concept of women's rights.'30 That they did not subject racial
minorities or disabled people to similarly bemused, belittling commen-
tary conveys the prevalence and taken-for-granted quality of official
assumptions about sex differences and women's marginality as workers.
Indeed, many of the "jokes" traded on the incongruity between women's
desire for workplace equality and their inferior social position. As
sociologist John Skrentny has observed, such jocular remarks reveal
preconscious beliefs about women that "not only shaped boundaries of
appropriateness regarding jokes," but also "guided the boundaries of the
appropriateness, and thus the making of policy, for women."'13' In the
absence of concerted pressure from women's groups, early EEOC
officials resisted the idea that sex discrimination was a serious social
problem akin to race discrimination'32 or that sex-segregated employ-
ment reflected labor market discrimination like racial segregation.
33
The EEOC quickly learned, however, that sex discrimination was a
reality of the American workplace when ordinary working women all
over the country began to file individual complaints of sex discrimina-
tion. In its first year of operation, from 1965 to 1966, at least one-third of
all the charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC alleged sex
discrimination, challenging the view that sex discrimination was not a
pervasive problem.134 The largest portion of complaints challenged
discriminatory practices associated with sex segregation, such as exclu-
sionary hiring systems, separate seniority lists, and protective labor
laws. 3 5 Individuals complained about discrete practices, but the real
issue was the larger system of sex-segregated employment that presumed
women were suited for some kinds of work but not others. Such segrega-
tion harmed women economically, both by denying them access to the
higher paying jobs typically held by men and by crowding them into
remaining fields in which their oversupply reduced wages. 136 Segregation
130. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 260-61. This jocular style was not limited to agency officials
or members of the press; even President Nixon indulged it on more than one occasion. In one
incident, Nixon dismissed a female reporter's question about how he would address women's
absence from governmental supervisory positions and how he viewed women's liberation by
laughingly writing off the question since it came from a woman. "After that question, I am not going
to comment [on] women's liberation!," Nixon replied. Id.
131. Id. at 262.
132. Id. at 113; see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 250-5 I.
133. See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 8, at 190 (citing EEOC Director Roosevelt's statement
that the 1965 guidelines "would not result in a massive assault on sex-segregated jobs"); KESSLER-
HARRIS, supra note 8, at 251 (quoting an EEOC official as saying, "We're not going out on our
charger to overturn patterns [of sex-segregated employment]...").
134. See Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html (last visited June 15, 2014) (noting
that in its first year of operation, 33.5% of all charges of discrimination alleged sex discrimination);
see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 246 (stating the figure as 37%); MACLEAN, supra note 8,
at 123 (stating the figure as more than one-fourth); SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at Ill (stating the
figure as 34% of all claims filed in 1966); Fuentes, supra note 104, at 5 (stating the figure as 37%).
135. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 247.
136. For more on the economic harms of segregation and its negative impact on women's
social status, see supra note 27.
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also inflicted status and psychic harms, "confining . . . women to a
narrow range of jobs in which they nearly always took direction from
men and often literally served them . ... ,137 Segregation also raised
citizenship concerns, relegating women to the ranks of family dependents
and preventing them from reaching the position of equal wage earners, a
position historically equated with that of full-rights-bearing citizen. 138
Title VII enabled women to express a pent-up sense of injustice
over these unrecognized harms. Not only did individual women chal-
lenge sex segregation by filing discrimination charges and lawsuits:
139
The EEOC's resistance to combatting segregation as a form of prohibited
sex discrimination created a collective feminist counter-resistance that
urged and ultimately won unprecedented legal reforms. As historians
have shown, no single issue brought divided women's groups together or
galvanized the rebirth of the modem women's movement more than the
EEOC's initial refusal to ban sex-segregated want ads (job advertise-
ments in newspapers indicating "Help Wanted Female" or "Help Wanted
Male").140 Despite acting quickly to prohibit racially segregated adver-
tisements in August 1965, the EEOC did not similarly outlaw sex-
segregated ads, but instead convened a task force composed mostly of
advertisers and business interests that unsurprisingly concluded that sex-
segregated ads did not violate Title VII. 141 Acting on the basis of these
137. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 127.
138. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR, at xxviii-xxxii (1995) (describing how in nineteenth
century America, "the republican citizen was indisputably male" and feminists demanded equal
opportunity to enter the labor market because economically dependent women "could make no
significant contribution to society"); MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 149 (describing how feminists in
the 1960s saw equal opportunity in the workplace as essential to recognizing women as "self-reliant
earners and citizens, as persons with constitutional rights"); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 64-101 (1991) (linking citizenship to the capacity to earn
one's own living).
139. As historian Nancy MacLean emphasizes, Title VII would not have been effective without
the efforts of ordinary working-class women at the grassroots level. Not only did they file
complaints of individual discrimination with the EEOC: They also initiated class-wide lawsuits
against powerful American companies and industries challenging systemic discrimination that
resulted in sex segregation and unfairly limited their employment prospects. MACLEAN, supra note
8, at 123-24.
140. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 218 (noting that the "EEOC's inconsistency and
timidity in enforcing women's rights would likely have provoked the divided women toward greater
unity of purpose" anyway, but the EEOC's "colossal blunder" in backpedaling on sex-segregated
want ads goaded women's groups into a "unified attack on the reeling agency"); HARRISON, supra
note 8, at 192 (observing that the EEOC's ruling approving segregated advertising led to widespread
protest among women's groups and "by 1966 virtually every women's organization protested the
EEOC's cavalier attitude toward sex discrimination"); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 258
(stating that "[m]ore than any other single incident, the EEOC's inconsistent policies on help-wanted
advertising galvanized a rising impatience among some women for attention to the language of sex
discrimination" and "women of many persuasions began to protest").
141. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 187-88. The American Newspaper Publishers Association
(ANPA) insisted upon a business necessity exception for separate-sex classified ads, GRAHAM,
supra note 8, at 216, while also insisting that the EEOC only had authority over employers, not
publishers. Id.
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pressures142 and agency officials' belief that "[c]ulture and mores,
personal inclinations, and physical limitations will operate to make many
job categories primarily of interest to men or women,"' 143 the EEOC
issued a guideline permitting sex-segregated advertising so long as
newspapers published a disclaimer stating that the segregated advertising
was not meant to be discriminatory, but rather simply reflected the fact
that "some jobs were of more interest to one sex than another."'
44
This decision unified and enraged women's activists from across the
spectrum, who correctly ascertained that it meant EEOC staff did not
believe standard practices limiting women to certain jobs was unfair.1
45
When the EEOC took another giant step backward and ruled that even
the disclaimer was unnecessary,46 the EEOC "crossed an invisible
line" 147 that provoked the uniform anger of all women's groups and led
them to band together in protest. As historian Hugh Graham put it, "The
inconsistency between the EEOC's guidelines on sex and race in job
advertisements created a symbolic rallying point to unify women leaders
who for so long had been paralyzed by their divisions over protective
legislation."'' 48 Older protectionists and newer egalitarian leaders alike
began to protest the EEOC's double standard and to press for the agency
to treat sex discrimination just as seriously as race discrimination. 1
49
As part of this emerging counter-resistance, a small but highly de-
voted group of women in Washington formed a new national organiza-
tion designed to pressure the EEOC and other legal institutions to
142. The EEOC may also have been influenced partly by then Supreme Court Justice Abraham
Fortas's comment to President Johnson that the Supreme Court would strike down a ban on sex-
segregated advertising as a violation of the First Amendment. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 188.
143. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 217 (quoting the first EEOC Chair, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.).
144. Job Opportunities Advertising, 30 Fed. Reg. 14928 (Dec. 2, 1965); see GRAHAM, supra
note 8, at 217; HARRISON, supra note 8, at 188.
145. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 257.
146. Job Opportunities Advertising, 31 Fed. Reg. 6414 (Apr. 28, 1966). Again, the ANPA had
a large role in influencing the EEOC to change its policy. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 218-20.
147. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 258.
148. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 218.
149. For example, Esther Peterson, the influential DOL protectionist who had earlier opposed
Title Vl's sex amendment, in 1965 wrote to the New York Times protesting its tone of ridicule and
urging the Times to ask instead "How many jobs are 'women's jobs' merely because they are
menial, routine, monotonous and, of course, low-paying?" Id. at 222 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This change in her position "signaled the imminence of a sea change in feminist thought."
Id. At the same time, the Citizens' Advisory Council overcame its own historic divisions over
protective labor legislation and adopted a pragmatic stance, which allowed them to get on with the
rest of their equal employment agenda. Id. Also in 1965, Pauli Murray and Mary Eastwood
published their law review article, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965), which catalyzed a change in feminist thinking by "finessing the old
debates over protective legislation and by pressing hard ... the case for a race-sex analogy in EEO
law." GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 222. Edith Green had been the only congresswoman to oppose the
addition of sex to Title VII. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 284-85. By 1966 she was a board
member of NOW, id at 258-59, and in 1970 she chaired congressional hearings on discrimination
against women during which she castigated the EEOC, the DOJ, the DOL, and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare for all failing to "recognize the seriousness of sex discrimination."
Id. at 286-87.
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advance women's rights.150 Founded by twenty-eight women, including
Betty Friedan and Pauli Murray,' 51 the National Organization for Women
(NOW) would grow to become the largest organization of feminist
activists in the United States, but it was born of simple outrage at the
failure to take working women seriously.'52 NOW launched a frontal
assault on the nature, existence and relevance of sex difference.1 53 NOW
and other egalitarian activists pressed the analogy between race and sex
discrimination not simply for the purpose of eliminating formal sex-
based classifications, but primarily for the purpose of challenging the
fundamental, biased assumptions about women's difference that justified
sex discrimination and inequality throughout society. 154 As historian
Cynthia Harrison emphasizes, NOW's rejection of the notion that
"biology is destiny" rested on an analytical separation of childbearing
from childrearing. This distinction provided the foundation for a coher-
ent, world-changing new feminist philosophy.'55 By insisting that, while
only mothers can give birth, both mothers and fathers can care for
children-and thus women and men can be equally committed to work-
NOW made it possible to demand an expansive equality no earlier group
could claim.' 
56
Jettisoning earlier protectionist claims for special provisions based
on women's reproductive roles, NOW and other early egalitarian
activists promoted a new vision of equality that was far from narrow or
elitist, as some later critics charged. "By spurning the family wage
150. For descriptions of NOW's founding, see GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 225-26; HARRISON,
supra note 8, at 192-96; ROSEN, supra note 2, at 74-75; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 116-17.
151. See Honoring Our Founders & Pioneers, NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN,
http://now.org/about/history/honoring-our-founders-pioneers/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014). After
Betty Friedan wrote The Feminine Mystique, she began visiting the EEOC to gather material for an
article she was writing and befriended frustrated female EEOC employees such as Pauli Murray and
Sonia Pressman Fuentes, thus forming the "feminist underground" in Washington that eventually led
to NOW's creation. For more on Betty Friedan, the influence of The Feminine Mystique, and her
significant role in the formation of the modem women's rights movement, see COONTZ, supra note
79, at 155-57, 160-65, and ROSEN, supra note 2, at 4-8. For more on Pauli Murray and the
importance of her ideas and activism to the development of both modem feminism and sex
discrimination law, see supra note 74.
152. See MARYANN BARAKSO, GOVERNING Now: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM IN THE NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN 21-23 (2004); SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 116-17 (noting that
existing women's rights organizations were not sufficiently organized nor interested in lobbying the
EEOC to enforce Title VII's sex provision but Betty Friedan indicated that NOW's first order of
business was to make it "clear to Washington, to employers, to unions, and to the nation that
someone was watching, someone cared about ending sex discrimination" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
153. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 118-19.
154. See, e.g., MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 147 (noting that NOW leaders echoed Pauli
Murray's race-sex analogy and insisted that the excuses employers gave for practicing sex-based
discrimination were not substantially different from those used to justify racial bias and could be met
by the same laws and agencies); MAYERI, supra note 8, at 30, 33-34 (noting that NOW and other
feminist lawyers in the late 1960s drew upon Pauli Murray's sex-race analogy).
155. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 199-200.
156. This distinction, popularized and promoted by NOW, was also made by an important
group called the President's Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women in its 1970
statement of principles on pregnancy. See infra note 416 and accompanying text.
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system that had never included most women of color and now failed to
provide for growing numbers of white women," Nancy MacLean
concludes, "and by claiming instead access to all jobs and the right to be
rewarded as equals, activists overthrew the tradition of 'coverture'
[which treated women as family dependents] and enabled women to be
recognized as self-reliant earners and citizens, as persons with constitu-
tional rights."157 NOW's influence spread far beyond its national head-
quarters, as local groups and campaigns sprung up all over the country.
158
Encouraged and emboldened by the presence of local activist campaigns
in the streets, ordinary women began to fight for equality in the work-
place. 159
Spurred by the actions of NOW and other newer egalitarian
groups,60 the EEOC began to take seriously its mandate to eliminate sex
discrimination. NOW's first goal was to convince the EEOC to retract its
position on sex-segregated advertising. By August 1968, in clear
response to pressure from NOW, the EEOC had revised its guidelines to
declare all sex-segregated advertising discriminatory.161 In 1969, as the
influence of the protectionist wing began to fade and the prominence of
egalitarian Second Wave women's rights groups like NOW grew,1 62 the
EEOC also revised its position on state protective laws, stating that they
were in conflict with Title VII because they were no longer "relevant,"
157. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 149.
158. Id. at 137-42; Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2130 n.328 (noting that NOW both
pressed a national agenda and encouraged local consciousness-raising roups) (citing SARA EVANS,
PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND
THE NEW LEFT (1979)).
159. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 123-24, 130-32.
160. NOW initiated its campaign by writing letters to the President, the EEOC commissioners,
and various other executive departments, organizing a national day of protest and regularly picketing
the EEOC and the White House, petitioning the EEOC for public hearings, and filing suit against the
agency for failing to enforce the ban against sex discrimination. HARRISON, supra note 8, at 200,
203-04; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 11 8; Fuentes, supra note 104, at 8. NOW also formed a spinoff,
the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), to bring lawsuits. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at
265, 268; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 133. The group engaged in a litigation campaign to pressure
the DOL to adopt affirmative action for women, id. at 133-35, and worked with NOW to secure
passage of the ERA in both houses of Congress in 1972. Id. at 240.
161. Job Opportunities Advertising, 33 Fed. Reg. 11,539 (Aug. 14, 1968). This decision
occurred only a few months after NOW's general counsel, Marguerite Rawalt, followed through on
NOW's threat to sue the EEOC and the court agreed to dismiss the case only if the EEOC "promised
to improve its performance on behalf of women." HARRISON, supra note 8, at 204. In altering its
policy on sex-segregated advertising, the EEOC "tacitly noted the contribution of NOW by
indicating that it would inform the organization of 'the disposition of the actions raised by their
petition."' KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 259. Justice Fortas's prediction turned out to be
wrong: the Supreme Court upheld a similar prohibition on sex-segregated advertising in 1973.
HARRISON, supra note 8, at 204. See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
162. At the EEOC's 1967 hearings prompted by NOW, the EEOC encountered new thinking
among women's rights groups regarding state protective laws and began to rethink its own position.
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 265. By then, NOW and other Second Wave activists had sparked
a growing feminist consensus that these laws did more harm than good in a post-Title VII world in
which sex-segregated employment could be challenged, rather than simply accepted as natural.
HARRISON, supra note 8, at 204; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 267.
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they did not take the "capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual
females" into account, and they "tend[ed] to discriminate rather than
protect."1 63  In addition, after years of waffling on pregnancy
discrimination,164 renewed feminist activism inside and outside the
EEOC prompted the agency to overcome initial ambivalence and move
forward in a clear direction. Led by young feminist staff attomeys who
embraced the new spirit of egalitarianism,'65 the EEOC issued guidelines
on pregnancy discrimination that abandoned an older protectionist
position treating pregnancy as unique and deserving of special protection
and directed employers instead to treat pregnancy-related problems the
same as other temporarily disabilities.
66
In addition to clarifying these important issues, the EEOC partici-
pated in a number of high-profile lawsuits that challenged significant
patterns of sex segregation under Title VII, as was routinely done in race
cases. By 1970, the women's movement had established a foothold in the
EEOC, and the agency overcame its initial reluctance to infer sex
discrimination based on women's statistical underrepresentation as
revealed in an employer's EEO-I reports.167 The EEOC used the EEO-1
163. Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 34 Fed. Reg. 13,367, 13,368 (Aug. 19,
1969) (stating that state protective laws "will not be considered a defense ... or as a basis for the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception").
164. In the early years, the EEOC was internally divided and treated pregnancy discrimination
inconsistently. The Office of General Counsel's opinion letters stated at times that Title VII did not
prohibit employers from excluding pregnancy from disability policies and at other times that Title
VII required employers to give maternity leaves to pregnant women even if no leaves were given
other ill or disabled employees. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 253-55; Schwartz, supra note
107, at 11-15. In its reasonable cause rulings, the EEOC took similarly inconsistent positions. Id. at
17-20; see also Dinner, supra note 16, at 456 (noting that "[c]onfusion and ambivalence character-
ized the initial response of the EEOC" to pregnancy). These policy inconsistencies paralleled the
divided views of influential women at the EEOC in that era. Sonia Pressman Fuentes, the first
female lawyer at the EEOC, apparently favored requiring employers to provide pregnant women
maternity leaves, even if they did not provide leaves to other employees. See Schwartz, supra note
107, at 21, 23 (citing an unpublished piece by EEOC staff attorney Sonia Pressman Fuentes entitled
Two Conflicting Theories For Protecting Women Regarding Pregnancy, which echoed the views of
older, protectionist women's rights groups in describing pregnancy as unique and deserving of
special consideration). Aileen Hernandez, the only female Commissioner, wanted to investigate
alternative approaches. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 254.
165. See SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 126 (observing that by 1970, "the women's movement
had established a solid base in the formerly black-oriented EEOC"); Schwartz, supra note 107, at
22-28 (explaining that in the early 1970s, a handful of women who identified with the women's
rights movement had become influential at the EEOC, including Sonia Pressman Fuentes, Susan
Deller Ross, and Aileen Hernandez). For a discussion of evolving feminists' views and the EEOC's
approach to pregnancy discrimination, see infra note 413.
166. For the text of the EEOC's 1972 guidelines, see Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (Apr. 5, 1972) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973)) (providing
that "[dlisabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy . . . are, for all job-related purposes,
temporary disabilities.., under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan...").
167. The EEO-I form is an annual form the EEOC required all employers to file reporting the
racial, ethnic, and gender breakdowns of their workforces using standard occupational categories.
The EEO-1 was based on Form 40, a form created by President Kennedy's Presidential Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity to monitor minority hiring by government contractors.
SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 101-04. The EEOC included the category of "women" on this form,
along with African-Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and American Indians. Id. at 103-04; see
also id at 125-26 (noting that before about 1970, the EEOC was reluctant to infer sex discrimination
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data, as well as individual complaints, to target leading American
industries that were the worst offenders. After receiving a disproportion-
ately high number of individual complaints about sex discrimination at
AT&T, 168 the telecommunications monopoly that was then the nation's
largest employer of women, 169 the EEOC joined the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) in 1970 in a high-profile campaign to eliminate
systematic sex discrimination throughout the company. Ultimately, the
government won a settlement that disrupted entrenched patterns of sex
segregation at AT&T and sent a message to other employers that,
whether practiced covertly or overtly, the custom of hiring men and
women for different jobs would be regarded as a form of sex discrimina-
tion.7 ° In 1973, the EEOC similarly investigated and eventually sued
Sears, Roebuck and Co., the second largest employer of women after
AT&T, 171 challenging the sex disparities in employment and pay that
permeated its sales force.172 Although the EEOC would later lose this
lawsuit against Sears,173 these and other early initiatives, spurred by
groups like NOW, undercut the assumption of sexual difference that
organized American industry and signaled that Washington was now
taking sex discrimination seriously.
2. Department of Justice Litigation
The EEOC was not the only agency responsible for enforcing Title
VII, nor the only one that was slow to enforce its sex discrimination
prohibition. Until 1974, when responsibility for bringing such cases
against private employers transferred to the EEOC, Title VII gave the
Department of Justice (DOJ) exclusive authority to initiate Title VII
based on women's underrepresentation and had a tendency to drop the "women" category when
investigating and condemning discrimination against minority groups based on the EEO- I reports).
168. AT&T accounted for 5-7% of all charges pending before the EEOC, and so EEOC
technical expert Phyllis Wallace determined that it would be more efficient to bring a pattern or
practice case than to process so many individual complaints. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 132;
SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 126-27.
169. The Bell System, which included AT&T, was the nation's largest single employer of
women in 1971. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 131.
170. The EEOC proved that there was deep sex segregation at AT&T. For example, 92.4% of
all employees were concentrated in jobs where the workers were 90% or more of the same sex.
SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 127. In fact, Phyllis Wallace's report for the EEOC concluded that
"[e]very single wage-eaming job was classified as male or female." MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 132;
see also SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 126-28 (describing how the EEOC combined statistics from
EEO-1 data, the many individual complaints it received, and a feminist theory of sex discrimination
inspired by NOW's involvement in the case to arrive at a historic consent decree with a substantial
affirmative action and back pay remedy); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 837-44 (2010)
(describing the joint effort between the EEOC and the FCC and the extensive consent decree that
resulted).
171. In the 1970s, Sears was the largest employer of low-wage female sales workers and the
second-largest employer of women after AT&T. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 139. By the time the
Sears case went to trial in the early 1980s, Sears had become the nation's largest private employer of
women. See infra note 349.
172. See infra notes 299-310 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 307-310 and accompanying text.
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lawsuits. The DOJ could file suit "whenever the Attorney General has
reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights secured by [Title VII].' 174 Beginning in 1967, when Attor-
ney General Ramsey Clark instructed lawyers in the Civil Rights
Division to focus on employment discrimination, the DOJ led federal
enforcement litigation efforts.'75 In 1967, DOJ lawyers filed six pattern
or practice lawsuits, and in 1968 another twenty-six such suits, against
private employers.176 By 1973, the Division had initiated one hundred
such lawsuits raising significant precedential issues, including cases
against employers in some of the nation's leading industries.77
Like the EEOC, the DOJ viewed Title VII's major mandate as elim-
inating race discrimination. It was not until 1970 that the DOJ brought its
first lawsuit alleging a pattern or practice of sex discrimination,178 even
though, by then, its attorneys had filed forty or fifty such suits based on
race.179 In congressional hearings on sex discrimination held in 1970,
Jerris Leonard, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at the
time, defended the Division's record by insisting that "[t]he truth of the
matter is there is, at least as far as what is brought to our attention, far
greater discrimination on the ground of race than there is on the ground
of sex.' 80 His statement echoed earlier remarks by Benjamin Mintz,
Deputy Director of the Civil Rights Division, who testified in 1969 that
the DOJ had brought only racial discrimination cases that year because
174. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707(a), 78 Stat. 241, 261; see also supra
note 105 (discussing the authority transferred from and granted to the DOJ in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972).
175. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment
Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1138 (1989).
176. Id.
177. Thomas R. Ewald, Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-A Ten-Year Perspective, 7 URB. L. ANN. 101, 113-14 (1974). The DOJ's nationwide suits
against the steel and trucking industries, which resulted in expensive and far-reaching consent
decrees, instilled fear among employers of major litigation, bad publicity, and large back pay awards
if they did not address their discrimination problems. Rose, supra note 175, at 1145-46.
178. Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Part 2 Before the
Special Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 91st Cong. 680, 682 (1970)
(statement of Jerris Leonard, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Justice Dep't) [hereinafter
1970 House Hearings on Discrimination]; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 277; Owen M. Fiss,
The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade After
Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 750 (1974). That first sex discrimination case
was United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 372 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 3,
1971). See 1970 House Hearings on Discrimination, supra, at 680; Developments in the Law, supra
note 65, at 1233 n.225. The lawsuit resulted in a wide-ranging consent decree that covered seniority,
promotion, transfer, training, hiring, recruitment, and notice requirements for female hourly paid
employees at a manufacturing plant. See generally Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 372.
179. 1970 House Hearings on Discrimination, supra note 178, at 636 (statement of William H.
Brown Ill, Chairman, EEOC); id. at 682 (statement of Jerris Leonard, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil
Rights Div., Justice Dep't).
180. Id. at 688 ((statement of Jerris Leonard, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Justice
Dep't); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 277.
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racial discrimination was a "more serious social problem" than sex
discrimination, with "more deeply ingrained" prejudices to battle. 18'
Although the DOJ did not become as actively involved as the EEOC
in combating sex discrimination in the years immediately following Title
VII's passage, activism by NOW and other women's rights groups
probably did influence DOJ lawyers to take steps to address the problem.
In the early 1970s, for example, NOW joined a coalition of civil rights
and labor groups to pressure the DOJ to sue the country's nine major
steel producers and the United Steelworkers of America alleging a.... 182
pattern or practice of race and sex discrimination. NOW's involvement
grew out of grassroots efforts by female steel workers in multiple
regions, including Chicago, Baltimore, and Pennsylvania.'83 These steel
companies had already been subject to a number of discrimination suits.
In an effort to secure an industry-wide solution and avoid future litiga-
tion, they negotiated for months with the federal government,'84 whose
investigation covered 73% of the steel industry.185 The final consent
decree, signed in April 1974, provided $30.9 million in back pay for
forty thousand women and minorities who had experienced discrimina-
tion and established numerical goals and timetables designed to bring the
industry into compliance with Title VII in the future. 86
Despite the rampant sex discrimination in the steel industry, it is not
clear that the DOJ would have alleged sex discrimination absent NOW's
involvement. None of the DOJ's early pattern or practice suits had
alleged sex discrimination, even though most of those cases involved
firms or industries employing few women.187 Indeed, one of the Civil
181. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 403. Such statements not only understated the problem of sex
discrimination: they also created the impression that race discrimination pertained only to men,
ignoring the problems of Black women. For a classic article criticizing civil rights law for erasing
the problems of Black women, see Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
182. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. I (N.D. Ala. 1974). For an
account of the case from a labor history perspective, see JOHN HINSHAW, STEEL AND
STEELWORKERS: RACE AND CLASS STRUGGLE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY PITTSBURGH 211-17
(2002).
183. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 130-31 (describing the experience of Alice Peurala, who sued
U.S. Steel's South Works plant in Chicago and paved the way for a larger lawsuit and consent
decree when other female steelworkers in Chicago, Pennsylvania, and Baltimore organized with
NOW).
184. Casey Ichniowski, Have Angels Done More? The Steel Industry Consent Decree 8-15
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 674, 1981), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w0674 (describing the extensive litigation the steel industry had already
been involved in and the desire among the industry to adopt an industry-wide solution and avoid
future litigation).
185. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 834 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975).
186. Id. at 834-39 (explaining in detail the nature of the two consent decrees that were
reached); SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 127-28 (same). For the text of the actual consent decree, see
Consent Decree i, United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., No. 74 P339, (N.D. Ala. Apr. 12,
1974), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-AL-0 115-0005.pdf.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36, 416 F.2d
123, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1969) (suit against building trades council and crafts unions); In re Trucking
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Rights Division's lead lawyers in the steel industry case made comments,
years later, suggesting that, in that case, the sex discrimination claim was
added mainly as a bargaining chip to induce the steel industry to agree to
hire Black men.
88
Nor would there have been as much pressure to hire women under
the steel industry consent decree absent NOW's attention. NOW at-
tempted to intervene in the lawsuit specifically in order to challenge the
adequacy of the decree's promotion goal for women.8 9 NOW argued
that because women had been discriminatorily excluded from entry-level
production jobs in the steel mills since the 1940s, a provision in the
decree tying the number of women to be promoted to the number of
women already employed in production jobs would perpetuate the
industry's own past sex discrimination,' "mak[ing] a mockery' out of
any obligation on the companies' part to promote females into trades and
crafts."191 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit rejected NOW's challenge on
both substantive and procedural grounds.1 92 Nonetheless, the lawsuit had
a considerable impact upon the lives of the women who already worked
in the steel mills or who entered them thanks to the hiring goals, bringing
"enormous changes in the status of female workers and revers[ing] the
marginalization they had suffered during the 'liberal' 1960s."'193 In
addition, the widespread publicity the suit generated helped establish that
it was sex discrimination that explained women's absence from the steel
industry, not their lack of interest or competence.
3. Department of Labor Regulations
Like the EEOC and the DOJ, the Department of Labor (DOL) was
also slow to take sex discrimination seriously. Although the DOL had no
authority to enforce Title VII, its Office of Federal Contract Compliance
(OFCCP) was responsible for implementing President Kennedy's 1965
Executive Order 11,246, which prohibited federal contractors from
discriminating in employment and required them to take affirmative
action to ensure against such discrimination. 94 Once again, women's
Indus. Emp't Practices Litig., 384 F. Supp. 614, 615 (J.P.M.L. 1974) (suit against the trucking
industry); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 704-05 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (suit against Alabama
Department of Public Safety regarding state troopers).
188. Conversation between Robert T. Moore, Lead Attorney in Allegheny-Ludlum, Deputy
Section Chief for the Employment Litigation Section of the Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, and the author sometime between 1983 and 1986, when the author was a trial attorney in
the Employment Litigation Section.
189. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1, 4 (N.D. Ala. 1974); see also
Allegheny-Ludlum, 517 F.2d at 841-42 (explaining NOW's arguments in favor of its right to
intervene in the steel industry lawsuit).
190. See id. at 879-80.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 840-46, 879-8 1.
193. H1NSHAW, supra note 182, at 213.
194. From the 1940s to the 1960s, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy
issued executive orders barring discrimination by federal contractors and requiring that they take
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rights advocates had to exert pressure to convince the OFCCP to give
women access to affirmative action policies created for African-
Americans and other minorities.
By 1970, as noted above, the EEOC had begun relying on statistical
data drawn from employers' annual EEO-1 reports reporting the number
of women in each occupation to initiate high profile sex discrimination
suits against large companies like AT&T. 195 Long after EEOC attorneys
had overcome an initial reluctance to infer sex discrimination from
evidence of significant female underrepresentation, DOL officials
struggled with relying on such data as a basis for requiring affirmative
action for women. The DOL relied on such statistical data to press for
greater inclusion of African-Americans and other minorities on the
premise that, absent labor market discrimination, these groups ordinarily
should constitute approximately the same share of an employer's
workforce and jobs as their share of the area labor force.' 96 Yet, DOL
officials had a hard time accepting that the same basic premise applied to
women.97 By requiring employers to explain or eliminate such dispari-
ties, affirmative action was a key policy tool for dismantling entrenched
patterns of segregation and inequality in employment. Because only the
Labor Department had authority to press directly for affirmative action,
and because the policy found its "most explicit regulatory formulation in
the hiring goals and timetables" of the OFCCP,' 98 the DOL's initial
exclusion of women from these policies and programs was potentially
very damaging.
affirmative action to address employment discrimination. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. § 957
(1938-1943) (issued by President Roosevelt on June 25, 1941); Exec. Order No. 9346, 3
C.F.R. § 1280 (1938-1943) (issued by President Roosevelt on May 27, 1943); Exec. Order No.
10,308, 3 C.F.R. § 519 (1951) (issued by President Truman on December 3, 1951); Exec. Order No.
10,479, 3 C.F.R. § 97 (1953) (issued by President Eisenhower on August 13, 1953); Exec. Order No.
10,925, 3 C.F.R. § 86 (1962) (issued by President Kennedy on Mar. 6, 1961); see KESSLER-HARRIS,
supra note 8, at 275-76. The OFCCP within the DOL had, and still has, authority to implement
Executive Order 11,246. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 167 (1966) (issued by President
Johnson on September 24, 1965). The original Executive Order 11,246 prohibited federal contractors
from discriminating on the basis of "race, creed, color, or national origin" and mandated that
contractors "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to" such factors. Id. Amended over the years, the
Executive Order today bans discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. See Executive Order 11246, As Amended, U.S. DEP'T LAB. OFF. FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS (last visited June 19, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/statutes/eoI1246.htm.
195, See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text,
196. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 276; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 89, 133; James E.
Jones, Jr., The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employment.- Economic, Legal,
and Political Realities, 70 IOWA L. REV. 901, 921 (1985). See generally James E. Jones, Jr., The
Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 wts. L. REV. 341 [hereinafter Jones, Bugaboo] (describing
the development, theory, and design of the Department of Labor's use of labor market statistics to
set minority employment goals for government contractors).
197. Many officials questioned whether women's absence from good jobs and professional
schools in which males predominated, and women's resulting lower pay, was the result of their own
choices or employer bias. As Kessler-Harris argues, "When it came to women, goals and timetables
seemed to undermine the centrality of sex 'difference,' to challenge gender as a system of social
order." KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 276.
198. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 130.
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The original Executive Order did not cover sex discrimination, even
though it was meant to be an analogue to Title VII. 199 One of NOW's
first successes was convincing President Johnson to amend the Executive
Order in 1967 to add sex discrimination.20 Mary Keyserling, director of
the DOL's Women's Bureau at the time, argued that this inclusion
opened the door for the DOL to apply to sex discrimination the same
presumptions it already applied to race discrimination: DOL lawyers
could presume that women were skilled and qualified for the full range
of jobs and that any significant disparity of women in the workforce
reflected the presence of sexually discriminatory barriers and invited an
agency investigation or an affirmative action program.2 °'
The DOL refused to follow such an approach, prioritizing race and
publicly resisting the sex-race analogy just as the EEOC and the DOJ
initially had done.20 2 Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson told a
speechwriter that, while there were benefits to "appeasing women,"
"women's Lib groups are obviously trumpeting some absurdities.,20 3
Assistant Secretary of Labor Arthur Fletcher, a key player in race-based
affirmative action, remarked that women "were legislated their minority
status" through the late addition of "sex" to Title VII and that very few
women were victims of economic discrimination.204 As a result of such
attitudes, the OFCCP left women out of the Revised Philadelphia Plan, a
path-breaking 1969 program that required federal contractors to hire
minority men in numbers approximating their share of the relevant
industry or labor force.0 5
Pressing the race-sex analogy, women's rights activists reacted with
anger. Led by NOW's litigating arm, the Women's Equity Action
League, or WEAL, 20 6 advocates filed a historic class action sex discrimi-
nation complaint with the Department of Labor against all universities
and colleges holding federal contracts,207 alleging an "'industry-wide
199. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 167 (Supp. 1965) (issued by President Johnson on
Sep. 24, 1965); see KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 275-76; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 130.
200. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 684 (1966-1970) (issued by President Johnson on
Oct. 13, 1967). The Executive Order is often referred to as "11246 as amended." See KESSLER-
HARRIS, supra note 8, at 276; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 130.
201. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 130-31.
202. Id. at 138-39 (citing DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON'S CIVIL RIGHTS: POLITICS, PRINCIPLE,
AND POLICY 242 (2001)).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 139.
205. Id. at 89, 132-33; Jones, Bugaboo, supra note 196, at 364-73. The OFCCP originally
developed this approach through its compliance programs for construction contractors across the
country, including in Philadelphia, and then later expanded it to apply to all federal contractors when
it issued Order 4 in February 1970. Order No. 4, 35 Fed. Reg. 2586, 2587 (Feb. 5, 1970); see
SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 132-33. Women were left out of this plan even though sex was covered
by the Executive Order that authorized the plan. Id.
206. For more on WEAL, see supra note 160.
207. WEAL was authorized to bring such a complaint under Executive Order 11,375, 32 Fed.
Reg. 14,303 (1967); see Bernice Sandier, A Little Help From Our Government: WEAL and Contract
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pattern' of sex discrimination against women in the academic commu-
nity," particularly in admissions quotas, financial assistance, hiring
practices, promotions, and pay.20 8 Educational institutions were, at the
time, exempted from coverage under Title VII, so only the newly
amended Executive Order 11,246 provided legal remedies for sex
discrimination directed at female faculty and staff.20 9 WEAL and other
women's rights activists sought to expose the facts and force the OFCCP
to acknowledge that women faced systematic sex discrimination similar
to the race discrimination confronted by racial minorities.21 0  This
complaint, and the public pressure surrounding it, led the OFCCP to
more closely investigate educational institutions and issue guidelines on
sex discrimination.2 1'
These sex discrimination guidelines, issued on June 9, 1970,212
again left women disappointed. The OFCCP previously had issued Order
No. 4, an order requiring government contractors to use hiring goals and
timetables and to correct any identifiable deficiencies in minority
employment based on the percentage of racial minorities in the work-
force in the area labor market.213 The OFCCP's guidelines made clear
that women were not included in this proactive approach to affirmative
action. The guidelines vaguely called for employers to make an extra
effort to recruit and promote women, but failed to require, or even
mention, numerical goals.21 4
Women's rights activists called the guidelines "useless" and insisted
215that the DOL enforce Order No. 4 with respect to women. In June1970, less than a month after the guidelines were released, NOW filed a
Compliance, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 439, 440 (Alice S. Rossi & Ann Calderwood
eds., 1973).
208. Sandier, supra note 207, at 440-41; see also SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 133-34. WEAL
wrote to members of Congress to pressure the DOL to act upon the complaint. Sandier, supra note
207, at 443. WEAL also filed specific charges with the DOL against the University of Maryland and
more than 250 other academic institutions. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 134; Sandler, supra note
207, at 441. Other women's rights groups filed class actions against medical schools, law schools,
and other universities. Sandier, supra note 207, at 441.
209. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 ("This title shall
not apply ... to an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform
work connected with the educational activities of such institution."); see SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at
133.
210. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 133.
211. Sandier, supra note 207, at 443.
212. Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. 8888 (June 9, 1970).
213. Order No. 4, 35 Fed. Reg. 2586, 2589 (Feb. 5, 1970); SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 133.
214. Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. at 8889 (requiring affirmative action, but
only action such as recruiting at women's colleges, designing advertisements to be more inclusive of
women, and committing to include female candidates in training programs); see SKRENTNY, supra
note 8, at 135. This discrepancy foreshadowed favorable treatment courts later gave employers'
evidence of having made "special efforts" to attract women in sex discrimination cases, while not
crediting such evidence in race discrimination cases challenging patterns of segregation. For a
discussion of the role of evidence of special efforts in persuading courts to accept or reject the lack
of interest argument in such cases, see Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1126-27.
215. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 135-36; see also JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF
FEMINISM 46 (1971) (detailing the problems women's rights groups found with the guidelines).
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formal complaint with the DOL, charging 1,300 government contractors
216with sex discrimination. House Representative Edith Green, who had
initially opposed the sex amendment to Title VII, held hearings and
questioned Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, director of the DOL's Women's
Bureau, as to why women should not receive the benefits of affirmative
action.217 In response, Koontz read from an explanatory statement by
Secretary of Labor George Shultz. Shultz stated that using goals and
timetables to correct for women's underutilization based on area work-
force statistics was not appropriate, because "[m]any women do not seek
employment," whereas "[p]ractically all adult males do., 2 18 Furthermore,
Shultz emphasized, even women who do seek employment are not
attracted to many lines of work. "Many occupations sought after by all
racial groups may not have been sought by women in significant num-
bers," as he put it.219 For these reasons, he concluded, the OFCCP could
not rely on the usual statistical methodology; instead, administrators
would need to ascertain the level of local women already qualified for
and interested in the jobs at issue, as evidenced by female applications
for employment, when designing sex-based affirmative action programs
for women.
220
Although the Labor Department initially refused to accept the
analogy between sex and race discrimination urged by NOW and other
women's rights groups, activists eventually succeeded in persuading
DOL officials to adopt a more expansive approach to affirmative action
for women. After all, as sociologist John Skrentny has observed, there
was no language in either Title VII or the executive orders, and "nothing
in the concepts of 'civil rights' and 'equal opportunity,' suggest[ing]
there should be different models of justice for different groups. 221 When
Labor Department officials met with women's rights groups in April and
May of 1971, the DOL finally acceded to including women in Order No.
4.
222
Activists' struggle with the DOL reveals that, even as the women's
rights movement unified and gathered momentum, old cultural
assumptions died hard. The same approach that DOL officials used to
pursue affirmative action for racial minorities was too radical to apply to
216. HOLE & LEVINE, supra note 215, at 46; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 136.
217. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 135-36. These hearings were held in support of an
amendment prohibiting sex discrimination Green sought to make to a law about higher education. Id.
at 242. While the amendment did not pass, the hearings "provided an occasion for Green to attack
the Nixon administration on its initial failure to extend affirmative action to women" and "publicized
the problem of women's inequality." Id.
218. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 279; SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 137.
219. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 138.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 140.
222. Revised Order No. 4, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,152 (Dec. 4, 1971); see SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at
140-41.
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women.223 "When it came to women," as historian Alice Kessler-Harris
put it, "goals and timetables seemed to undermine the centrality of sex
'difference,' to challenge gender as a system of social order.
224
Although DOL officials ultimately relented and extended affirmative
action policies to cover women, some public officials never fully
accepted the idea that, with active steps to eliminate discrimination,
women would aspire to train for and work in the same or similar fields,
at the same levels of commitment and expertise, as men.225 The DOL's
position foreshadowed similar arguments about women's lack of interest
in higher paying employment that were later made by employers in Title
VII lawsuits and accepted by many courts.26
C. The Consolidation of Progress in Congress and the Federal Courts
The foregoing examples of early enforcement illustrate the dynamic
process of official resistance, movement counter-resistance, consensus
building, and eventual reform through which progress occurred. By the
early to mid-1970s, women's rights activists and their sympathizers had
won important struggles over the meaning of sex discrimination under
Title VII. Reflecting the power of the still-strong women's movement,
these activists forced politicians, agency officials, and judges to
acknowledge and address the discrimination experienced by working
women.
By the time Congress amended Title VII in 1972,227 the political
and cultural climate had changed so much that Congress not only
endorsed the important race discrimination precedents established by the
federal courts and agencies:228 Lawmakers also explicitly acknowledged
the long-standing patterns of sex segregation and discrimination that
characterized America's workforce and instructed courts and policy-
makers to treat sex discrimination as seriously as race discrimination.229
The 1972 Act culminated, and consolidated, a dynamic process of law
223, SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 140.
224, KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 276.
225. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 246-50 (explaining how the Nixon administration's Office
for Civil Rights in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare later dragged its heels in
implementing Title IX of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination in higher education).
226. See infra Part lII.A.
227. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
228. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 190 (noting that in the 1972 amendment o Title
VII, Congress affirmed Griggs and "the leaders of the House-Senate conference prefaced their report
with an explicit endorsement of 'the present case law as developed by the courts,' declaring that it
should 'continue to govern the... construction of Title VII').
229. See S. REP. No. 92-415, at 7 (1971) ("While some have looked at... women's rights as a
frivolous divertissement, this Committee believes that discrimination against women is no less
serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and that it is to be accorded the same degree of
concern given to any type of similarly unlawful conduct."); H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (1971)
("[Wlomen are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible and the less remunerative
positions on the basis of their sex alone. Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objection-
able in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its
enactment in 1964.").
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reform that confirmed advances made by agencies and the courts and
called into question the presumed sex differences traditionally used to
justify women's inequality in the workplace. The reform process did not
stop at the factory gate or office door. Inspired by the women's rights
movement's growing strength and unity, Congress addressed women's
concerns in realms beyond the workplace and Title VII. Congress not
only ratified the Equal Rights Amendment,
230 but also enacted Title IX 231
and passed other lesser-known laws prohibiting sex discrimination.
2 32
The federal courts also helped consolidate the early gains. Under
Title VII, judges adopted innovative approaches in numerous areas to
invalidate sex segregation and other inequalities that characterized the
American workplace. When employers tried to justify overt sex discrim-
ination by arguing that hiring women or men only was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job,233 for example, courts
refused to endorse biased assumptions about sex differences and con-
strued the BFOQ defense narrowly to avoid limiting Title VII's reach. To
support a narrow reading, courts relied upon Title VII's legislative
history and the EEOC's regulations.234 The EEOC guideline in question
was the one earlier secured by NOW, when activists succeeded in
persuading the EEOC to rule that state protective laws violated Title
VII. 235
The Fifth Circuit took the lead in developing this important body of
BFOQ law. As early as 1969, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
230. By March 1972, the Equal Rights Amendment, which provided that "[e]quality under the
law shall not be denied by the United States or by any State on account of sex," Equal Rights
Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1972), won two-thirds of the vote in both
houses of Congress. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REC. 9517-98 (1972) (debate and vote
in the Senate with 84 in favor, 8 opposed, and 7 not voting); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 117 CONG.
REC. 35782-815 (1971) (debate and vote in the House of Representatives with 354 in favor, 24
opposed, and 51 abstaining); see also SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 232, 240-41 (explaining that after
women's leaders put forth a unified front in challenging Title VII's protective legislation, both the
ERA and Title IX passed easily); Cynthia Harrison, "Heightened Scrutiny: " An Alternative Route to
Constitutional Equality for U.S. Women, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
HISTORY, INTERPRETATION, AND PRACTICE 347, 353 (Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia Smith
eds., 2003) (same).
231. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-07, 86 Stat.
235, 373-75 (1972). For a detailed discussion of the role of the women's movement in the passage
of Title IX, see SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 230-62.
232. SKRENTNY, supra note 8, at 241 (giving examples of lesser known laws such as the
Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, the Nurses Training Act of 1971, the Child
Development Act, vetoed by President Nixon, etc. and explaining how Congresswomen Bella Abzug
and Martha Griffiths added sex discrimination prohibitions to as many new bills as possible).
233. For an explanation of the BFOQ defense, see supra note 122.
234. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (citing to the EEOC's guideline stating that the BFOQ for sex should be interpreted nar-
rowly); Diaz v. Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); Weeks v.
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 nn.3-4 (5th Cir. 1969) (citing to the EEOC's guideline
and Title VII legislative reports indicating that the BFOQ should be narrowly construed).
235. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
TAKING SEX DISCRIMINATION SERIO USL Y
Telegraph Company,236 the Fifth Circuit construed the BFOQ defense
narrowly to avoid having "the exception . . . swallow the rule." 237 The
court held that in order to prove a BFOQ defense, the employer had to
show that "all or substantially all women would be unable to perform"
the duties of the job in question.23 8 Two years later, in Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways,239 the Fifth Circuit held that Pan Am's policy
restricting flight attendant jobs to women only was not justified as a
BFOQ exception.240 Pan Am attempted to defend its female-only hiring
by arguing that women were better at tending to the "special psychologi-
cal needs" of the airline's mostly male passengers41 The Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument, ruling that the primary function of a flight
attendant was to help transport passengers afely and that soothing them
psychologically was tangential to the job.242 Once the court defined the
job's primary duties in mechanical, gender-neutral terms, it became
obvious that men could perform them as well as women. Notably, the
Fifth Circuit rejected Pan Am's argument that customers preferred
female attendants, holding that it would be contrary to the purposes of
Title VII to allow the company to cater to customers' preferences and
prejudices, as "it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was
meant to overcome.2 43
That same year, in 1971, the Supreme Court applied similar reason-
ing to reject a hiring policy that relied on sex stereotyping and promoted
gender roles in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation.244 The per
curiam opinion invalidating Martin Marietta's refusal to employ women,
but not men, with pre-school age children was brief, but pathbreaking.
The Court held that the mere allegation of the "existence of ... conflict-
ing family obligations" for women was not enough to justify a BFOQ.24 5
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion went further, emphasizing that the
BFOQ should be construed narrowly and that "[e]ven characterizations
of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve as predicates
for restricting employment opportunity."246 Citing the Weeks decision
and the EEOC guideline, Marshall concluded that, in prohibiting sex
discrimination, Congress had "intended to prevent employers from
refusing 'to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of
236. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); see also MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 123-24 (explaining
how Title Vil's success depended upon the efforts of working-class women like Lorena Weeks, who
used the law to expose sex segregation).
237. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
238. Id.
239. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
240. Id. at 386.
241. Id. at 387.
242. Id. at 388.
243. Id. at 389.
244. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
245. Id. at 544.
246. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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see.,24724the sexes." '  In addition to the United States government,248 both the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and NOW filed amicus briefs
urging the Justices to disavow the assumption that mothers with young
children, but not fathers, were incapable of doing their jobs. 249 That
Marshall took Title VII's sex ban on sex discrimination seriously,
implicitly rejecting that the sex amendment was a joke and relying on an
EEOC guideline that NOW's activism had helped secure, shows how far
the federal courts and agencies had come under the influence of women's
rights groups. Within a few years, the Supreme Court issued other
expansive Title VII rulings that rejected arguments based on sex differ-
ence.
250
The Supreme Court also issued expansive decisions under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Many of these early cases
involved male plaintiffs. As head of the new ACLU Women's Rights
Project, Ruth Bader Ginsburg creatively included male plaintiffs in a
series of sex discrimination cases designed to challenge the stereotypical
roles for men and women that were part of the larger sexual division of
labor targeted by Second Wave feminism.2 5 ' Ginsburg strategically
broadened her arguments to encompass the harms of sex stereotyping to
men, promoting the concept that "[flair and equal treatment for women
means fair and equal treatment for members of both sexes.,252 To
247. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(i)(ii) (1970)).
248. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (No. 73),
1970 WL 136379. In addition to the Solicitor General, attorneys from the Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division, were counsel of record on the brief. Id.
249. Motion for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae for National
Organization for Women at 9-12, Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (No. 73), 1970 WL 122570;
Motion for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union,
Amicus Curiae at 16, Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (No. 73), 1970 WL 122566. Pauli Murray was
one of the counsel of record on the ACLU's brief. Id.
250. See, e.g., City of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-11 (1978)
(invalidating city's pension fund plan requiring female employees to make larger contributions than
male employees and rejecting arguments justifying the differential on the ground that, on average,
women live longer than men); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (applying disparate
impact doctrine to invalidate height and weight requirements for prison guard positions, and
rejecting arguments that impact could not be established with reference to general population figures
because women of average height and weight would not be interested in such positions).
251. See MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 134 (explaining that Ginsburg "oversaw a vast methodical
effort to topple a centuries-old legal tradition" and used male plaintiffs to show that men were also
hurt by the family wage system); Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2134 & n.355 (concluding
that Ginsburg brought cases before the Supreme Court "challenging sex discriminations that
reflected archaic stereotypes" and that her strategy to include male plaintiffs was controversial
among feminists but aimed to "show male judges that everybody-including people like them-was
harmed by sex discrimination"); Franklin, supra note 16, at 119-42 (chronicling the series of cases
Ginsburg litigated at the time in hopes of convincing the Supreme Court to adopt her theories
regarding sex discrimination); see also Wendy W. Williams, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Equal
Protection Clause: 1970-80, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41,44-45 (2013) (showing that if cases the
Supreme Court decided per curiam or remanded or declined to review are counted, Ginsburg
represented far more female plaintiffs than commonly believed). For more information on the
Second Wave feminism's targeting of the larger sex-biased social system sometimes referred to as
the family wage system or the sexual division of labor, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
252. Franklin, supra note 16, at 92 (quoting Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 20, Moritz v.
Comm'r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1971) (No. 71-1127) (on file with the Library of Congress,
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Ginsburg and other early reformers, challenging the biased system that
viewed women as only secondarily committed to employment meant, by
definition, challenging the corollary assumption that men were rarely, if
ever, committed to family caretaking.253
In Frontiero v. Richardson,254 for example, Ginsburg persuaded the
Supreme Court to invalidate a federal statute that required proof of
dependency for U.S. servicewomen claiming their husbands as depend-
ents, but not for servicemen claiming their wives.255 The government
appealed to administrative convenience, arguing, in Justice Brennan's
words, that it was "both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to
presume that wives of male members are financially dependent upon
their husbands, while burdening female members with the task of
establishing dependency in fact. 256 As the Court noted, this argument
assumed that "as an empirical matter, wives ... frequently are dependent
upon their husbands, while husbands rarely are dependent upon their
,257wives." The Court rejected this assumption, citing evidence which
suggested that the presumption of dependency did not even accurately fit
258the service wives and cast doubt on the wisdom of relying on sweeping
descriptive assertions about men and women in general that ignore
variation by such factors as occupation and socioeconomic class.
Even if the government's factual assumptions were more accurate,
the Court held, the Fourteenth Amendment would still not permit
"according differential treatment to male and female members of the
uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative
convenience."259 On one level, this conclusion simply reaffirmed the
earlier principle that constitutional values, such as equality, have higher
value than efficiency.260 Yet, on another level, the decision reflected a
newer understanding of the law's role in shaping the gendered social
realities marshaled as "facts" to show the efficacy of making sex-based
distinctions under the law. Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority
expressed an acute awareness that, although social change was under-
way, women continued to suffer ongoing, pervasive sex discrimination
261that relegated them to an inferior status throughout society in the name
Manuscript Division, Ruth Bader Ginsburg papers, Container 5, Folder: Moritz v. Comm'r [ 19711))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
253. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 134 (emphasizing that in pursuing sex discrimination cases
for the ACLU Women's Rights Project, Ginsburg aimed both to dislodge the family wage system
and to demonstrate more broadly "how the notion that men are this way ... and women are that
way ... ends up hurting both sexes" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
254. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
255. Id. at 679.
256. Id. at 689.
257. Id. at 688-89.
258. Id. at 689 & n.23.
259. Id. at 690-91.
260. Id. at 690 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
261. Id. at 686-87.
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of honoring their special family roles.262 As the Court's ringing indict-
ment of laws promoting stereotypes acknowledged,263 such discrimina-
tion, if left unchecked by the Constitution, would continue to produce the
very patterns of female economic dependency that governments invoked
in order to justify further differential treatment.
Although Ginsburg has faced criticism for her approach,264 her
agenda held promise for unsettling the established sex roles and stereo-
types that characterized American life and supported women's workplace
265marginalization at the time. As Frontiero illustrates, stereotypes are
not simply overgeneralized descriptive statements about what most men
and women do or desire; they are also prescriptive ones about what
people should do. These phenomena operate on the deepest levels of
human consciousness and institutional logic, altering people's percep-
tions and behavior in fundamental ways that appear to confirm the
stereotypes' truth. As early feminists knew, removing the law's legitima-
tion of prevailing stereotypes and sex roles would not in and of itself
create conditions of equality. But doing so could create new possibilities
for women and men who-whether out of daring, or desperation, or a
sense of duty-sought to cross settled gender boundaries and take up
non-traditional activities. By the mid-1970s, women's rights activists had
moved the law forward in preventing employers and legislatures from
acting on the basis of traditional understandings of women's and men's
proper place in society. As we have seen, Congress, the federal enforce-
ment agencies, and the federal courts all participated in creating this
change.
III. JUDICIAL REGRESSION BACK TO OLDER VIEWS OF WOMEN AND
WORK
Up to now, my account of Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimina-
tion has emphasized the activist efforts and legal reforms that created
change. Yet an account that discussed only the advances, and neglected
262. Id. at 684-85 (citing a passage from Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring), as an example of the traditional "paternalistic attitude" relegating women to the role of
wife and mother).
263. Id. at 684-86 ("As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became
laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.").
264. See Franklin, supra note 16, at 83-86, 92 (providing examples of traditional critiques of
Ginsburg's approach as being too narrow and formalistic); Vicki Schultz, Roundtable Discussion:
Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 206 (2003) [hereinafter Schultz,
Roundtable] (noting, while not agreeing with the criticism, that some feminists had later criticized
Frontiero and similar decisions for "privileg[ing] women who 'acted like men' while ignoring the
plight of those who 'acted like women').
265. See Schultz, Roundtable, supra note 264, at 206-07 (reading Frontiero expansively to
acknowledge and prohibit the law's involvement in prescribing the formation of gender roles);
Williams, supra note 251, at 45-47 (arguing that Ginsburg was targeting the complex "sex-role
pigeon-holing" framework that treated "women as yin and men as yang" and rewarded compliance
and penalized deviation from societally created gender roles).
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the setbacks, would be seriously incomplete. The early years did produce
new understandings of workplace sex discrimination and new legal tools
for addressing them. But, as we have seen, those reforms did not emerge
easily and inevitably from the work of enlightened officials; they resulted
from active conflict and struggle. Nor did the initial momentum lead
ineluctably to further progress. Instead, over time, reformers confronted
new versions of earlier, biased views.
Part II reviewed the legislative history of the sex discrimination
provision, the ensuing stories about its enactment, and the early efforts
by agencies and courts to enforce the provision. These were the arenas in
which activists, academics, the press, and the public waged interpretive
struggles that produced momentum and change. This Part analyzes
subsequent decisions by the federal courts to show how progress can and
did stall, and even reverse, in the absence of a visible, active women's
movement challenging sex difference and pressing a cohesive and
inclusive set of demands for equality.
266
To illustrate this phenomenon, I analyze two different areas of law.
The first involves a line of Title VII decisions in which employers sought
to defend sex-segregated workforces as the expression of women's own
lack of interest in higher paying jobs. Feminist inattention to this rela-
tively obscure "lack of interest" argument,267  coupled with the
reemergence of feminist division over the question of women's differ-
ence, freed conservative judges to accept conventional assumptions
about women's allegedly different job preferences. The second area,
pregnancy discrimination law, further illustrates how the courts idled,
and even backpedaled, as the women's movement initially waffled and
ultimately waned in strength and advocates divided over whether
pregnancy should be treated as a uniquely female condition or one
comparable to other temporary disabilities that affect both women and
men.
266. In flagging judicial retrenchment, I do not mean to suggest that courts are the only
institutions that regressed back to earlier, biased views. There are examples of executive, agency and
legislative pullback, too. See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 270-71 (1987) (documenting similar changes at the Solicitor
General's office during the Reagan era); infra note 550 and accompanying text (discussing the
EEOC's more conservative view of pregnancy in the Bush era in UA W v. Johnson Controls); infra
note 314 and accompanying text (discussing then EEOC Chair Clarence Thomas's more conserva-
tive stance on the use of statistical evidence during the Reagan administration). Nonetheless, for a
variety of reasons beyond the capacity of this Article to explore fully, including the well-worn
observations that federal judges are not democratically elected and are generally more insulated from
public pressure and accountability than Congress and administrative agencies, see generally
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), the courts have more leeway than other institutions to resort to their own
views and, consequently, a greater capacity to revert back to older, pre-reform attitudes, in the
absence of activist pressure or public attention.
267. See generally Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27 (coining the phrase "lack of interest
argument" and comprehensively examining cases addressing this argument).
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Case studies of course have limits, and some caveats are in order. I
do not claim that courts pulled back in all areas of Title VII law or that
the retreat was total in the areas examined here-only that regression
was the general tendency. Nor do I assert that the social movement
factors highlighted here-the absence of initial activist presence, decline
of movement strength and visibility, and increased internal division-are
the only ones that can weaken a social movement's influence on the
law.268 Over time, as a movement matures and its constituency becomes
simply another interest group in ordinary pluralist politics, its exuberance
and influence may inevitably weaken.269 Although these factors contrib-
ute to or detract from the public consensus a social movement must
generate to effectuate legal change, I do not argue that social movement
factors alone can fully explain legal resistance or retreat in the areas I
examine. As noted above, movement trends cannot easily be separated
from concurrent economic, political, and cultural changes that also shape
law's momentum and meaning.
270
Regardless of how complex the ultimate explanations for such
trends may be, however, the patterns that emerge from the case studies
are striking. They document significant regression in two distinct, but
important areas of Title VII sex discrimination law. They suggest that,
despite enormous initial progress in challenging biased assumptions
about women and work, those biases continued to influence legal
reasoning and results fifty years later.
A. Women's Inequality as Lack of Interest
Nowhere does the biased view of working women appear more
clearly than in Title VII cases raising the lack of interest argument as a
defense to claims of systemic discrimination in hiring or promotion.
These cases typically challenge longstanding, entrenched patterns of sex-
segregated employment. The plaintiffs present statistical studies showing
that women are significantly underrepresented in an employer's work-
force or higher paying jobs, even after controlling for any sex differences
268. See supra note 18.
269. Eskridge observes that antidiscrimination statutes have a natural life-cycle. After an initial
period when a social movement's youthful burst of energy generates a growing public consensus that
leads to law reform, visible activism eventually dissipates as a movement matures. At that point,
administrators and judges return to business as usual, slowing or halting expansion of the law.
Congress intervenes to move things forward again only when a new political consensus demands
action. Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 5, at 497-98. Eskridge's analysis suggests that law reform
may stall or wane as part of an evolutionary process in which a social movement matures and its
demands simply become part of normal pluralist politics.
270. See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 158-85 (2004); John J. Donohue IlI & Peter
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983
(1991); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue Ill, The Selection of Employment Discrimination
Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest/Klein Hypothesis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). See also supra note 18.
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in qualifications. Employers argue that the disparities are not due to
discrimination, but to women's own choices. "It's not our fault," they
say, "women don't want the jobs. 27'
The belief that women lack interest in working for pay, particularly
in jobs traditionally filled by men, lies at the heart of the old set of
cultural assumptions about difference that hampered initial enforcement
efforts. When women demanded affirmative action to address segrega-
tion and underutilization in the federal contracting sector, for example,
DOL officials doubted that such patterns reflected past or present
discrimination; they suggested instead that many women had shunned
covered employment, as discussed above. Although the DOL's position
provided precedent and paved the way for judges to accept the lack of
interest argument, the courts did not issue many decisions272 addressing
this argument until the late 1970s.27 3 Moreover, when the argument did
begin to show up in judicial decisions, it did not at first appear as a sexy,
standout defense in high-profile cases. Instead, this obscure judge-made
defense was often raised in connection with technical contests over the
validity of the plaintiffs' statistical proof, where it largely escaped notice.
For these reasons, cases raising the lack of interest argument rarely drew
274visible activist or feminist attention.
271. For my previous studies of these issues, see Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27;
Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59.
272. Although not in a traditional lawsuit, AT&T did raise the lack of interest argument to
defend against the federal government's allegations of sex discrimination in the early, high-profile
public hearings before the FCC. See Phyllis A. Wallace, Equal Employment Opportunity, in EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 253, 268 (Phyllis A. Wallace ed., 1976)
[hereinafter THE AT&T CASE] (describing how AT&T's expert, Dr. Leona Tyler, attributed AT&T's
sex segregation to "well-known patterns of occupational interests, preferences, and preparations of
women," particularly "cultural sex roles"). For experts' refutations of AT&T's lack of interest
argument, see Judith Long Laws, Psychological Dimensions of Labor Force Participation of
Women, in THE AT&T CASE, supra, at 125, 136-50; Ronald Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Differen-
tials in the Telephone Industry, in THE AT&T CASE, supra, at 17, 32-33. For an overview of these
hearings and the consent decree that resulted, see supra note 168-70 and accompanying text.
273. In two studies of all published sex discrimination decisions by lower federal addressing
the lack of interest argument between 1967 and 1989, 1 found only eleven such cases decided before
1977, compared to forty-three decided thereafter. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1776
tbl. I; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1095 tbl.l. In contrast to the race discrimination
context, where the number of lack of interest cases tracked the distribution of cases filed in each
period, in the sex discrimination context, lack of interest cases were underrepresented before 1977
and overrepresented thereafter, relative to filed cases. These figures suggest that employers began to
raise the lack of interest argument more frequently in sex discrimination cases after 1977, when the
Supreme Court issued three decisions that signaled to lower courts and employers that the lack of
interest argument was a potentially valid defense to be analyzed factually, on a case-by-case basis.
See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1759-65 (discussing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); and Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)). In the earlier period, in sex discrimination cases,
employers may have focused on trying to defend overtly discriminatory policies by securing broad
readings of the BFOQ exception, discussed at supra note 122 and text accompanying notes 233-50,
and, after that strategy failed, may have appealed to the lack of interest argument to defend more
covert forms of discrimination.
274. The widespread public attention given to the EEOC v. Sears case, which highlighted the
lack of interest argument as discussed infra in notes 299-310 and accompanying text, reveals the
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Kyriazi v. Western Electric Company275 reveals both the stereotyped
assumptions underlying the lack of interest defense and the role that
energetic feminist advocacy can play in refuting those assumptions. In
1973, Judith Vladeck, a prominent New York City labor attorney who
"turned her attention to workplace discrimination ... [a]s the women's
[rights] movement gained footing,, 276 brought suit under Title VII on
behalf of Cleo Kyriazi, an industrial engineer, and a class of thousands of
other women who were employed or who had sought employment at
Western Electric's Kearney, New Jersey plant.277 The suit challenged
several of Western Electric's practices as sexually discriminatory,
including hiring and promotion.2 78 One of the first women to attend
Columbia Law School in the 1940s, Vladeck knew something about how
firms denied women job opportunities and failed to take them seriously• 279
as professionals. She was nevertheless unprepared for the severity of
the sex discrimination confronting Kyriazi and other women at Western
Electric.280 Sounding the same challenge to sex difference that had
emerged with the women's rights movement, Vladeck spent over a
decade fighting for these women, assembling a wealth of evidence
showing the systematic nature of the discrimination and unearthing facts
refuting the idea that women were responsible for their own second-class
status.
Like its telephone-company parent AT&T and other leading electri-
cal manufacturers such as General Electric who were also sued for sex
relative obscurity of the lack of interest argument in cases preceding it. Before the Sears case was
publicized, even most feminist scholars did not realize that courts had addressed the lack of interest
argument in many previous cases and it was not until 1990 that academic work systematically
documented and analyzed the courts' treatment of this argument. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note
27, at 1753-54.
275. 461 F. Supp. 894, 921-23 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 473 F. Supp.
786 (D.N.J. 1979).
276. Dennis Hevesi, Judith Vladeck, 83, Who Fought for Women's Rights, Dies, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/1l/nyregion/lI vladeck.html.
277. See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 527 F. Supp. 18, 19 (D.N.J. 1981); Jennifer J. Armiger,
The Gender of Industrial Decline: Reconsidering Sex Discrimination and Equal Opportunity at
Western Electric, 1965-1985, at 6 (Spring 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Delaware) (on file with author).
278. Kyriazi, 461 F. Supp. at 899.
279. Vladeck graduated in 1947 as one of only 26 women in a 174-member class of Columbia
Law School. Stephen Miller, Judith Vladeck, 93, Pioneering Lawyer in Sex Discrimination Lawsuits,
THE SuN, (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/obituaries/judith-vladeck-93-pioneering-lawyer-in-
sex/46495. At the time, discrimination among law firms was so widespread and well accepted that
Columbia's placement office did not even send women on job interviews. Judith Vladeck: A Pioneer
in the Field of Labor and Employment Rights for Women, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/directories/womentrailblazersproject listing/judith_p_ vladeck.html
(last visited Dec. 23, 2014). After having three children and working part-time, Vladeck joined her
husband's employment law firm. Miller, supra.
280. Vladeck later remarked that, although she did not consider herself a feminist when she
initiated the case, she became one as a result of what she learned through the litigation. Conversation
between the author and Judith Vladeck, at Yale Law Sch. (sometime in the late 1990s) (on file with
author). Vladeck's "concern with sex discrimination went back at least as far as her legal training,"
Miller, supra note 279, but it was the Kyriazi case that renewed her "vigor" for the issue and set her
on her path as a prominent sex discrimination litigator. Armiger, supra note 277, at 289, 326, 327.
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discrimination in the 1970s,281 Western Electric's workforce exhibited
the severe patterns of sex segregation that then typified many American
industries, in which "females [were] virtually excluded from the highest
level positions, while they swell[ed] the ranks of the lowest clerical and
operative grades." Among Western Electric's 735 officers and manag-
ers, for example, less than 2% were female; among its 545 professionals,
less than 7% were female, including secretaries and nurses.283 Even for
entry-level operative jobs requiring no training or experience, women
were overwhelmingly hired for the lower pay grade.284 The district court
found that the "sex-segregation of jobs [was] dramatically summed up by
the following statistic: For the period 1967-1976, there were 141 jobs at
Western into which only males were hired and 47 jobs into which only
females were hired.,
285
Promotional patterns were even more stratified by sex. Although
Western Electric promoted from within and women were more than a
third of its labor force, no woman had ever been promoted above the
initial supervisory level.286 Even the few women who had managed to
climb to that first level "were given responsibility [only] over stereotypi-
cally 'female work' and almost exclusively over female populations.,
287
These disparities could not be explained by differences in seniority,
qualifications, or occupation.288 As presiding Judge Stern observed,
"women do not even progress within the occupations into which they
have been segregated.,
289
To defend its record, the company argued that "women were not
promoted because they were simply not interested in promotion.' 290 The
court rejected this lack of interest argument, however, recognizing that
Western Electric's supervisors had the power to elicit or discourage the
very "interest" that they claimed women -lacked. At Western Electric,
employees were not advised of openings and allowed to apply. Instead,
supervisors decided unilaterally which employees were interested in
promotion; "[i]f [a] supervisor represented that [an employee] was not
interested, that individual was not interviewed" or further considered.29'
281. At the time of the Kyriazi suit, Western Electric was an AT&T subsidiary whose
operations resembled that of other electricity manufacturers such as General Electric. Armiger, supra
note 277, at 165. For more on AT&T's sex discrimination investigation and lawsuit, see supra notes
168-70 and accompanying text. For more on General Electric's lawsuit, see infra notes 389-412 and
accompanying text.
282. Kyriazi, 461 F. Supp. at 902-03.
283. Id. at 903.
284. Id. at 906.
285. Id. at 907.
286. Id. at 908.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 910. Women had more seniority than men in each pay grade, and they were not
promoted at equal rates even within the so-called women's lines of work. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 921.
291. Id.
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According to Judge Stem, women never had an "opportunity to express
their alleged lack of interest, because they were rarely even considered
for promotion.,292 Indeed, despite company directives to document all
instances in which female employees declined opportunities for promo-
tion due to lack of interest, not one of Western Electric's 400 to 500
supervisors could produce any such documentation.
293
In Kyriazi, the court not only rejected unproven assertions that
women were less interested in promotion than men, but also acknowl-
edged that any such differences may have been the consequence, and not
the cause, of the promotional disparities. Western Electric's practices
facilitated sex discrimination in ways that were likely to depress
women's aspirations. The court condemned the company's overly
subjective selection process, for example, concluding that a system
giving supervisors the unconstrained discretion to select candidates based
on vague, personalistic criteria too readily permitted male supervisors to
prefer candidates who looked like themselves, predictably excluding
women.294 The judge also chastised Western Electric for ignoring
Kyriazi's complaints about discrimination and harassment, recognizing
that when her superiors sided with male colleagues who tormented her
and "treated her with contempt and ridicule," their actions may well have
elicited from Kyriazi some of the negative behaviors cited as the reasons
for her discharge.2 95 Thus, despite observing that Kyriazi was a difficult
person who had the "capacity to thoroughly infuriate those who deal[t]
with her,"296 the court rejected the company's attempt to pin her dismis-
sal on her own personality. "[W]hile Kyriazi was and is a strong-willed
person, who understandably and justifiably bridled at the discriminatory
treatment she received by the defendant," Judge Stem wrote, "she was
not irrational nor was she unduly difficult to get along with, unless that
term is construed to mean that she refused to supinely accede to the
male-female stereotyping which confronted her at Western.,
297
292. Id.
293. Id. at 922. Indeed, more than ten years after Title VII took effect, Western Electric was
still using requisition forms that prompted supervisors to indicate whether they preferred a male or
female for every position at the plant. Id. at 917; see also Judith P. Vladeck, The Kyriazi Case
Reviewed, Keynote Speech Before the 1979 Annual Meeting of the Advisory Board of the Institute
for Education and Research on Women and Work 4 (1979) (transcript available in the Cornell
University Library) (explaining that, as "one of the most dramatic parts of [the] case," Vladeck
discovered that Western Electric was using these forms, even though such practices had been
unlawful since 1965). During her painstaking document review, Judith Vladeck discovered that
Western Electric officials had actually altered evidence, changing some forms to make it appear that
supervisors checked both "male" and "female" as preferences. See Kyriazi, 461 F. Supp. at 914-20
(describing how Western Electric admitted to this perjury and evidence-tampering at trial and
finding that these forms are "direct evidence of discriminatory intent and purpose"); Vladeck, supra,
at 3-4 (describing how onerous it was to gather this evidence and the harassment her staff faced
throughout the discovery process).
294. Kyriazi, 461 F. Supp. at 908-09.
295. Id. at 934-35.
296. Id. at 942.
297. Id. at 925.
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Kyriazi was the exception and not the rule, however. The favorable
decision in the case reflected the presence and skill of an effective
feminist advocate whose claims and arguments on behalf of women at
Western Electric paralleled women's popular demands for respect as
equal wage earners and citizens. In Kyriazi, Western Electric alleged
women's lack of interest in higher level jobs explicitly and openly in a
pioneering case involving extreme facts. Judith Vladeck's response
reaffirmed the challenge to sex difference conveyed by early women's
movement leaders: Women's allegedly different job preferences did not
explain their inferior employment status-sex discrimination did.298 As
noted above, however, most cases raising the lack of interest argument
did not fit this same profile. The case-by-case invocation of this obscure
judge-made defense, often raised in the context of technical arguments
about the statistical evidence in little known cases, made it a difficult
issue on which to focus sustained activist pressure and attention. By the
time the argument began to surface regularly in sex discrimination cases
toward the end of the 1970s, factors such as the loss of the ERA, the rise
in political conservatism, and the economic slowdown had already
stalled the women's movement's momentum, ushering in a gradual
breakdown in feminist consensus and weakening activists' ability to
overcome regressive arguments made in federal courts to defeat sex
discrimination claims. Finally, as frontline activists retreated, the balance
of influence shifted to feminist academics to set the terms of the debate.
This shift provided an opening for courts to selectively credit feminist
scholars who validated arguments based on women's difference. In this
changed context, where feminists no longer presented an attentive,
cohesive front, courts were able to retreat to stereotyped assumptions
about women in the workplace and roll back the movement's hard-won
advances.
In contrast to the realistic approach taken in Kyriazi, EEOC v.
Sears, Roebuck, & Co.2 99 illustrates the regressive reasoning and results
that emerged with the courts' uncritical acceptance of the lack of interest
defense. In 1973, the same year that the Kyriazi suit was filed, the EEOC
first began investigating sex discrimination at Sears,30 as part of an
ambitious effort to challenge the systematic patterns of sex segregation
and inequality that characterized leading American companies at the
298. Id. at 921-23. Throughout her long and distinguished career, attorney Judith Vladeck
remained committed to this principle and devoted herself to fighting the discrimination and
stereotyping she believed continued to dampen women's career prospects decades even after decades
of Title VII enforcement. See, e.g., Armiger, supra note 277, at 326-27 (giving an overview of
Vladeck's most famous sex discrimination cases); Interview by Elizabeth A. Bousquette with Judith
P. Vladeck 16 (Nov. 1, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
directories/women_trailblazers/judithvladeck oral history.authcheckdam.pd) (quoting Judith
Vladeck's statement that "most men are trained to think of work outside of the home as 'male"' and
"the only time ... women are welcome in the workplace is when we're at war").
299. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Il1. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
300. Id. at 1278.
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time.3 ' The EEOC filed a nationwide Title VII lawsuit in 1979, alleging
that Sears had engaged in sex discrimination in hiring and promotion for
commission sales, reserving those jobs mostly for men while relegating
women to much lower-paying noncommission sales jobs.30 2 The highly
contested case resulted in a ten-month trial, which began in September
1984,303 and culminated in an eighty-two page opinion two years later in
early 1986 .304 The EEOC presented statistical studies showing that Sears
had significantly underhired female sales applicants for the more
lucrative commission sales positions, even after controlling for sex
differences in qualifications.30 5 Sears hired salespeople through a highly
subjective process that permitted supervisors to use their own selection
criteria, including an employment test containing sex-biased questions.
30 6
The district court ruled in favor of Sears, however, attributing its
segregated sales force to women's own job preferences. The court re-
jected the EEOC's statistical analyses as "virtually meaningless," finding
they were premised on a "faulty basic assumption" that female sales
applicants were as interested as males in commission selling.30 7 The
judge credited various explanations for women's alleged lack of interest,
all based on stereotypical images of women as risk-averse, cooperative
secondary earners unsuited for and uninterested in the high-stakes,
rough-and-tumble world of commission sales.308 This reasoning not only
accepted stereotypes about women's distinctive traits and job prefer-
ences; it also accepted as reality Sears's highly masculiniz~d description
of a commission salesperson as a "special breed of cat" who has a
"sharper intellect and more powerful personality" than a noncommission
301. For a discussion of how the EEOC targeted Sears and AT&T (Western Electric's parent
company) as two of the largest companies in the country at the time, see supra notes 168-73 and
accompanying text.
302. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1278; see also Ruth Milkman, Women's History and the Sears
Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 375, 377-79 (1986) (explaining the EEOC's investigative efforts and
interactions with Sears before it filed suit in 1979). Between 1973 and 1980 the median hourly
wages for first year commission sales employees were twice as high as those for all noncommission
sales employees. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR ON AMERICAN WOMEN 378-
79 (1991); Alice Kessler-Harris, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck
and Company: A PersonalAccount, 35 RADICAL HIST. REV. 57, 66 n.25 (1986).
303. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 1988).
304. See generally Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1264.
305. Id. at 1287-88 (discussing the EEOC's multiple regression analyses).
306. Id. at 1300. The district court exonerated such questions from Sears' employment test as
"Do you have a low pitched voice? Do you swear often? Have you ever done any hunting? Have you
played on a football team?" Id. at 1300 n.29 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
insisted that these tests were not discriminatory because they were not meant to be used to determine
whether a woman would be selected for a commission sales job, id. at 1292, 1317-18, yet it also
explained that most applicants were tested at some point in the process and the extent to which
supervisors relied upon these tests "varied." Id. at 1292.
307. Id. at 1305.
308. Id. at 1307-09. For example, the court accepted testimony that "[w]omen tend to be more
interested than men in the social and cooperative aspects of the workplace. . . . They often view
noncommission sales as more attractive than commission sales, because they can enter and leave the
job more easily, and because there is more social contact and friendship, and less stress in
noncommission selling." Id. at 1308.
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salesperson.309 Thus, women were naturally sociable and cooperative,
traits that were the opposite of the ones needed for commission sales.
Once the court accepted the company's gendered description of the job,
the conclusion that women would not find it equally appealing became
inevitable.
310
As the decision in Sears helps clarify, the lack of interest argument
is premised on sex stereotypes that support the view of women as
marginal workers. The argument is powerful precisely because it draws
on the widespread assumption that women and men are different and
extends it to an account of gendered job preferences. In this account,
gender is totalizing: There is no room to acknowledge that women may
exhibit some differences from men, in some contexts, but still aspire to
the same types of work.311 Not only does this oversimplified account
obscure variation among women and changes in women's job prefer-
ences over time: It also fails to detect employers' role in shaping peo-
ple's job preferences along gendered lines.312 In contrast to Kyriazi's
acknowledgment that workplace practices can differentially dampen
female employees' aspirations, Sears assumed that women's allegedly
different preferences preexist, and remain largely unaffected by, employ-
ers' actions. Thus, the company's use of a potentially biased selection
process was of little relevance or concern.
313
In the decade between the Kyriazi and Sears decisions, the political
and legal environment had changed. By 1986, Ronald Reagan had been
elected President, ushering in a more conservative era. The Chair of the
EEOC at the time, Clarence Thomas, publicly discredited the suit against
Sears brought by his own staff attorneys and denounced the use of
statistics to prove discrimination generally.t 4 Along with the shift in
309. Id. at 1290 (internal quotation marks omitted) (accepting this description of a commission
salesperson from Sears' retail testing manual).
310. For a discussion of how jobs can be reified as though human and described in gendered
terms that make it seem that only men or only women can do them, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing,
supra note 27, at 1800-04. For a discussion of how the very same job can be described in masculine
or feminine terms, see Sandra L. Bem & Daryl J. Bem, Does Sex-Biased Job Advertising "Aid and
Abet" Sex Discrimination?, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 6, 7-14 (1973); and Robin Leidner, Serving
Hamburgers and Selling Insurance: Gender, Work, and Identity in Interactive Service Jobs, 5
GENDER& SOC'Y 154, 154, 171-75 (1991).
311. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1805.
312. See id at 1815-32 (explaining that the lack of interest argument assumes that women's
job preferences are pre-existing and independent, and providing evidence that, to the contrary,
employers actually help shape workers' job preferences).
313. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1281-85 (refusing to consider the EEOC's argument that the
highly subjective hiring and selection processes at Sears had a disparate impact upon women); id. at
1317-18 (dismissing the EEOC's argument that Sears' psychological tests disadvantage women). At
the time of this decision, social scientists had shown that subjective selection systems can facilitate
the exercise of both sexual and racial bias. See Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1128 & n.155;
see also William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 120,
123 (2000) (citing more recent research confirming this point).
314. Robert Pear, Changes Weighed in Federal Rules on Discrimination: Employment Is at
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1984, at AI (quoting EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas as stating that
the EEOC "had relied too heavily on statistics" in 50 to 100 of its cases, including Sears, and that
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political landscape, the women's movement had weakened and the old
fault lines had reappeared.315 The Sears suit reflected these changes. The
case was presided over by Judge John Nordberg, a Reagan appointee,
31 6
who at one point during the trial asked the EEOC to prove that American
women had ever been subject to workplace discrimination.317 Nordberg's
decision was affirmed by a conservative Seventh Circuit panel.3 8
Feminist historians testified as expert witnesses on opposite sides,
articulating new versions of older arguments about women's prefer-
ences.
3 19
Furthermore, the resurgence of feminist analyses that once again
highlighted sex differences, while attributing them to forces outside the
labor market,320 lent legitimacy to the lack of interest argument. The
Sears court drew on the testimony of a defense expert, historian Rosalind
Rosenberg, to endorse an analysis of women's work aspirations that was
premised on idealized images of white, middle class motherhood
321
even though the women who worked at Sears were, at best, an uneasy fit
statistical disparities can often be explained by other factors "such as culture, educational levels,
'previous events,' or commuting patterns"); see also FALUDI, supra note 302, at 384 (describing how
Clarence Thomas opposed the Sears case so strongly that the Sears lawyers considered calling him
as their own witness).
315. For descriptions of anti-feminist counter-movements that arose during this period, see
MAYERI, supra note 8, at 78-86; Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 5, at 472-73; Eskridge, Some
Effects, supra note 5, at 2138-41; Siegel, supra note 18, at 1389-403.
316. See FALUDI, supra note 302, at 384 (explaining that Judge Nordberg was a Reagan
appointee who "didn't stand far from Thomas on the issues in the Sears case").
317. Id; see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 295 (explaining that "Judge Nordberg
shared the habits of mind to which [Sears] appealed. In court, he repeatedly placed evidence in the
context of his own experience and that of his wife, convinced that his own family experience pro-
vided the standard for judging the desires of the wage-earning women who typically sought jobs at
Sears"); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 817 (1989) (claiming that
"Sears' attorneys had help from the trial judge in policing gender stereotypes," as Judge Nordberg
"played an active role in shaping the evidence to support his eventual holdings that women lack
interest in 'male' jobs").
318. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming the district
court's finding of no discrimination in an opinion written by Judge Harlington Wood, Jr., a Gerald
Ford appointee, and joined by Judge Jesse Eschbach, a Reagan appointee, over a vigorous dissent by
Judge Richard Cudahy, a Carter appointee); see also Williams, supra note 317, at 820 (characteriz-
ing the Seventh Circuit panel reviewing the case as conservative).
319. See Milkman, supra note 302, at 375-76 (stating that the tension between the testimony of
Rosalind Rosenberg and Alice Kessler-Harris in the Sears case raised the "tension between equality
and difference [that] has divided feminists in a variety of contexts"); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving
the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical
Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 302 (1991) (linking Rosenberg's testimony to difference
feminism).
320. See Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 14, at 1899-919 (describing and criticizing feminist
thought that attributes workplace inequality to family-related differences). For the emergence of
difference feminism, see also infra note 444 and accompanying text.
321. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (accepting
Rosenberg's testimony as "further evidence that men and women were not equally interested in
commission sales at Sears"); Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Dr. Rosalind, reprinted in
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall & Sandi E. Cooper, Women's History Goes to Trial: EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck
and Company, 11 SIGNS 751, 757 (1986) [hereinafter Hall & Cooper, Women's History] (arguing
that men and women have had historically different interests, goals, and aspirations regarding work
and that those aspirations persist into the present); id. at 760-66 (arguing that women remain
committed to the home, prioritizing family obligations over earning potential).
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with the narrative.322 Claiming that "[t]hroughout American history
women have been trained . . . to develop the humane and nurturing
values expected of the American mother," Rosenberg testified that as a
result of those allegedly shared maternal values, women dislike the
competitive environments said to exist in mostly-male occupations and
jobs.323 The EEOC's expert, historian Alice Kessler-Harris, attempted to
counter this reasoning by showing that, historically, diverse groups of
women-including African-Americans, immigrants, working-class
whites, and well-educated professionals-had all entered mostly-male
lines of work when the opportunity became available. Contrary to
Rosenberg's assertion, she stated, these women had not perceived a
conflict between such work and the values or demands associated with
motherhood.324 The presiding judge dismissed Kessler-Harris's testi-
mony on the ground that it pertained only to "unusual women,,325
however, in a move that ignored variation among women and change
over time and disregarded women whose experiences the judge consid-
ered outside the norm.
The Sears case received a great deal of attention, but it was not
an anomaly. Earlier studies of federal court decisions that addressed the
lack of interest argument between the late 1960s and the late 1980s found
that judges accepted the lack of interest argument in about half of the sex
discrimination cases in which it was made.326 These decisions not only
delivered victories to employers on the underlying claims; they also
reasoned about the evidence in ways that favored employers.
Courts departed from the evidentiary approach established in
early race discrimination precedents,327 imposing on sex discrimination
plaintiffs more onerous standards of proof reflecting the biased assump-
tions about women's job preferences that the evidence was intended to
overcome.328 In sex discrimination cases, for example, evidence that theemployer had engaged in past discrimination did not lead courts to
322. Evidence showed, for example, that of the women employed at Sears in 1981 who
responded to a survey question on spousal income, 28% had husbands who were unemployed, 35%
had husbands who earned less than the national median income for men, and of the remaining 37%,
half had husbands with incomes below $25,000 per year. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at
1753 n. 10.
323. Hall & Cooper, Women's History, supra note 321, at 763.
324. Written Testimony of Alice Kessler-Harris, reprinted in Hall & Cooper, Women's His-
tory, supra note 321, at 771-74.
325. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1314.
326. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1766-69, 1776 (describing method of
constructing a data set containing all lower federal court decisions addressing the lack of interest
argument since Title Vil's effective date and reporting that in sex discrimination cases decided from
1967-1989, the courts accepted the argument in 42.6% of cases); Schultz & Petterson, supra note
59, at 1089-95, 1097 (describing methodology and concluding that from 1967-1989, the courts
accepted the argument in 57.4% of cases).
327. For a detailed narrative description of this body of race discrimination cases, see Schultz,
Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1771-75. For a detailed statistical analysis of these cases and how
they differed from sex discrimination cases, see Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1100-66.
328. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1113-34,1180.
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invoke the futility doctrine, under which an alleged failure to apply is
ascribed not to any lack of interest in the work, but to a sense of futility
329caused by the employer's record or reputation for discrimination. In
fact, evidence of past discrimination actually hurt sex discrimination
plaintiffs, because many judges interpreted women's longstanding
absence from mostly-male occupations and jobs as a sign that women
had never been interested-not that employers had excluded or discour-
aged them.33 ° Courts denied the history of labor market discrimination
against women, reverting back to the biased explanations for sex segre-
gation that prevailed when Title VII was enacted.
The courts' failure to acknowledge the existence of sex discrimina-
tion in the labor market led them to accept uncritically employers'
arguments that they had tried and failed specifically to attract women;
courts ruled more frequently for employers who testified to making such
special efforts, even though supporting documentation and a comprehen-
sive plan were often lacking.331 Courts also abandoned their traditional
skepticism toward the lack of interest argument coming from employers
who used highly subjective, standardless selection systems. Although
such subjective systems have been shown to facilitate both sex- and race-
based bias,332 the courts did not attach significance to their use in sex
333discrimination cases, suggesting that judges simply did not see
discrimination as the cause of sex segregation. Nor did courts penalize
employers' failure to openly post, advertise, or recruit for job openings in
sex discrimination cases. Judges were no more likely to reject the lack of
interest argument where employers had relied on word-of-mouth recruit-
ing systems or other closed, "old boy" systems for disseminating
information about job opportunities,334 even though a long line of race
discrimination cases recognized that such systems can differentially
dampen job interest.
335
329. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1781-89; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at
1122 tbl. 4, 1123-25; see also Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1772-74 (discussing the
development and application of the futility doctrine in early race discrimination cases).
330. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1782-85; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at
1124-25.
331. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1789-93; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at
1126-27.
332. See supra note 313.
333. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1128.
334. Id. at 1127-28.
335. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1773-74 (explaining how, in early race
discrimination cases, courts recognized that informal, word-of-mouth recruiting systems had led to
fewer minority applications and thus must be remedied through affirmative recruitment of
minorities); see also Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1127 n.150 (citing cases rejecting the
lack of interest argument due, in part, to a recognition that informal, word-of-mouth recruiting
systems are racially biased); id. at 1127 n.152 (explaining that "extensive literature documents that
male workers are more likely to share job information with other men than with women" and secure
their jobs through personal contacts, whereas women are more likely to rely on formal job search).
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In sex discrimination cases, moreover, courts insisted that plaintiffs
supplement statistical proof with anecdotal evidence of discrimination.
336
Despite important precedents holding that statistical evidence alone
suffices to prove a pattern or practice of discrimination,337 courts con-
demned sex discrimination plaintiffs who failed to present anecdotal
evidence,338 emphasizing the importance of testimony from individual
victims of discrimination.339 In fact, anecdotal evidence was the only
type of proof that helped plaintiffs overcome the lack of interest argu-
ment in sex discrimination cases.340 Without seeing and hearing from
real, live women who had sought and been denied mostly-male jobs,
judges had difficulty believing that ordinary women genuinely wanted
such jobs341 or that discrimination explained why they did not hold them.
These lower court trends were largely attributable to politically con-
servative judges: Judges appointed by Republican presidents were
significantly more likely to accept the lack of interest argument than
judges appointed by Democratic presidents.342 More liberal, mostly
336. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1125-26. In contrast, in race discrimination cases,
"direct or anecdotal evidence of discrimination made little or no difference to the outcome of the
lack of interest argument." Id. at 1125.
337. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (holding that
"gross statistical disparities ... alone" may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination); Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1773-74 (collecting early race discrimina-
tion cases relying on statistical proof and placing little or no emphasis on anecdotal evidence of
discrimination in rejecting the lack of interest argument); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at
1123-26 (making a similar point).
338. Conservative courts have explicitly disregarded statistical proof without additional
evidence of individual discrimination victims. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1795-96;
Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1125. For example, in Sears, the court "berated the EEOC for
failing to produce individual victims of discrimination," Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at
1796, stating that it was "almost inconceivable" that in a nationwide suit involving more than 900
stores, the EEOC could not produce one witness to credibly testify that she had been discriminated
against. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1324 (N.D. 111. 1986). Yet, as Susan
Faludi points out, the EEOC actually had presented testimony from individual victims at trial.
FALUDI, supra note 302, at 385-87.
339. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1796 (finding that in half of the cases where
courts accepted the lack of interest defense, "judges pointed to the fact that plaintiffs had produced
no individual victims"). Even liberal judges relied heavily upon anecdotal evidence to reject the lack
of interest argument, indicating an overall ambivalence as to whether women were generally as
interested in men in certain kinds of work. Id. at 1796-97; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at
1125.
340. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1794 tbls. 5 & 6 (showing the relation
between the presence of anecdotal evidence and the success of the lack of interest argument);
Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1125-26 (demonstrating the positive influence of anecdotal
evidence upon a plaintiffs likelihood of prevailing and concluding that courts are reluctant to find
discrimination absent anecdotal evidence).
341. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1795 ("Anecdotal evidence has served to
convince judges that the 'modern' woman exists-that women have managed to emerge from early
life experiences with aspirations for nontraditional work. This image allows judges to attribute
current patterns of sex segregation to employers' 'coercion' rather than to women's own 'choice."').
342. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1171-73 & tbl. 10 (showing that courts accepted the
lack of interest argument in 66.7% of the cases in which Republican presidents appointed the district
court judge or a majority of the appellate judges on the panel, but they did so in only 48.1% of cases
where Democratic presidents appointed the district court judge or a majority of the appellate panel);
id (showing that 70.8% of Republican judges accepted the lack of interest argument, while only
38.7% of Democratic judges did so).
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Democratic judges frequently rejected the lack of interest argument,
sometimes acknowledging that the argument reflects overly broad
stereotypes343 about women's job interests and sometimes even recogniz-
ing that an employer's past record and reputation for discrimination can
create the apparent lack of interest the employer cites to justify current
sex disparities.344 Overall, however, such decisions tended to adopt the
same troubling evidentiary approaches as their more conservative
counterparts.345 Absent systematic guidance from enforcement agencies
or feminist advocates, judges lacked a coherent framework for ascertain-
ing and analyzing women's job preferences.
346
Had early women's rights activists energetically pursued this issue
with arguments that built on the movement's early successes-
challenging the sex-biased assumptions typically underlying the lack of
interest argument, presenting a dynamic explanation for gendered job
preferences, and insisting on women's latent interest in all forms of
work-courts might well have rejected the lack of interest argument
roundly in sex discrimination cases, just as they did in race discrimina-
tion cases in the civil rights era. Feminists might have persuaded the
EEOC to issue policy guidance on the lack of interest argument, as
occurred on other important sex discrimination issues. Instead, activism
on the issue was muted and plaintiffs' victories failed to cohere into a
systematic rollback of the defense. Over time, judicial rulings on the lack
of interest argument helped normalize sex segregation and revived older
stereotypes about women and work.
Although the lack of interest argument gained momentum dec-
ades ago, it is clear that the argument retains its vitality and hold on the
judiciary. The Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes34 7 provides a striking if subtle example of the way in which courts
continue to rely on the essentialist assumptions underpinning the lack of
interest argument, extending them to new issues such as class certifica-
tion. In 2004, female employees filed a nationwide class action suit
343. See, e.g., Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 326 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding
that job interest surveys cannot be used as a defense in disparate treatment cases because "[e]ven in a
situation where gender stereotypes about work interest patterns reflect reality, it is unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against those whose work interests deviate from the stereotype").
344. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1282 1283 (1 1th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting lack of interest argument from an Old World restaurant that historically refused to hire
women as servers, and recognizing that the restaurant's own past discrimination and present current
reputation for discrimination instead caused recent sex-based isparities); Stender, 803 F. Supp. at
326-27 (stating that "[i]nsofar as women's attitudes towards work are shaped in part by the past
discrimination of their employer, the results of job interest surveys must reflect that past discrimina-
tion. To give much credence to proof which is tainted by the lingering effects of the past discrimina-
tion of an employer would be to prevent courts from recognizing and taking into consideration the
very evolution in women's work interests which Title VII was enacted to encourage").
345. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1785-88, 1795-97; Schultz & Petterson,
supra note 59, at 1124-25, 1173.
346. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1799-815.
347. 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
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against Wal-Mart, claiming the company's use of a highly subjective,
standardless system for promotion and pay discriminated against women
based on their sex. 348 By then, Wal-Mart had eclipsed Sears as the
349
world's largest retailer and the nation's largest employer of women.
When the plaintiffs asked the district court to grant a motion to certify a
nationwide class of women, they presented statistical studies showing
pervasive, company-wide disparities: Women were significantly under-
represented in each managerial classification in nearly every geographic
region in which Wal-Mart was located; women were also promoted two
years later on average than comparable men.
350
The evidence highlighted Wal-Mart's highly centralized, company-
wide selection policies.351 Wal-Mart did not post notice of most promo-
tional positions or permit employees to freely apply for them.352 Instead,
the company deliberately delegated to store managers the discretion to
use their own unspecified, subjective criteria to nominate and select
employees for promotion.353 Although Wal-Mart's system produced few
female promotions, even in comparison to its competitors,354 the compa-
ny's expert attributed the disparities to "differing job aspirations and
interests between men and women which exist in the general labor force
and cannot be blamed on Wal-Mart."
355
348. Id. at 2547; First Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-02252 MJJ), 2001 WL 34134868.
349. Before Wal-Mart, Sears was the largest retailer in the nation. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1986). For many years, including those when the EEOC filed
and prosecuted its lawsuit, Sears was also the largest private sector employer of women in the
United States. Milkman, supra note 302, at 376. Wal-Mart is now the largest retailer and private
employer in the world. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 141. At the time the case was filed, Wal-Mart was
also the nation's largest employer of women. BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC
EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 58 (2005).
350. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 160-61 ("On average, it took women 4.38 years from date of
hire to be promoted to assistant manager, while men took 2.86 years. It took 10.12 years for women
to reach Store Manager, compared with 8.64 years for men."). Overall, the district court found that
[p]laintiffs present[ed] largely uncontested descriptive statistics which show that women
working in Wal-Mart stores are paid less than men in every region, that pay disparities
exist in most job categories, that the salary gap widens over time even for men and
women hired into the same jobs at the same time, that women take longer to enter into
management positions, and that the higher one looks in the organization the lower the
percentage of women.
Id. at 155.
351. Id. at 151-53.
352. Until January 2003, Wal-Mart did not post openings for its Assistant Management
Training Program and posted only a small number of openings for the Co-Manager position. Id. at
149. In addition, despite its stated policy to post hourly Support Manager positions, Wal-Mart did
not post 80% of such openings. Id. Although Wal-Mart did post openings for Store Manager
positions, it did not use an open application process; instead, "candidates were required to obtain
permission from their District Manager before being allowed to apply." Id. Furthermore, store
managers were allowed to nominate employees for management training in a "tap on the shoulder
process" based on largely subjective criteria. Id. at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
353. Id. at 152-53.
354. See infra note 372.
355. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 161.
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The district court rejected this lack of interest argument, finding that
Wal-Mart's system provided female employees "no ability to apply for,
or otherwise formally express their interest in, openings as they arose.,
356
The court credited expert estimony concluding that Wal-Mart's uniform
corporate culture promoted sex stereotyping and influenced managers to
favor men for promotions.357 Female employees confirmed that view,
providing numerous examples of sexism and discrimination by Wal-Mart
managers.358 The court rejected Wal-Mart's effort to discredit and
disaggregate the evidence, ruling that female employees had demon-
strated sufficiently common methods and claims of sex discrimination to
certify a class action.359
The trial court's decision implicitly acknowledged the uniform
harm sustained by female employees at Wal-Mart. In the hands of an
employer who has hired or promoted few women, such as Wal-Mart, a
failure to advertise and recruit openly for jobs or promotional positions
does more than passively exclude women from the web of information
about employment opportunities: It actively signals that the employer
prefers insiders and that newcomers, such as women, are not welcome.36 °
The employer's use of a highly subjective selection system is similarly
destructive not simply because the absence of standards passively
permits supervisors to exercise bias, but also because its opacity actively
discourages women from seeking opportunities. When newcomers such
as women cannot predict whether they have the qualifications for the job,
or even discern what he necessary qualifications are, it becomes difficult
to make the "futile gesture"36-to overcome the sense, reinforced by an
employer's exclusionary record or reputation, that the employer has men
in mind for the job and women are not welcome.362 Thus, allegedly
neutral practices can create active exclusion.
The Supreme Court failed to see these processes at work in Wal-
Mart, however, and held that female employees had failed to establish
the "convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promo-
356. Id at 149.
357. Id at 153-54.
358. Id. at 165-66 (describing some of the anecdotal evidence that women were told that
"[m]en are here to make a career and women aren't," "[r]etail is for housewives who just need to
earn extra money," "you're a girl, why do you want to be in Hardware," and that a store manager
"needed a man in the job" of sporting goods department manager).
359. Id at 166.
360. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1811-13.
361. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1282 (11 th Cir. 2000) (quoting Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-66 (1977)).
362. In Joe's Stone Crab, the district court below and a member of the Eighth Circuit panel
reviewing the case recognized this reality. On top of the general futility that the Eleventh Circuit
majority recognized derived from the employer's history of exclusion of women, they argued that
the employer's current informal, word-of-mouth method of recruiting system and highly subjective
hiring practices were also factors that deterred otherwise interested women. Id. at 1293 (Hull, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 727, 741
(S.D. Fla. 1997), vacated, 220 F.3d 1263 (11 th Cir. 2000).
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tion policy" required to show a common question of law or fact for
purposes of class certification.363 Although the Court's decision reversing
the grant of class certification did not formally endorse or even explicitly
rule on Wal-Mart's lack of interest argument, the opinion's benign,
below-the-surface explanations for the employment disparities ubtly
affirmed the argument's underlying premises. Not only did the ruling
terminate the class action, making it more difficult for women to chal-
lenge similarly pervasive employment and pay inequalities under Title
VII: The reasoning also sanctioned the troubling evidentiary approaches
taken by many lower courts in sex discrimination cases accepting the
lack of interest argument.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia's opinion discarded decades
of judicial findings that overly subjective, discretionary decision-making
systems provide "a ready mechanism for discrimination" that facilitates
and masks bias.364 The Court acknowledged that highly subjective,
discretionary systems such as Wal-Mart's do not produce clear, con-
sistent, objective standards of evaluation or ensure that decision makers
apply the same standards evenhandedly to all candidates.365 Indeed, the
majority conceded, "[t]he whole point of permitting discretionary
decisionmaking is to avoid evaluating employees under a common
standard.,366 Nonetheless, the fact that Wal-Mart's discretionary system
facilitated double standards and discrimination did not mean that its
female employees had common Title VII claims, because although some
managers might exercise their discretion in biased ways, most would not.
"[L]eft to their own devices," wrote Justice Scalia, "most managers in
any corporation-and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids
363. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556-57; see also id. at 2553 54 (setting
a requirement of "significant proof' that the company "operated under a general policy of
discrimination" in order to prove that an individual's claim and a class's claim will share common
questions of law or fact (internal quotation marks omitted)).
364. Rowe v. General Motors, 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972). For examples of early cases,
see Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 240 (5th Cir. 1974) (describing how
courts have ordered that employers develop objective criteria "in order to eliminate the possible
discrimination inherent within subjective employment determinations"); Brown v. Gaston Cnty.
Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir. 1972) (concluding that "the lack of objective
guidelines for hiring and promotion ... are badges of discrimination that serve to corroborate, not to
rebut, the racial bias pictured by the statistical pattern of the company's work force"). For more
recent cases, see Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 871 (11 th Cir. 1985) (stating that subjective
evaluations leave a supervisor "free to indulge a preference, if he has one, for one race of workers
over another" and that subjective and vague criteria "do not allow a reasonable opportunity for
rebuttal" and leave no objective criteria for an employee "to point to in order to show competence");
Boykin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 706 F.2d 1384, 1390 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[a]lthough proof
of discriminatory motive is generally required in disparate treatment cases, the evidence of
subjective, standardless decision-making by company officials, which is a convenient mechanism for
discrimination, satisfies this requirement"); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 990-91 (1988) (noting that "undisciplined system[s] of subjective decisionmaking" may allow
supervisors to exercise bias and act on the basis of "subconscious stereotypes" and have "precisely
the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination").
365. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
366. Id. at 2553.
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sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria
. . . that produce no actionable disparity at all. 367 By denying the
existence of discrimination or depicting it as an aberrant problem,368 the
analysis assumed away the question of commonality the Court was
supposed to consider.
Not only did the Wal-Mart Court legitimate subjective decision-
making systems: The majority also drained even the minimal "special
efforts" requirement of all content by announcing that the mere fact that
Wal-Mart had a written policy forbidding sex discrimination and
threatening penalties showed that the company did not engage in the
alleged sex discrimination.369 Under this reasoning, Wal-Mart was not
required to cite any affirmative efforts to attract or promote female
employees, let alone document that women turned down job offers at
disproportionate rates. Remarkably, the opinion did not even mention-
let alone condemn-Wal-Mart's closed, "tap on the shoulder" system
that permitted managers to promote their favorite candidates without
even apprising other employees of available openings. In disregarding
such aspects of Wal-Mart's selection process, the Court both abandoned
a longstanding judicial commitment to opening up and rationalizing
employee selection processes in ways that eliminated insider favorit-
ism 370 and obscured the ways in which Wal-Mart's practices actively
produced the unequal patterns of promotion and pay its expert attributed
to women's own lack of interest.
The Supreme Court not only concluded that the statistical evidence
did not suffice to show common patterns of sex discrimination: the
opinion actually suggested that proof of significant sex disparities
prevailed at every one of Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores would not necessarily
show such patterns. "Some managers will claim that the availability of
women, or qualified women, or interested women, in their stores' areas
does not mirror the national or regional statistics," Justice Scalia stated
for the majority.371 In this thinly-veiled, updated version of the lack of
interest argument, sex differences in job preferences are not universal,
they are local: Women who work at a Wal-Mart store in, say, rural
Arkansas might be less interested in moving up through the managerial
ranks than women who work in one in urban California. Under this logic,
367. Id. at 2554.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 2553; see supra note 331 (describing the lower courts' earlier evaluation of
employers' claims to have made special efforts to attract and hire women).
370. Historically, the judicial focus on rationalization provided a method to expose and
challenge the processes of insider favoritism, stereotyping, and bias that disadvantaged outsiders,
including women and minorities. For an argument that one of Title VlI's main consequences and
contributions to American life has been that of spurring employers to rationalize their selection
systems by making them more open, objective and accountable in ways that benefit almost all
employees, see Vicki Schultz & Selin Akkan, Rationalizing the Workplace: Title VII's Lasting
Contribution after 50 Years (Sept. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
371. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
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even highly disaggregated proof showing similar patterns of exclusion
and inequality at individual stores all over the country would not suffice
to sustain a class action.372 At each store, the Court suggested, those
patterns might reflect only area women's different preferences or
qualifications, rather than deeply rooted, persistent, and company-wide
employment attitudes, policies and practices.
373
Traditionally, courts relied on anecdotal evidence to overcome such
arguments, citing testimony from individual women who were denied or
discouraged from pursuing jobs.374 The Supreme Court rejected such
testimony from 120 female Wal-Mart employees, however, insisting that
a finding of commonality required testimony from a higher number and
share of class members37 5-including more women from every state and
perhaps even from every Wal-Mart store.376 The majority quoted favora-
bly from the Ninth Circuit dissenting opinion by Judge Kozinski, which
characterized the female employees of Wal-Mart as having "little in
common but their sex and this lawsuit."377 Ironically, this statement
failed to appreciate that it is not Title VII suits, but sex discrimination
itself that targets individuals who are otherwise different and reduces
them to the common denominator of their sex. Thus, the Court wrote off
evidence that Wal-Mart's practices had transformed a diverse collection
of individuals into an artificial class of women-a group whose bosses
disparaged them as "little Janie Q's, ' 378 denied them promotions on the
ground that "[m]en are here to make a career and women aren't,,379 and
372. See id. at 2556 ("Merely showing that Wal-Mart's policy of discretion has produced an
overall sex-based disparity does not suffice."). Inexplicably, the majority opinion failed to mention
that the plaintiffs had submitted expert evidence that controlled for any potential differences in
women's interest at the individual store level. Expert witness Dr. Marc Bendick concluded that,
compared to competitor stores in the same local labor markets, Wal-Mart had a "shortfall" in female
managers in 79.5% of its stores. Declaration of Marc Bendick, Jr., Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification at 2 1, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), 2003 WL 24571703 [hereinafter Bendick Wal-Mart Declaration].
Bendick controlled for any differences in the percentage of qualified, interested women in those
areas and concluded that the dearth of female managers at Wal-Mart compared to its local
competitors was not geographically isolated, but rather was prevalent throughout the nation in both
rural and urban areas for the past twenty-four years. Id. at 9, 21-23. The Supreme Court, however,
found the evidence insufficient to show "the uniform, store-by-store disparity upon which the
plaintiffs' theory of commonality depends." Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
373. But see Bendick Wal-Mart Declaration, supra note 372, at 30-32 (concluding that
women's significant under-representation at Wal-Mart is not based on differences in candidate
interest, reporting, or geographic region, but rather are tied to Wal-Mart's corporate culture and
policies).
374. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 59, at 1125-26.
375. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 & n.370.
376. Id. (noting that the anecdotes only describe experiences in 6 states and in 235 out of 3,400
Wal-Mart stores).
377. Id. at 2557 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting)).
378. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
379. Id.
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deprived them of equal pay because "retail is for housewives who just
need to earn extra money.,
380
In disavowing that such practices systematically deter female em-
ployees from seeking and training for promotions, Wal-Mart's reasoning
reaffirmed a line of caselaw that denies the reality of workplace sex
discrimination and casts doubt on the need for Title VII. The Court's
subtle invocation of women's lack of interest and availability fit a
familiar pattern, flying largely under the radar screen and escaping close
public scrutiny. Although working women had achieved many advances
toward sex equality, by the time of the Wal-Mart decision the idea of
women's rights as a vigorous, unified, in-the-streets social movement
demanding the same rights as men was little more than a memory. In the
more staid world ushered in by the millennium, even the Supreme Court
felt free to adopt reasoning subtly interpreting inequality as the natural
expression of sex differences.
38 1
B. Pregnancy's Problems as Uniquely Female and Unlike Other
Disabilities
Pregnancy discrimination law provides a second example of how
important it is for a social movement to be both engaged and unified in
order to advance legal change, or at least to prevent regression. Whereas
the lack of interest cases suffered from an absence of sustained activist
attention, pregnancy discrimination cases have been negatively affected
by a lack of feminist and agency consensus. When women's rights
activists came together to insist that pregnant women are no different
from other employees who receive or should receive workplace protec-
tions, progress occurred. But when some feminists publicly dissented
from this view and promoted pregnancy's distinctiveness and centrality
to women's special reproductive role, the resulting feminist disagreement
lent courts greater freedom and enhanced legitimacy in returning to older
approaches emphasizing pregnancy as a marker of essential sex differ-
ence.
The history of pregnancy discrimination law is complex,382 but one
set of themes emerges clearly. Pregnancy often entails physical impair-
380. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004), revd, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011).
381. Only a few years later, working women had already felt the negative consequences of the
decision. See, e.g., Nina Martin, The Impact and Echoes of the Wal-Mart Discrimination Case,
PROPUBLICA (Sep. 27, 2013, 9:53 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-impact-and-echoes-
of-the-wal-mart-discrimination-case.
382. Although I am not aware of any single comprehensive history of pregnancy discrimination
law, parts of the history have been ably recounted in many different sources. Accounts consulted
here include Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 67, 71-82 (2013); Dinner, supra note 16, at 422-
64; Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2136-37; Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The
Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality,
13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513, 518-36 (1983); Patricia A. Shiu & Stephanie M. Wildman,
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ments, (such as nausea, fatigue, and a reduced lifting capacity) shared by
many other medical conditions; it also culminates in a physical event,
childbirth, which requires a period of recovery like many illnesses. Yet,
popular images of pregnancy portray it as a unique experience that is
foundational to womanhood and incomparable to any other condition-
images that together comprise what I refer to as the uniqueness view of
pregnancy. Due to the persistence of this view, efforts to define preg-
nancy functionally as a condition that can interfere with the ability to
work like many others, thus bringing it under the conceptual framework
of disability, have never fully succeeded. In the more conservative,
totalizing version of the uniqueness view, pregnancy reflects a choice to
pursue motherhood over work that inevitably reduces women's work
commitments and competencies.383 In the more liberal version of this
view approved by some feminists, pregnancy and motherhood do not
automatically alter women's work aspirations, but they do conflict with
standard workplace norms in ways that require accommodation of the
female experience.384 Both uniqueness approaches reject comparing
pregnancy to similarly disabling conditions and set pregnant women
apart from other employees.
Despite their different political valences, both versions of the
uniqueness view have had negative effects on the law. In the 1970s, the
Supreme Court deployed the conservative version of uniqueness to
women's disadvantage, upholding policies treating pregnant employees
less favorably than other workers with similar disabilities;385 in the
1980s, the Court used the more liberal version to women's advantage,
upholding laws treating pregnant employees more favorably than such
other workers.386 In recent decades, the legal status of pregnancy has
returned full circle: Pregnancy discrimination claims are on the rise,
387
Pregnancy Discrimination and Social Change: Evolving Consciousness About a Worker's Right to
Job-Protected, Paid Leave, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 126-44 (2009); Lise Vogel, Debating
Difference: Feminism, Pregnancy, and the Workplace, 16 FEMINIST STUD. 9, 10-15 (1990); Deborah
A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended
Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 979-84, 989-1004 (2013); Wendy W.
Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 333-51 (1985); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality
and Anti-Discrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82
GEO. L.J. 193, 198-207 (1993); Schwartz, supra note 107, at 24-28. Here I offer my own interpreta-
tion of the underlying events.
383. In the conservative view, pregnancy is a physical symbol of women's difference that
provokes all the conventional biased assumptions about how women's alleged differences lead them
to automatically prioritize family roles over work roles, discussed supra at text accompanying notes
40-47. For an insightful discussion of how pregnancy triggers these biases, see Brake & Grossman,
supra note 382, at 102-07 (describing how pregnancy provokes stereotyped views of mothers as less
competent and less committed to their work).
384. See infra notes 428-44 and accompanying text.
385. See infra notes 389-417 and accompanying text.
386. See infra notes 445-51 and accompanying text.
387. See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited May 24,
2015) (showing a 46% increase in pregnancy discrimination complaints filed with the EEOC
20151 1067
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
and employers once again subject pregnant women to harsher treatment
than more favored employees. Courts rely on pregnancy's uniqueness to
approve such discriminatory treatment, making ever more fine-grained
distinctions between pregnant women's problems and other physical
disabilities.8 8 Although the uniqueness view of pregnancy has some-
times delivered pregnant women short-term victories, ultimately it
distances pregnant women from their coworkers in ways that reinforce
the very differences and inequalities that early women's rights activists
successfully challenged.
1. Division Over the Uniqueness and Disability Views of
Pregnancy
The Supreme Court's mid-1970s decisions in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert389 and Geduldig v. Aiello390 illustrate the problems associated
with the uniqueness view of pregnancy. Both cases upheld the validity of
temporary disability plans that excluded pregnancy, plans that at the time
were not unusual. Over the years, American employers had used the state
protective labor laws that were meant to protect women from overwork
as the basis for crafting a host of policies that treated pregnant workers
differently and less favorably than similarly disabled men. In the name
of protection, employers routinely subjected pregnant women to a
barrage of discriminatory practices, refusing to hire them, firing them,
denying them health care coverage and sick pay, and forcing them to
take maternity leave-typically without pay, benefits, seniority, or
reinstatement rights-regardless of whether they wanted to continue
working.392 Employers justified these exclusionary policies by appealing
to the conservative version of the uniqueness view of pregnancy. They
argued that, unlike other temporarily disabled employees, pregnant
women were merely secondary workers who did not intend to return to
between fiscal years 1997 to 2011); Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related
Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (July 14, 2014), http://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/pregnancyguidance.cfm [hereinafter EEOC 2014 Pregnancy Discrimination
Guidance) (collecting sources showing that "pregnancy discrimination complaints have risen at a
faster rate than the steady influx of women into the workplace" and that women of color are
particularly affected).
388. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 382, at 963, 1004, 1008-09.
389. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
390. 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974). The analysis here will focus on Gilbert, as it involved Title VII
and was later overruled by Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978 following
extensive activist efforts.
391. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 382, at 12; Widiss, supra note 382, at 981-82. For a general
discussion of state protective laws and the role of traditional women's groups and organized labor in
advocating them, see supra notes 80, 114-22 and accompanying text.
392. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 382, at 12; Widiss, supra note 382, at 963, 978-79. Because
most private employers excluded pregnancy from their disability plans (as was permitted in many
states), pregnant women received no replacement income during these mandatory leaves. Vogel,
supra note 382, at 12.
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work after giving birth and who therefore lacked the work commitment
to warrant the usual protections.393
In both Geduldig and Gilbert, the Court upheld such plans, implic-
itly agreeing with employers that pregnancy is fundamentally different
from other medical conditions because pregnancy is a choice.394 "Preg-
nancy is, of course, confined to women," Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the majority in Gilbert. "But it is in other ways significantly different
from the typical covered disease or disability. The District Court found
that it is not a 'disease' at all, and is often a voluntarily undertaken
and desired condition.,395 Because pregnancy was distinguishable from
covered disabilities and was not completely coextensive with sex, the
Court held, there was no basis for inferring that General Electric (GE)
had excluded pregnancy from coverage as a pretext for discriminating
• . 396
against women.
Although commentators have made wide-ranging and important
criticisms of Geduldig and Gilbert,397 the literature has largely over-
looked the troubling, self-reinforcing quality of their reasoning and
results. As Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out, GE's plan covered
many potentially voluntary "disabilities.' 398  The Court's appeal to
voluntariness did not distinguish pregnancy from other covered condi-
tions, but it did obscure the coercion involved in forcing pregnant women
out on unpaid leave.399 By becoming pregnant, the analysis hints, women
choose not only to have children, but also to place family above work in
a way that people with other medical conditions do not.400 The language
of choice subtly appeals to totalizing notions of pregnancy and mother-
hood: Pregnancy is a singular, defining moment in a woman's life that
unleashes a host of other differences, including different priorities and
preferences about work.4 °' Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's reference to
393. Dinner, supra note 16, at 425 26, 455-56 (showing that both in the Gilbert case and in
opposition to the passage of the PDA, employers argued that pregnant women did not deserve
disability benefits because their general patterns of intermittent employment demonstrated that they
were not committed workers with the same level of labor force attachment as men).
394. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 489-92.
395. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
396. Id.
397. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,
983 n.107 (1984) (collecting numerous articles criticizing Geduldig and Gilbert in the decade
following the decisions).
398. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that GE's disability plan covered
"sport injuries, attempted suicides, venereal disease, disabilities incurred in the commission of a
crime or during a fight, and elective cosmetic surgery").
399. Id. at 150 n.1 (noting that GE's current policies frequently forced pregnant women onto
leave).
400. Id.
401. In briefs urging the Court to hold that excluding pregnancy was not sex discrimination,
General Electric and other employers made these arguments explicitly, insisting that pregnant
women "more often than not did not return to work after delivery" and that those who did "would be
tempted to malinger" to stay home longer with their children. Some argued that because new
mothers don't ordinarily retum to work, providing pregnancy disability benefits would serve as a
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women's "differing roles in the scheme of human existence" invoked
precisely this image of pregnancy as the gateway to a life of domesticity
and difference.40 2 In the Court's analysis, failing to pay disability benefits
to pregnant employees simply reflected a natural order in which women
stop working when they become pregnant. The majority failed to
contemplate that this gendered pattern did not simply spring from nature,
but rather from man-made policies that relegated women to marginal
jobs and forced them home without pay when they became pregnant.
Justice Brennan's dissent acknowledged that reality. In contrast to
the "hypothetical '403 world of neutral actuarial risk analysis presumed by
the majority, Brennan's analysis depicted employer disability policies as
the artifacts of a labor market permeated with "stereotypes and signals
concerning the pregnant woman employee.,,4°' These biases had shaped
employment policies at General Electric, the Justice emphasized: The
trial court had found that the company's "discriminatory attitude"
toward women was "a motivating factor in its policy 'A 5 and that its
disability plan was not neutral "in its intent.,406 Indeed, the disability
plan was a part of GE's long history of discriminating against women,
"who were presumed to play only a minor and temporary role in the
labor force.40 7
Justice Brennan not only recognized the history of discriminatory
treatment of pregnant women by General Electric and other American
companies: He acknowledged that such discrimination had negatively
affected women's labor market attachment. The Justice highlighted the
real-world effects of policies like GE's, citing "the uniform testimony of
governmental investigations which show that pregnancy exclusions
built into disability programs both financially burden women workers
and act to break down the continuity of the employment relationship,
"unique form of severance pay" not given to other workers. Dinner, supra note 16, at 424-46
(quoting from briefs filed by General Electric and various amici).
402. In the part of the opinion analyzing whether the disability plan's exclusion of pregnancy
had an illegal disparate impact, the majority concluded that he company was not required to include
pregnancy and thus provide a greater economic benefit to women "because of their differing roles in
'the scheme of human existence."' Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 n.17. Here, Justice Rehnquist changed
the wording used by the district court judge, who had referred to pregnancy as "women's biologi-
cally more burdensome place in the scheme of human existence." Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F.
Supp. 367, 383 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The
subtle change of phrase belies a view that pregnancy is more than just a temporary biological
condition; it is the pathway to motherhood, a social role unlike any other that marks women as
different and defines their destinies.
403. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 160.
405. Id at 150 (quoting Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 383).
406. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 382) (internal quotation marks omitted).
407. Id. at 149 n.1. Originally, the company did not even allow its female employees to
participate in the disability plan, on the theory that "women did not recognize the responsibilities of
life, for they probably were hoping to get married soon and leave the company." Id. Eventually, GE
allowed women to participate in the plan, but continued to cap their wages at two-thirds the level
paid to men. Id.
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thereby exacerbating women's comparatively transient role in the
labor force."40 8 Thus, in contrast to the majority's opinion, Brennan's
dissent acknowledged that the interrupted employment patterns exhibited
by many American women did not simply reflect a choice to prioritize
pregnancy and childrearing over paid work. Instead, those patterns were
partly attributable to discriminatory employment policies that pressured
or encouraged pregnant women to leave the labor force, thereby creating
the very intermittency employers later cited to justify those policies.
Justice Brennan's dissent reveals the importance of an engaged, uni-
fied activist feminist presence pressing for change in the law. Although
their view did not prevail in Gilbert, by that time feminist activists had
forged a new consensus about pregnancy discrimination, successfully
lobbied the EEOC, and laid the groundwork for new Congressional
thinking on the issue. The dissent explicitly acknowledged the influence
of feminist organizations. To support finding GE's plan discrimi-
natory,40 9 he cited the EEOC's 1972 guidelines on pregnancy discrimina-
tion, which instructed employers to treat pregnancy-related disabilities
the same as other temporary disabilities for purposes of insurance and
sick leave plans.410 While the majority refused to defer to the guidelines
due to the agency's initial waffling,4 I Brennan commended the EEOC
for comprehensively studying the issue with input from organizations
like the feminist Citizens' Advisory Council.412 The EEOC had enacted
the guidelines in response to the efforts of two young staff attorneys who
were persuaded by the Council's 1970 declaration that pregnancy should
be treated as a temporary disability for all job-related purposes.
4 13
408. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
409. Id. at 152.
410. Id. at 156 (citing Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Child Birth, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.10(b) (1975)). The guidelines were originally promulgated in 1972. See Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (Apr. 5, 1972).
411. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140-45. For a description of the EEOC's early ambivalence and
inconsistency, see supra note 164.
412. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 156-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Citizens' Advisory Council was
an important, highly visible successor to President's Kennedy's Commission on the Status of
Women. Their 1970 statement of principles declared that "[c]hildbirth and complications of
pregnancy are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such
under any health insurance, temporary disability insurance, or sick leave plan of an employer, union,
or fraternal society." CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, JOB-RELATED MATERNITY BENEFITS 3 (1970) (emphasis omitted) (citing Citizen Advisory
Council's earlier October 29, 1970 Statement of Principles). The Council was the first feminist
group to adopt a functional disability approach to pregnancy.
413. Swayed by the Council's 1970 Statement of Principles, new attorney Susan Deller Ross
argued that the EEOC should take that same approach comparing pregnancy to other disabilities
similarly affecting an employee's ability to work. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 30-31;
Schwartz, supra note 107, at 23 24. By then, nascent feminist groups had increased demands to
address pregnancy discrimination a d begun to embrace the newer egalitarian thinking that shunned
protectionist claims based on sexual difference. In this new climate, Ross and her colleague Nancy
Stanley prevailed and the EEOC's 1972 guidelines on pregnancy discrimination adopted the
functional disability approach, Schwartz, supra note 107, at 24-28, overcoming the agency's earlier
ambivalence. See supra note 164. Thus, feminist debate inside and outside the government was
crucial to the development of the EEOC's new approach. Dinner, supra note 16, at 456-57; Widiss,
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This approach represented a shift from the Advisory Council's ear-
lier position, which, influenced by traditional feminist protectionist
concerns,414 had advocated maternity leaves extending beyond the period
of actual physical disability in order to recognize women's maternal
caregiving role.41 5 In a ground-breaking move, the Council's new
position separated the initial period of physical disability due to preg-
nancy and childbirth from the subsequent period of infant care and
bonding. 6 This distinction allowed both pregnancy and caregiving,
which previously had been seen as exclusively female experiences, to be
compared to other life experiences affecting both men and women:
Pregnancy could be conceptualized as a temporary disability, like many
others that may affect both male and female employees; maternal
bonding could be reconceived as parental caregiving, something both
fathers and mothers can provide. Thus, the Council's new functional
disability approach helped consolidate an emerging feminist consensus to
move beyond the view of pregnancy as a unique and defining experience
for women, just as activists were doing at the time with respect to other
policies that presumed women's essential difference. 7
Debate over the nature of pregnancy and its relationship to women's
employment reemerged, however, in subsequent efforts to pass the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)418 and to interpret it in the
case of California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra (commonly
referred to as Cal. Fed.).419 Soon after Gilbert was announced, a group of
women's rights advocates, lawyers and law professors centered in East
Coast institutions mobilized to overturn it. 42° Building on the Advisory
Council's report, the EEOC's pregnancy discrimination guidelines, and
Justice Brennan's dissent in Gilbert, these East Coast feminists pushed
supra note 382, at 989-91; Schwartz, supra note 107, at 28. For an in-depth account of the evolution
of the EEOC's approach in this early era, see Schwartz, supra note 107, at 9-28.
414. See supra note 80.
415. See Dinner, supra note 16, at 450-51, 453.
416. See id. at 454-55. (discussing this issue and citing statements by Citizens' Advisory
Council Chair Jacquelyn Gutwillig about the innovation and importance of distinguishing legally
between childbirth and childcare).
417. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
418. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
419. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
420. Georgetown law professor Wendy Williams and ACLU attorney Susan Deller Ross took
the first steps towards organizing the coalition that helped draft and pass the PDA. Susan Deller
Ross had been a lawyer at the EEOC who worked on the EEOC's 1972 guidelines relating to
pregnancy and childbirth and persuaded the EEOC to adopt the disability approach based on the
Citizens' Advisory Council's 1970 Statement of Principles. Widiss, supra note 382, at 993;
Schwartz, supra note 107, at 24-28; supra note 413 and accompanying text. Williams had argued
before the Supreme Court in Geduldig on behalf of the women challenging the law excluding
pregnancy from California's disability insurance plan. Schwartz, supra note 107, at 35-36. Most of
the East Coast women's rights organizations supported these feminists' efforts and the disability
approach they urged Congress to adopt in the PDA. Id. at 63. For an account of how these feminists
came together and organized a broad coalition to support the PDA, see id.at 58-69.
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Congress to adopt a functional disability approach.4 2 1 Like the members
of the Council, they believed that, for purposes of employment discrimi-
nation law, it was best to compare pregnancy to other illnesses or
disabilities that similarly affected an employee's ability or inability to
work. Their view reflected both practical and normative considera-
422tions. These activists recognized the deeply embedded urge to treat
pregnancy as unique, but worried that giving into that urge and affording
pregnant women leaves not available to other employees affirmed
stereotypes about pregnant women's primary commitment to family and
risked harming their employment prospects.3 They also believed it was
fundamentally unfair to give pregnant women benefits that male and
female employees who suffered from similarly disabling conditions did
not receive.
424
Congress adopted the disability approach advocated by these femi-
nists in the PDA. The statute not only defines sex discrimination to
include pregnancy discrimination; it also requires employers to treat
pregnant women "the same . . . as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work." 425 Committee reports and
421. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 382, at 15-19; Widiss, supra note 382, at 999-1001.
422. See Shiu & Wildman, supra note 382, at 136. These feminists did not equate pregnancy
with disability in any metaphysical or experiential sense; they were making a practical, legal
argument that based the definition of pregnancy on the purpose for which it was being defined. As
Wendy Williams put it:
[w]hen a woman goes into labor, the measures appropriate for someone having a heart
attack won't help; but if both childbirth and a heart attack cause an inability to work and
income loss, it makes sense to encompass both within a disability program designed to
cushion the economic effects of temporary inability to work.
Williams, supra note 382, at 357.
423. See CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 412, at 4
(noting that affording pregnant women benefits not available to other temporarily disabled workers
"could very well result in reluctance to hire women of childbearing age"); see also Brief of
American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Cal. Fed., 479
U.S. 272 (No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728369, at *9 [hereinafter ACLU Cal. Fed. Brief] (arguing that
giving pregnant workers benefits not extended to other disabled employees "places women
perpetually outside the mainstream of the labor force, permanently marginalizing their role as
workers"); Williams, supra note 382, at 367 (including similar observations by one of the original
feminist architects of the PDA); Schwartz, supra note 107, at 73 (quoting a similar observation by
Susan Deller Ross, another architect of the PDA).
424. Reformers in both the 1970s and '80s cited contemporary data showing that women and
men lost roughly the same amount of time from work due to disability, including pregnancy-related
issues. ACLU Cal. Fed Brief, supra note 423, at 25; CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS
OF WOMEN, supra note 411, at 4. The Citizens' Advisory Council concluded in 1970 that giving
pregnant women more benefits than men and women who were similarly disabled "is not sociologi-
cally or economically justified and would be divisive." CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE
STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 412, at 4. Wendy Williams similarly emphasized that a disability
approach could foster policy changes that would benefit all workers, whereas extending benefits to
pregnant workers alone could "shift attention from the fact that the employer has a generally
inadequate sick leave policy to the fact that some employees have special privileges." Williams,
supra note 382, at 371.
425. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). The PDA is commonly
referred to as having two clauses. The first extends the terms .'because of sex' or 'on the basis of
sex"' in Title VII to include "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or other related
medical conditions." Id. The second clause states that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
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floor debates reveal that Congress specifically rejected the idea that
pregnancy is such a distinct experience that pregnant women cannot be
compared to non-pregnant employees with similarly limiting disabili-
411ties. Indeed, in considering the PDA, Congress demonstrated a
sophisticated awareness that stereotypes distinguishing women from
other employees based on pregnancy had historically harmed women and
had justified failing to take them seriously as workers.427
During the 1980s, however, a group of feminist advocates based in
West Coast institutions began to champion a different approach. In
contrast to the disability approach urged by East Coast women's groups
and adopted by Congress and the EEOC in the 1970s, these feminists
articulated a newer, more liberal version of the view that pregnancy is a
unique, female-specific experience that cannot and should not be
compared to other disabling conditions. Composed primarily of feminist
law professors and lawyers, this group used this uniqueness argument to
defend state laws requiring employers to provide job-protected disability
leaves to pregnant women, even if they did not offer them to other
temporarily disabled employees, against claims that the laws violated the
PDA's command to treat pregnancy the same as other conditions simi-
larly affecting the ability to work.428
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work." Id.
426. For example, a Senate committee report stated, "[b]y defining sex discrimination to
include discrimination against pregnant women, the bill rejects the view that employers may treat
pregnancy and its incidents as sui generis, without regard to its functional comparability with other
conditions." S. REP. No. 95-331, at 4 (1977); See also H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 4 (1978) (calling the
bill's approach "narrow" and emphasizing that it would not require employers to treat pregnant
employees specially, but would rather "simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as
other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work"); Widiss, supra note 382, at 995-
96 (noting that "[a]s a threshold matter, legislators considered and rejected arguments that pregnancy
differed from classic disabilities") (citing S. REP. No. 95-331, at 4 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 4
(1978)).
427. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 6 (1978) (noting that employers' discriminatory policies
toward pregnant women "have long-term effects upon the careers of women and account in large
part for the fact that women remain today primarily in low-paying, dead-end jobs"); H.R. REP. No.
95-948, at 3, 6-7 (1978) (noting that "[a]s testimony received by this committee demonstrates, the
assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor force leads to the view of women
as marginal workers, and is at the root of the discriminatory practices which keep women in low-
paying and dead-end jobs" and that "[w]omen are still subject to the stereotype that all women are
marginal workers. Until a woman passes the child-bearing age, she is viewed by employers as
potentially pregnant"); 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("Because of their
capacity to become pregnant, women have been viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full
benefits of compensation and advancement granted to other workers.").
428. Members of this group supported California's and Montana's pregnancy-specific leave
statutes in cases challenging their validity under the PDA that were winding through the courts, such
as Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry, 694 F.2d 203 (1982), and California
Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). Dinner, supra note 16, at 474. The East
Coast and West Coast feminist groups debated the validity of these statutes and their respective
views of pregnancy in two key articles, one by Wendy Williams advocating the East Coast group's
functional disability approach, Williams, supra note 382, at 325, 351-52, and another by Linda
Krieger, then a law professor at Berkeley, and Patricia Cooney advocating the West Coast group's
liberal uniqueness approach. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 382. Linda Krieger represented the party
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These advocates had admirable intentions: They believed that
women could never achieve workplace equality without the benefit of
affirmative protections for pregnancy that other groups did not need.429
Articulating this position, an amicus brief filed by a coalition spear-
headed by members of the group in the Cal. Fed case argued that,
because only women can become pregnant, statutes requiring employers
to give only pregnant women job-protected leaves do not discriminate,
but rather prevent discrimination by allowing women to keep their jobs
while exercising the same procreative choice as men. °30 To support this
argument, the brief described pregnancy as unique to women in stark,
unmistakable terms, urging that because "women, and women alone,"
bear the risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth, they require
special protection.
431
In other writings, feminists in this tradition were even more explicit
in stressing pregnancy's uniqueness and its profound, definitional effect
on women. Many rejected the PDA's approach comparing pregnancy to
other disabilities.432 In the eyes of most of society, after all, "pregnancy
of interest in the initial state proceedings in Cal. Fed., and Patricia Shiu later took over the case. Shiu
& Wildman, supra note 382, at 130; Widiss, supra note 382, at 999 n.167. Other women in this
group filed briefs as amicus counsel in the Cal. Fed. case, discussed more fully below. See infra
notes 445-51 and accompanying text. Although the debate between the East Coast and West Coast
feminists is commonly referred to as the "equal treatment" versus "special treatment" debate, see,
e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 206; Shiu & Wildman, supra note 382, at 139, those terms do not
capture the complexity of the controversy or convey any sense of the important dimensions of the
issues discussed here.
429. See, e.g., Krieger & Cooney, supra note 382, at 515.
430. Brief for the Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace (CREW) et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 35-38, 43-45, Cal. Fed, 479 U.S. 272 (No. 85-494), 1986
WL 728372 [hereinafter CREW Cal. Fed. Brief]. CREW was a coalition of reproductive rights and
labor groups organized by the Southern California chapter of the ACLU, which filed an amicus brief
in Cal. Fed. defending the California statute, while the national ACLU filed a brief opposing the law
as written. Shiu & Wildman, supra note 382, at 137-38. The CREW coalition included influential
UCLA law professor Christine Littleton and then-USC law professor Judith Resnik. Id. at 138. The
national ACLU brief was written by attorneys in the Women's Rights Project, id. at 137-38, the unit
headed earlier by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See supra text accompanying note 251.
431. The passage from the CREW brief in its entirety reads:
Women, and women alone, are at risk of illness from pregnancy. Women, and women
alone, may have to have surgery during the childbirth process. Women, and women
alone, may need time physically to recuperate from childbirth. To deny women's specific
role in childbirth is to relegate women to the position of having to choose between child-
birth and work.
CREW Cal. Fed. Brief, supra note 430, at 21 (emphasis added).
432. See, e.g., Wendy Chavkin, Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting, and Work, in
DOUBLE EXPOSURE: WOMEN'S HEALTH HAZARDS ON THE JOB AND AT HOME 196, 202 (Wendy
Chavkin ed., 1984) (arguing that pregnancy is not comparable to disability because it is not an illness
but rather a unique condition); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1136, 1139 (1986) (noting that
pregnancy is unique and thus treating it like a disability or an illness is illogical, and that "it would
be a shame to treat" a free, natural choice "as if it were something unfortunate like a workplace
injury"); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Inequality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1292-93
n.82 (1987) (arguing that treating pregnancy like a hernia may not help women if existing benefit
schemes are paltry or insufficient); Scales, supra note 15, at 429-30 (criticizing the PDA for failing
to recognize pregnancy's uniqueness and comparing it to a disability); Reva B. Siegel, Note,
Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 930 n.7,
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[was] presumed to be natural and good, whereas disabilities [were]
presumed to be unnatural and bad.,433 To these feminists, identifying
pregnancy as a "disability" implied that what was "normal" was to be not
pregnant, or, as they saw it, to be male.434 The functional disability
approach was misguided, in their view, because it "stigmatize[d] child-
bearing as a pathological departure from an implicitly male norm.
' 435
These feminists sought to normalize pregnancy and childbirth and other
female reproductive experiences.
Professor Ann Scales's pioneering 1980 law review article436 pro-
vides an early, clear example of this reasoning. Scales criticized the
disability approach reflected in the PDA, castigating Congress for
"refus[ing] to accept the idea that pregnancy is in any way a unique
condition."437 Scales argued that because pregnancy and breastfeeding
"really [do] differentiate women from men, it is crucial that we
overcome any aversion to describing these functions as
'unique.'"438 "Uniqueness is a 'trap,"' Scales contended, "only in terms
of an analysis . . . which assumes that maleness is the norm. 'Unique'
does not mean uniquely handicapped."'439 In her view, liberal feminists
and politicians wrongfully sought to develop institutions that would
"nullify the effect of ... the natural differences," and that such
change could occur
only if pregnancy were strictly confined to the category of 'disa-
bility,' if it were treated like a growth to be removed, if pregnant
workers departed from and returned to work without recognition of
their new motherly status and if the heterosexual nuclear family
were abolished and social institutions for childrearing developed
so that the birth would have no effect on the life of the pregnant per-
440
son.
Overall, these writings suggest that the critique was motivated by a
desire to preserve or elevate women's social status in relation to preg-
942 (1985) (arguing that "fundamentally, pregnancy is neither a disability nor a dysfunction, but a
normal moment in the human reproductive process specific to women"); see also Vogel, supra note
382, at 22-23 (noting that many of these feminists were "repelled by ... the ... representation of
pregnancy as a disability").
433. Matzzie, supra note 382, at 194.
434. See, e.g., Chavkin, supra note 432, at 202-03; Finley, supra note 432, at 1147-48;
Krieger & Cooney, supra note 382, at 545; Law, supra note 397, at 1007; Scales, supra note 15, at
430; Siegel, supra note 432, at 930 & n.7; see also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from
Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE
L.J. 1, 35 n.104 (1995) (noting that many feminists have "sought to recapture the notion that
pregnancy is an ability women have that men lack, rather than a disability") (emphasis in original).
435. Vogel, supra note 382, at 23.
436. Scales, supra note 15.
437. Id. at 405; see also id. (criticizing Congress for "act[ing] from the premise that pregnancy
is not a special condition and not entitled to special treatment").
438. Id. at 435 (alteration in original).
439. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
440. Id. at 429.
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nancy and mothering," a status thought to be demeaned by comparisons
to disability. In embracing such aims, these advocates implicitly invoked
(while refashioning) traditional protectionist aims that earlier women's
442movement leaders had set aside in Title VII's wake, publicly signaling
a breakdown of feminist consensus and heralding a newly divided future.
Long after the controversy over pregnancy-specific benefits ended, many
feminists continued to distinguish pregnancy from disability443 and to
criticize arrangements allegedly embodying a male norm.444
The reemergence of the uniqueness view of pregnancy among femi-
nists split a previously unified group, signaling a lack of cohesion and
providing space for the Supreme Court to revive older assumptions about
women's difference. In 1987, in Cal. Fed., the Court was called upon to
decide whether the PDA's second clause preempted the California law,
referred to above, requiring employers to provide job-protected disability
441. Professor Scales argued, as a theoretical matter, that women's physical reproductive
capacity was the original source of their social differentiation from, and subordination, to men. Id. at
425 (arguing that the sexual division of labor was rooted in women's reproductive capacity, which
kept "women, due to pregnancy, nursing and the maintenance of children, . . . restricted in their
function to childbearing and the productive tasks that could be accomplished in the home"); see also
Siegel, supra note 432, at 954 (contending that "[s]ocial relations are hierarchically organized
around the reproductive difference that exists between women and men"). This theoretical grounding
may help explain why this line of feminist analysis tended to highlight and naturalize pregnancy in
legal argument.
442. See supra notes 80, 148-56 and accompanying text.
443. See WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 219 (explaining that some feminists saw an approach
that equated pregnancy and disability as calling for assimilation into male-defined institutions and
norms and worsening the situation of many women); Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability" and
the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 448 nn.24-25 (2012) (collecting
sources).
444. For a classic critique of the male norm, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 36 (1987) (arguing that "[m]en's physiology defines
most sports, their needs define auto and health insurance coverage, their socially designed
biographies define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and
concerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit..." and so on)
(footnote omitted). For other examples, see WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 207 (contending that gender
equality requires "dismantling ... masculine norms"); Finley, supra note 432, at 1120 (arguing that
the law "leaves unquestioned the notion that life patterns and values that are stereotypically male are
the norm . . ."); Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV.
1043, 1051 (1987) (observing that society is constructed from the "male point of view," and defining
maleness as a social and not simply a biological category).
In feminist legal circles, there was substantial overlap between these criticisms of
approaches allegedly preserving male norms and criticisms of the allegedly elitist strategies used by
early women's rights advocates. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Both sets of criticisms
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and both targeted formal equality approaches on the
ground that they failed to challenge implicitly male-defined norms or to otherwise take account of
women's enduring differences and disadvantages. Over time, these criticisms spawned and became
part of a larger feminist tradition that stressed and sought accommodation for women's distinctive
life experiences. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 56-75 (3d
ed., 2013) (describing the development of feminist theories in this tradition); ALICE ECHOLS,
DARING To BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967-1975, at 4 5, 199-202, 243-86 (1989)
(describing the historical development of this strand of difference feminism); DEBORAH RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER 309-15 (1989) (describing the feminist debate over sexual difference that
began in the late 1970s and early 1980s).
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leaves for pregnancy but not for similar disabilities.445 Given the clash
between women's rights advocates on this issue, the "feminist legal
community was 'in a state of tension and disarray"' at the time.
446
The Court upheld the validity of the California statute, ruling it did
not conflict with the PDA. 4 7 Justice Marshall's opinion for the majority
acknowledged that, if read literally, the text of the PDA would preclude
treating pregnancy more favorably than other disabilities with a similar
affect on work ability.448 The Court rejected such a plain reading,
however, reasoning that the California law served the underlying purpose
of Title VII by permitting "women, as well as men, to have families
without losing their jobs."449 This reasoning tracked the West Coast
feminists' argument that, because only women can become pregnant,
mandating pregnancy-specific leave does not promote discrimination, but
rather avoids it by providing women the same choices as men.45' In
adopting such an analysis, the Court rejected the position of the East
Coast women's rights groups-who argued that the California law
conflicted with the PDA's directive to treat pregnancy the same as other,
similarly disabling conditions, but urged resolving the conflict by
extending the statute's protections to all such conditions, thus affirming a
broad version of the functional disability approach.451
445. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 275-77, 279-81 (1987); see
also Shiu & Wildman, supra note 382, at 125, 127 (providing detail on the California statute). The
Court explicitly noted the limited scope of the statute, stressing that it mandated leave only for the
period of physical pregnancy-related isability and did not include additional time for infant care and
bonding like a traditional maternity leave. See Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 290 (noting this fact and
emphasizing that a statute extending leave beyond the period of physical disability would
problematically "reflect archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the abilities of
pregnant workers"). But see WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 225 (observing that doctors typically
certify pregnant women as medically disabled for periods of six to eight weeks after birth, longer
than the period of actual disability, to account for the fact that new mothers often provide virtually
all of the newborn care).
446. Shiu & Wildman, supra note 382, at 137.
447. See Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 285, 291.
448. See id. at 290-91.
449. Id. at 289. The Court's citation to Griggs in the preceding paragraph may suggest the
Justices believed the California statute furthered Title VII's goals by alleviating a disparate impact
on pregnant women that would result from employers' failure to provide temporary disability leave.
Id. at 288 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)). The opinion cited no
empirical support for any such impact.
450. CREW Cal. Fed. Brief, supra note 430, at 7, 10-15.
451. ACLU Cal. Fed Brief, supra note 423, at 36-42, 48-64; Brief of the Nat'l Org. for
Women et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of Neither Party at 11, 20, 26, Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. 272
(No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728368 [hereinafter NOW Cal. Fed. Brief]. NOW and the ACLU urged the
Court to read the California law and Title VII together to "impos[e] mutual and complementary
obligations" upon California employers to give job-protected leave to all disabled employees. NOW
Cal Fed. Brief, supra, at 4-1 ; see ACLU Cal. Fed. Brief, supra note 423, at 48-52. NOW also
argued that if the laws were not so read, the California law would conflict with Title VII and that this
conflict could only be remedied by extending leave to all disabled employees. NOW Cal. Fed Brief,
supra, at 11-31. In an alternative holding, the Court accepted a thin version of NOW and the
ACLU's argument, concluding that even if the PDA were read to prohibit giving leave to pregnant
women only, the California statute would still not be preempted, because the statute merely
established minimum benefits that employers must provide to pregnant workers and employers were
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Although Cal. Fed. and Gilbert typically are portrayed as polar op-
posites,452 a close analysis of the two decisions reveals a remarkably
similar view of pregnancy, albeit marshaled to different ends. The Cal.
Fed. opinion did not discuss the nature of pregnancy, but, like the
reasoning in Gilbert, the analysis in Cal Fed. presumed pregnancy's
uniqueness. This assumption is clear from the Court's choice of the
appropriate comparative baseline for purposes of determining whether
discrimination has occurred under the PDA. In concluding that the
California law furthered Title VII's goals by "allow[ing] women, as well
as men, to have families without losing their jobs, '453 the Court implic-
itly specified the relevant comparators as women, who become pregnant
in order to have families, versus men, who do not.454 Framing the
comparison this way treated pregnancy as a unique aspect of womanhood
and female family-building that men cannot and do not experience-just
as the framework in Gilbert treated pregnancy as a unique, additional
455risk faced by women, but not men. In both cases, the Court relied on
pregnancy's alleged uniqueness to conclude that the laws at issue did not,
and could not, discriminate because the comparators were not similarly
situated with respect to pregnancy. In both cases, the Court's focus on
women's versus men's capacity to become pregnant precluded compar-
ing pregnant women to employees with other disabling medical condi-
456tions, thus assuming away the policy question of which sort of com-
free to give other similarly disabled employees benefits, Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 290-91, and therefore
"compliance with both statutes '[wa]s theoretically possible."' Id. at 291 (quoting Transcript of Oral
Argument at 6, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494)). The
Court did not, however, hold, as NOW and the ACLU requested, that the California statute could
only be saved by interpreting it to require all covered employers to extend disability leave to all
disabled employees.
452. See, e.g., Diana Kasdan, Reclaiming Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace
Discrimination Against Breastfeeding Women, 76 NYU L. REV. 309, 323 n.82 (2001) (noting that in
recognizing the "realities of 'social context,"' the Court took "markedly different" positions in Cal.
Fed. and Gilbert); Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 47 (1991)
(portraying Gilbert as a "false start" and Cal. Fed. as a move "in the correct direction"); Michael J.
Vargas, Title VII and the Trans-Inclusive Paradigm, 32 LAW & INEQ. 169, 181 n.74 (2014)
(calling Cal. Fed "a complete reversal of [the Court's] prior position" in Gilbert); Linda Hassberg,
Comment, Toward Gender Equality: Testing the Applicability ofa Broader Discrimination Standard
in the Workplace, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 217, 221 (1992) (describing Cal. Fed. as a case that "clearly
jettisoned the Geduldig/Gilbert approach").
453. Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 289.
454. Other parts of the opinion confirm this analysis. In a passage parallel to the one quoted in
the text, the Court reasoned that the California statute guaranteed equal employment opportunity by
"ensur[ing] that [women] will not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy." Id. at 272-73. This
statement specified the relevant comparators as pregnant women, who lose their jobs absent leaves,
versus non-pregnant women and men, who do not-a formulation that once again foreclosed
comparing pregnancy to any other medical condition and assumed employees do not lose their jobs
due to conditions other than pregnancy.
455. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 ("For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities
constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does
not destroy the presumed parity of benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from
the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks.").
456. Although Justice Brennan's dissent in Gilbert clarified that the Court's comparative
framework treated pregnancy as unique and precluded comparing pregnancy to other disabling
conditions, see, e.g., id. at 136 (stating that pregnancy is "significantly different from the typical
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parison would better serve Title VII's goals.457 In both cases, moreover,
the Court's analyses foreclosed discussion of the important feedback
effects issue raised in Brennan's Gilbert dissent.458 Specifically, the
Justices failed to consider whether, regardless of their supporters' good
intentions, laws singling out pregnant women for different treatment
might lead to increased stereotyping, discrimination, and resentment
against them and women generally, entrenching even more deeply the
unequal employment patterns and biased perceptions traditionally used to
justify sex discrimination.
At first it may seem puzzling that the liberal majority in Cal. Fed.
would endorse a perspective on pregnancy so similar to the one adopted
by a more conservative Court in Gilbert. After all, Congress had over-
ruled Gilbert and repudiated its reasoning in the PDA, and women's
rights groups had spearheaded this result. Early feminists had encoun-
tered the idea that pregnancy is uniquely female and unlike other
disabilities-among employers, at the EEOC, and in the courts-as part
of a larger set of stereotypes that rationalized inequality as the natural
expression of women's allegedly distinctive biological and social roles.
To make progress under Title VII, they overcame internal divisions, set
aside traditional protectionist arguments valorizing pregnancy and
motherhood, and came together to champion the functional disability
approach. By the time the Cal. Fed. case reached the Supreme Court in
1987, however, the country had become far more conservative along
both political and cultural lines. As the women's movement faced
resistance and faded in strength and unity, the earlier feminist consensus
covered diseased or disability"); id. at 150-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing pregnancy to
other voluntary and reproductive conditions and emphasizing that he Court's analysis precluded
such comparisons), the majority so took this framework for granted that the opinion did not explic-
itly acknowledge that the analysis precluded other comparisons. The concurring and dissenting
opinions came closer to doing so. See, e.g., Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 295 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(agreeing that the California statute may avoid comparing pregnant women to men suffering
somewhat similar disabilities by giving pregnant women preferential treatment); id at 297-300
(White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's holding and citing the PDA's legislative history
to show that Congress's focus was on comparing pregnant women to other similarly disabled
workers to ensure equal treatment).
457. For a more approving interpretation of Cal. Fed. that attempts to rescue it from the pitfalls
of uniqueness thinking, see Noah Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law 48-50 (Feb.
22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Zatz defends Cal. Fed. on the ground that
pregnancy-specific leave is simply a targeted remedy for disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 48-
49. But a leave policy (or other employment policy) may or may not have a disparate impact on
pregnant women or women generally in any particular case, depending on the age, socioeconomic
status, general health, and other characteristics of the employees who hold the job (or who would do
so in the absence of employment discrimination); the issue demands empirical examination. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. II1. 1991). In some labor markets
and workplaces, for example, almost all female workers will complete childbearing by the age of 30,
see, e.g., Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1219, 1233 (1986), while employees overall will experience an increasing number of non-
pregnancy-related medical problems beginning at that age. Thus, if the employees in a workplace
and labor market tend to be 30 or older, an inadequate leave policy may not have a disparate impact
on pregnant employees or on female employees as a result of pregnancy.
458. See supra text accompanying note 408.
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in favor of challenging sex difference had broken down.459 In this newly
conservative climate, older views of pregnancy and motherhood as
foundational female experiences warranting special recognition wit-
nessed a resurgence among feminists and their detractors. 460 As older
societal divisions over sex difference and pregnancy reappeared and
some feminist advocates refashioned uniqueness arguments to defend
pregnancy-specific benefits, the Supreme Court found new freedom to
return to earlier assumptions about pregnancy as a distinctive female
condition in Cal. Fed.461 This time, arguments from a subgroup of
feminists lent legitimacy and support to the Court's decision.
2. Theoretical Disadvantages of the Uniqueness View
In rejecting the disability framework in favor of a uniqueness
view of pregnancy, the Supreme Court endorsed an approach that has
had far-reaching, negative consequences for pregnant workers and other
employees. Traditionally, as in Gilbert, conservatives used assertions of
pregnancy's uniqueness to defend denying pregnant workers benefits
afforded other employees. West Coast feminists flipped these assertions
in Cal. Fed. to argue that pregnancy's uniqueness means it need not be
compared to conditions shared by men to merit legal protection. Despite
the limiting quality of these arguments, the uniqueness view of preg-
nancy urged by feminist advocates and accepted by the Court in Cal.
Fed. held the potential for broader transformation. At bottom, 1980s
feminist arguments against comparing pregnancy to disability and
forcing women to rely on a "male norm" contained an important critique
of the hidden androcentrism affecting institutional life.462 Because sex
bias often provides a lens for exposing other biases and broader harms,
459. For a discussion of the effect of the political and legal landscape of the late 1970s and
early 1980s upon the momentum of the women's rights movement, see supra notes 314-19 and
accompanying text. Note that the period between the PDA's 1978 enactment and the Supreme
Court's 1987 Cal. Fed. decision is, not coincidentally, the same as the one between the 1978 Kyriazi
decision and the 1986 Sears decision discussed in Part llI.A supra.
460. For a discussion of the rise of conservative social movements venerating women's
maternal role, see DONALD. T. CRICHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM:
A WOMAN'S CRUSADE (2005); MAYERI, supra note 8, at 81-82, 86-87, 199; Linda K. Kerber, "A
Constitutional Right to be Treated Like... Ladies ": Women, Civic Obligation, and Military Service,
1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 121-22. For a discussion of the rise of feminist thought
emphasizing women's difference and unique reproductive role from during this period, see supra
notes 428-44 and accompanying text.
461. The issue raised in Cal. Fed. is still live. At least six states mandate leaves for pregnant
employees regardless of whether such leaves are available to other, similarly disabled employees.
For statutes with a separate provision requiring leave for pregnant employees above and beyond that
given other temporarily disabled workers, see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(a) (West 2013); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(7)(b) (2013); HAW. CODE R. § 12-46-108(a); IOWA CODE § 216.6(2)(b), (e)
(2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7(VI) (2013); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4112-5-05 (g) (2014); see
also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:342(3)-(4) (2013) (regarding temporary transfers).
462. For an analysis of androcentrism, see NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 20 (1997) ("Certainly, a major feature of gender
injustice is androcentrism: the authoritative construction of norms that privilege traits associated
with masculinity. Along with this goes cultural sexism: the pervasive devaluation and disparagement
of things coded as 'feminine,' paradigmatically-but not only-women.") (footnote omitted).
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feminists and other reformers might have used this critique as a tool for
challenging taken-for-granted workplace structures that harmed not only
pregnant women or women in general, but also employees with disabili-
ties and perhaps even all employees.463 But uniqueness proponents did
not deploy their perspective on pregnancy or perceived sex bias as a
springboard to redress leave inadequacies generally or to extend protec-
tions for pregnant women to other employees across lines of sex or
physical ability in the pregnancy cases, as East Coast feminists advocat-
ing the disability approach had sought to do in Cal. Fed.
Even more troublingly, advocates did not defend the uniqueness
view of pregnancy on normative grounds. Conservatives used uniqueness
arguments to defend denying pregnant women benefits given other
employees, and liberals used them to defend giving pregnant women
benefits denied others. In both cases, uniqueness proponents simply
highlighted women's special reproductive role, made analytical distinc-
tions between pregnancy and other disabilities, or implicitly shifted the
baseline for comparison without ever articulating why it was fair or right
to exclude other employees from the analysis.464 Uniqueness advocates'
failure to defend pregnancy's distinctive legal status in normative terms
contrasted sharply with the stance taken by advocates for the disability
approach, who argued explicitly that it would be unwarranted and unfair
to give pregnant women benefits denied other temporarily disabled
workers.46'
Ironically, uniqueness arguments that distanced pregnancy from
disability overlooked the close parallels in the status of women and
people with disabilities. Historically, American legal and social institu-
tions regarded both groups as "dependents" who could participate only
marginally if at all, in the realm of employment;466 this legacy of exclu-
sion continues to affect and marginalize both groups. Distancing preg-
nancy from disability also ignored the insights of the social disability
model, developed in the early 1980s and championed by many as a
model for the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).467 This model
463. Cf LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 112 (2002) (arguing that attention to race and
"gender can help expose the ways in which the pervasive hierarchies of power are often perpetuated"
and thus broadly benefit everyone); Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn
in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1282 (2011) (arguing that an approach that promotes
inclusiveness and not simply universal protections would permit "equality norms to spark re-
evaluation of universal standards" without ignoring the problems of marginalized workers).
464. See, e.g., supra notes 394-96 and accompanying text (discussing how the Supreme Court
in both Geduldig and Gilbert distinguished pregnancy from other disabilities as a voluntary choice);
supra notes 453-58 and accompanying text (discussing how the Supreme Court shifted the baseline
in Cal. Fed.).
465. See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
466. CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 7 (2010) (noting these parallel histories).
467. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
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redefined the term "disability" to refer not to a dreaded medical condi-
tion or physical defect, but rather to a negative interaction between
people's bodies and their social and institutional environments.4 68 From
such a perspective, pregnancy looks very much like a disability, and
employers' unwillingness to accommodate pregnant women's physical
needs looks like just the sort of harm laws prohibiting disability discrim-
ination are designed to prevent. In disassociating pregnancy from
disability, uniqueness arguments suppressed similarities and squandered
potential alliances between pregnant women and a broader class of
people with disabilities.
At the same time, appeals to pregnancy's uniqueness obscured im-
portant differences among women in relation to pregnancy and employ-
ment.469 In portraying pregnancy as a quintessentially female experience,
the uniqueness view presented an artificial sense of unity among women
around their reproductive experiences, an exaggeration that later became
the subject of extensive critique by other feminists, including feminists
of color.4 70 African-American women, for example, do not receive the
same valorization for pregnancy and motherhood as upper and middle
class white women;471 they are presumed to need less protection from
work's rigors, even while pregnant.472 Similar observations undoubtedly
could be made about he cross-cutting influence of other social factors
such as age, physical ability, and sexual orientation.473 Ultimately,
pregnancy is perceived and experienced differently by different women,
who bring distinctive, though sometimes overlapping, issues to the
workplace.
468. Cox, supra note 443, at 450; Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621,653-59 (1999); Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What's Disability Studies Got To Do
With It or an Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403,416,426-
28(2011).
469. Vogel, supra note 382, at 23 (noting that feminists who favored pregnancy-specific leaves
saw pregnancy as a universal female phenomenon that "marks all women, constituting a strength and
source of unity but also creating specific needs").
470. Legal feminists in the 1990s produced a rich scholarship pointing out such essentialist
tendencies in earlier feminist work. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588 (1990) (providing a classic critique of how essentialist
tendencies in feminist legal thought neglect the crosscutting influence of race and obscure the
potentially distinctive experiences of Black women and other women of color); Crenshaw, supra
note 181, at 151 (providing a similar critique of the same tendencies in antidiscrimination law); see
also Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1045, 1048-49 (1992) (showing how such essentialist analyses can replicate the dominant
categories of male/female, dominant/subordinate that feminists seek to criticize).
471. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 382, at 106 (noting that for women for whom having
children is "tagged as socially valuable," pregnancy is regarded as a revered state, but for many
women of color, unmarried women, and poorer women who are viewed as "irresponsible reproduc-
ers, and are expected to work" pregnancy is denigrated as a form of work avoidance); supra note 48
(collecting sources).
472. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 382, at 105 (stating that "[w]omen of color historically
have been both less revered while pregnant and presumed to be less in need of protection from the
rigors of work"); supra note 49 (collecting sources).
473. See, e.g., supra note 53 (collecting sources suggesting that lesbians are not expected to
have children at all).
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The uniqueness view also downplayed relevant connections be-
tween men and women, reinforcing unnecessary division along sexual
lines. True, men cannot become pregnant. But Title VII does not seek to
define pregnancy from a metaphysical or experiential standpoint-only
for the pragmatic purpose of eliminating discrimination and advancing
equality on the job. Not only can pregnant employees who need leaves,
flexibility, or light duty accommodations be compared to other men and
women who need the same benefits due to other illnesses or disabilities:
To the extent that pregnancy is treated not simply as a physical condition
but also as a gateway to parenting and caregiving, pregnant women can
also be compared to men and women who are preparing for the arrival of
a new child, parenting, or caring for themselves or for other loved ones,
as feminists expanding on the functional disability approach would later
474successfully argue.
3. Practical Disadvantages of the Uniqueness View
Despite the disadvantages of the uniqueness view, images of
pregnancy as a distinctive female experience that is unlike other condi-
tions have persisted, reinforcing sex differences and harming both
working women and men. Pregnancy discrimination was and is a serious
problem. As noted above, pregnancy discrimination complaints increased
over the past decade.475 Many employers refuse to hire and promote
pregnant women, fire them when they become pregnant, or force them
onto unpaid leave or out of the workforce altogether after denying them
temporary work adjustments given other employees with similar disabili-
ties. Research reveals persistent negative stereotyping and hostility
474. See infra notes 620-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Family and Medical Leave
Act).
475. See supra note 387.
476. Although pregnant women face many types of discrimination, research suggests they are
especially vulnerable to termination. Like employment discrimination claims generally, most
pregnancy discrimination complaints relate to discharge. See, e.g., Reginald A. Byron & Vincent R.
Roscigno, Relational Power, Legitimation, and Pregnancy Discrimination, 28 GENDER & SOCIETY,
435, 436-37 (2014) (concluding from raw EEOC data that over half of the pregnancy discrimination
complaints made to the EEOC and state agencies over the past fifteen years pertained to discharge);
Peggy Mastroianni, Legal Counsel, EEOC, Written Testimony at EEOC Meeting on Unlawful
Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities (Feb. 15,
2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/mastroianni.cfm (stating that most
pregnancy discrimination charges over the past ten fiscal years have involved discharge based on
pregnancy). Discharge can result when employers simply fire women because they are pregnant or
deny requests for accommodation that would allow pregnant women to continue working. See, e.g.,
STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, POOR, PREGNANT, AND FIRED: CAREGIVER
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LoW-WAGE WORKERS 11-12 (2011) (describing numerous cases in
which low-income women were fired after informing their employers of their pregnancies); NAT'L
PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, LISTENING TO MOTHERS: THE EXPERIENCES OF EXPECTING
AND NEW MOTHERS IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (Jan. 2014) (estimating from survey data that more than
one-quarter million pregnant workers per year are denied reasonable accommodation requests by
their employers). Pregnant women also experience discrimination in hiring and promotion. See, e.g.,
BORNSTEIN, supra, at 13 (describing several cases in which employers rescinded job offers when
they discovered hirees were pregnant or reduced employees' work assignments and responsibilities
when they leamed about employees' pregnancies); NAT'L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES,
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directed at pregnant women, who are often seen as unreliable, incompe-
tent, and uncommitted employees who impose unfair burdens on oth-
477ers.
The PDA was intended to forbid such discriminatory treat-
ment.478 Yet, longstanding cultural assumptions about women's differ-
ence and pregnancy's uniqueness have hampered the law's effectiveness.
In the years following the PDA's enactment, as we saw earlier, women's
rights groups failed to take a united stance advocating a functional
disability approach; nor did the agencies issue unambiguous interpreta-
tions or pursue vigorous enforcement of the PDA.479 In the absence of
such clear, unified efforts challenging pregnant women's difference, the
lower courts fell back on older stereotypes about pregnancy's distinc-
tiveness to rationalize discriminatory treatment. Judges ruled in favor of
employers who refused to hire pregnant women or fired them upon
learning they were pregnant, often accepting tropes about their lack of
dependability.480 Courts also approved policies artificially distinguishing
pregnant women from non-pregnant employees with similar work
limitations, such as policies limiting light duty or other accommodations
to employees with on-the-job, but not off-the-job, injuries or illnesses.
48'
Such decisions are particularly likely to harm women who work in low-
wage jobs, male-dominated occupations, and rigidly structured work-
places, sectors that are disproportionately inhabited by low-income
supra, at 3 (reporting that 19% of surveyed women who resumed work with the same pre-birth
employer lost opportunities for pay increases or promotions).
477. For empirical evidence and analysis demonstrating this point, see Byron & Roscigno,
supra note 476, at 439-440, 447-450; see also NAT'L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: WHERE WE STAND 30 YEARS LATER 3, 10-11 (2008) (citing
cases and studies showing negative stereotyping and hostility toward pregnant women); Brake &
Grossman, supra note 382, at 103-04 (citing similar studies).
478. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (1977) (statement of Sen. Javits) (noting that "[m]any
women temporarily disabled by pregnancy have been forced to take leave without pay or to resign,"
while "other employees who face temporary periods of disability do not have to face the same loss"
and arguing that the PDA would resolve this "injustice" by requiring "equal treatment when
disability due to pregnancy is compared to other disabling conditions"); id. at 33,289 (statement of
Rep. Marks) (indicating Congress's disapproval of disability plans such as the one in Gilbert, noting
that this forces many pregnant women into situations where they must take leave without pay, and
indicating that the new bill would "require those employers who do provide disability coverage to
treat pregnancy-related disability the same as any other nonwork-related disability with regard to
benefits and leave policies").
479. See, e.g., Annalyn Kurtz, 8 Rights of Pregnant Women at Work, CNN (July 28, 2014,
11:47 AM), http://money.cnn.conm/2014/07/25/news/economy/rights-pregnant-workers ( xplaining
that in July 2014 the EEOC issued guidance on pregnancy discrimination for the first time in 30
years).
480. See, e.g., Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating
Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workplace, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 225-26, 235-40
(1998) (giving numerous examples of cases and describing the two main stereotypes affecting the
courts' rulings).
481. See, e.g., NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & A BETTER BALANCE, IT SHOULDN'T BE A HEAVY
LIFT: FAIR TREATMENT FOR PREGNANT WORKERS 16 (2013), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant workers.pdf; Brake & Grossman, supra note
382, at 110, 113; Cox, supra note 443, at 469 n.156 (collecting cases); Matzzie, supra note 382, at
227; see also Widiss, supra note 382, at 963-64 & n.6.
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women and women of color who need Title VII's protection the most.482
The consequences are often severe for the affected women, as the cases
show.
483Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., for example, involved a re-
tailer's refusal to exempt a pregnant stocker from a fifty-pound lifting
requirement even though non-pregnant employees who were temporarily
unable to perform heavy lifting received such exemptions in the form of
484light duty assignments. Arizanovska had miscarried once before when
Wal-Mart refused her light-duty request and when she asked for light
duty per her doctor's orders for a subsequent pregnancy, Wal-Mart again
refused her request and suggested she take unpaid FMLA leave; when
she refused to do so citing a need to support her family, she was fired
from her job and suffered a second miscarriage shortly thereafter.485 Wal-
Mart's policy disallowed light duty for a "non-work-related short-term
medical restriction that prevents the associate from performing his or her
job. 486 It also denied light duty for "a medical condition that is not a
disability, but which prevents you from performing your job, including
pregnancy."48 7 Thus, even on its face, the policy categorically excluded
pregnant women from light duty while offering it to some other employ-
488ees with similar lifting restrictions. In fact, Arizanovska's store
manager testified that if an employee broke her arm or wrist outside
work, Wal-Mart would find some form of accommodation, but the
company would not do the same for a pregnant employee, because
pregnancy is "not an impairment.,489 The Seventh Circuit upheld
summary judgment for Wal-Mart, concluding that the policy did not
violate the PDA because it denied light duty to both pregnant and non-
482. See, e.g., NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & A BETTER BALANCE, supra note 481, at 1, 5, 7;
Brake & Grossman, supra note 382, at 69, 71, 110, 112-14; Cox, supra note 443, at 452; see also
EEOC 2014 Pregnancy Discrimination Guidance, supra note 387 (noting that much of the recent
increase in pregnancy discrimination complaints "has been fueled by an increase in charges filed by
women of color").
483. 682 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2012).
484. Id. at 701. For an account of the underlying facts from the plaintiff, see NAT'L WOMEN'S
LAW CTR. & A BETTER BALANCE, supra note 481, at 18. For a more detailed analysis of the case,
see Brake & Grossman, supra note 382, at 110-12.
485. Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 701; NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & A BETTER BALANCE, supra
note 481, at 18.
486. Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 94 Empl. Prac. Dec. 44,314, 44,315 (S.D. Ind.
2011).
487. Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 701 (emphasis added).
488. See NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & A BETTER BALANCE, supra note 481, at 16, 25 n.39
(pointing to a Wal-Mart memorandum to its employees giving job reassignment accommodation to
disabled workers but not to pregnant workers).
489. Arizanovska, 94 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 44,317 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
district court refused to credit this evidence, finding that the store manager who made the statement
was not involved in making accommodations. Id.
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pregnant employees with short-term, non-job-related lifting re-
strictions.490
In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,491 the Fourth Circuit issued a
similar decision that was recently reviewed by the Supreme Court.492
UPS denied pregnant driver Peggy Young's request to be excused from
lifting more than twenty pounds, as her doctor ordered; like Arizanovska,
Young had previously miscarried.493 UPS's policy granted light duty
only to employees whose restrictions resulted from injuries sustained on
the job, impairments covered by the ADA, and medical conditions
precluding driver certification from the Department of Transportation
(DOT).494 Based on the policy, UPS denied Young's request, forcing her
onto unpaid leave and eventual loss of medical insurance.495 Young
argued that by offering light duty to three other classes of employees,
while failing to provide it to pregnant employees who were similarly
unable to perform heavy lifting, the policy violated the PDA's command
to treat women "affected by pregnancy ... the same ... as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.,
4 96
The Fourth Circuit rejected Young's argument, however, concluding,
to the contrary, that "[b]y limiting accommodations to those employees
... UPS ha[d] crafted a pregnancy-blind policy. ' 49 7 The court reviewed
the policy through the lens of the traditional uniqueness view of preg-
nancy, reflexively accepting distinctions that treated pregnant women
less favorably than many other employees based on the source of their
medical limitations. In a striking example of such superficial, circular
reasoning, the Fourth Circuit held that Young was "not similar to
employees injured on the job because, quite simply, her inability to work
does not arise from an on-the-job injury., 4 98 Similarly, the court found
490. Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 698, 703. Wal-Mart recently changed its policy to provide that
women experiencing a "temporary disability caused by pregnancy" may be eligible for some forms
of reasonable accommodation. See Lydia DePillis, Under Pressure, Wal-Mart Upgrades Its Policy
for Helping Pregnant Workers, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/05/under-pressure-walmart-upgrades-its-policy-for-helping-pregnant-
workers (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to mounting legal pressure, Wal-Mart faced
protest from female employees who had carried out an active grass-roots campaign against
pregnancy discrimination. See Lativia Johnson, Wal-Mart Put Me Through Hell: Inside the
Retailer's Pregnancy Discrimination Horror, SALON (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:58 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2015/04/06/walmartput me through hell inside the retailerspregnancy d
iscrimination horror (describing Respect the Bump, a group of Wal-Mart employees who organized
to fight against the retailer's treatment of pregnant workers).
491. 707 F.3d437 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
492. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 524-
29.
493. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
494. Young, 707 F.3d at 446. For an account of the facts providing more detail from the
plaintiff herself, see NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & A BETTER BALANCE, supra note 481, at 15.
495. See Young, 707 F.3d. at 441.
496. Id. at 445 (quoting second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012)).
497. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
498. Id. at 450-51.
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that Young did not resemble workers with ADA-protected disabilities,
because "[w]ith near unanimity, federal courts have held that pregnancy
is not a 'disability' under the ADA. 499 Nor was Young comparable to
employees who had lost Department of Transportation (DOT) driving
certification, because "no legal obstacle [stood] between her and her
work., 500 Thus, in order to prove a PDA violation, Young could compare
her light duty denial only to that of other employees who were not
covered by UPS's policy-not to any of the covered employees whom
the policy afforded better treatment.
Not only did the court's analysis eliminate most UPS drivers as PDA
comparators,5 1 making it virtually impossible for Young to prove that
502UPS's policy or the decision to deny her light duty was discriminatory2:
The reasoning also transformed Young's request exclusively into a
demand for preferential treatment. Disregarding evidence that UPS
considered pregnant drivers a unique liability, 50 3 the court emphasized
only that Young's position would "grant pregnant employees a 'most
favored nation' status' 5°4 over any non-pregnant employees who were
similarly "unable to lift as a result of an off-the-job injury or illness."
50 5
The Fourth Circuit's decision was not unusual: At the time of the
decision, several other circuits had upheld similar policies.50 6
499. Id. at 443 (quoting Wenzlaff v. NationsBank, 940 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D. Md. 1996)).
500. Id. at 450.
501. See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 382, at 90; Eliza H. Simon, Parity by Compari-
son: The Case for Comparing Pregnant and Disabled Workers, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
(forthcoming July 2015) (manuscript at 7, 32-33).
502. Under this reasoning, Young could not prove a PDA violation through either direct or
circumstantial evidence. The Fourth Circuit held that the policy itself did not provide direct evidence
of discrimination, because it treated pregnant women the same as non-pregnant employees whose
lifting restrictions resulted from off-the-job injuries or other non-covered conditions. Young, 707
F.3d at 446-49. Nor did a UPS supervisor's statement that Young was "too much of a liability"
while pregnant provide direct evidence of discriminatory purpose, id. at 441, 449 (internal quotation
marks omitted), because the supervisor had not actually made the decision to deny her light duty. Id.
at 449. Young also failed to make a prima facie case with circumstantial evidence under the
framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), because she
had not shown that UPS treated her less favorably than non-pregnant drivers who were not covered
by the light duty policy. Young, 707 F.3d at 449-51.
503. See, e.g., Young, 707 F.3d at 441 (noting that when Young asked UPS to accommodate
her lifting restriction, a manager told her that she was "too much of a liability" while pregnant and
could not come back until she was no longer pregnant); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015) (noting testimony from a UPS union steward that "'the only light duty
requested [due to physical] restrictions that became an issue' at UPS 'were with women who were
pregnant' (alteration in original)).
504. Young, 707 F.3d at 446.
505. Id at 448.
506. Several circuits had employed the reasoning in Young to uphold on-the-job injury
requirements. See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011);
Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196
F.3d 1309, 1313 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206-08 (5th Cir.
1998). The Sixth and Tenth Circuit had taken a different view, permitting comparison of PDA
plaintiffs to employees with on-the-job injuries for purposes of a prima facie case, but ultimately
requiring proof that policies or decisions denying accommodations to employees with off-the-job
injuries are a pretext for pregnancy discrimination. See EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp.,
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These decisions revived and complicated the older debate about the
uniqueness versus disability approaches to pregnancy. The reasoning and
results in these cases harken back to Gilbert,50 7 updating the earlier
uniqueness view by approving artificial, allegedly facial neutral distinc-
tions that cast pregnancy as a uniquely female liability and choice that
does not resemble or warrant the same protections as other disabilities.
The persistent view of pregnancy as a singular, female condition blinded
judges to the way such distinctions often target pregnant women for
mistreatment. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's analysis, UPS's light duty
policy was not pregnancy-neutral: It was facially discriminatory. True,
the policy did not explicitly exclude pregnant workers from light duty, as
facially discriminatory policies typically do.50 8 But it nonetheless ex-
cluded virtually all pregnant women, without ever mentioning preg-
509nancy, by using rules that served as definitional proxies.
Consider the provision limiting light duty to employees with work
limitations arising from on-the-job injuries. Because UPS drivers do not
become pregnant in the normal course of doing their jobs, the on-the-job
injury requirement denied accommodations to virtually 100% of the
pregnant drivers,510 all of whom were women-and it did so by definition
and not simply because of disparate impact. The on-the-job injury
requirement was equivalent to a rule liming light duty to employees with
220 F.3d 1184, 1195 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2000) (suggesting without expressly holding same); Ensley-
Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a pregnant worker may be
compared to a worker injured on the job). The Sixth Circuit later limited Ensley-Gaines to its facts
and followed an approach similar to that of the Fourth Circuit, holding that an employer's on-the-job
injury policy was "pregnancy-blind" and therefore non-discriminatory. Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641.
507. See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 382, at 67, 85-86, 122-23; Dinner, supra note
16, at 478; Widiss, supra note 382, at 1004.
508. Ordinarily, facially discriminatory policies explicitly treat some people differently based
on sex or pregnancy, such as pre-Title VII policies restricting flight attendant jobs to women only.
See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1971). Some facially
discriminatory policies single out a subset of people, in which case courts typically use a "sex-plus"
analysis that looks at whether the policy treats men and women in that subset differently in order to
determine whether discrimination has occurred. See, e.g., Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-98 (1991) (concluding that a policy that treated fertile women differently
from fertile men was facially discriminatory); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544
(1971) (reaching same conclusion about a policy that treated women and men with preschool age
children differently).
509. The term "definitional proxy" is my own; I have not seen this term or concept or my
proposed facial discrimination analysis of such proxies elsewhere in the literature. Mary Anne Case
has used the term perfect proxy, arguing that the Supreme Court will uphold an explicitly discrimi-
natory policy only when it is based on a "perfect proxy" that "must be true of either all women or no
women or all men or no men." Mary Ann Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns":
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447,
1449-50 (2000). Like Case's perfect proxy, a definitional proxy applies to all women or, under the
PDA, all pregnant women, but the similarity ends there. As the text below clarifies, a definitional
proxy analysis reveals whether an apparently neutral rule is actually facially discriminatory, not
whether such a rule will survive a sex discrimination challenge under the Constitution or Title VII.
See infra text accompanying notes 510-17.
510. Theoretically, an already-pregnant worker injured on the job would be eligible for light
duty for limitations arising out of that on-the-job injury, though not for limitations arising from the
pregnancy itself. For the sake of convenience, the text refers to drivers whose work limitations arise
out of pregnancy as pregnant drivers.
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a certain high level of testosterone: Such a rule might disqualify some
male drivers, to be sure, but it would not automatically disqualify all of
them, across the board, by definition, as it would do pregnant ones-
who, simply by virtue of being pregnant females, would never register
the required hormonal levels.5 1 From this vantage point, UPS's policy
was analogous to the policy in Gilbert that Congress invalidated in the
PDA.5 12 In Gilbert, GE's temporary disability policy categorically
excluded pregnancy and all pregnant women from covered "sicknesses
and accidents,"513 by definition, while it did not so categorically exclude
all employees affected by other disabling conditions. Similarly, in Young,
UPS's light duty policy categorically excluded pregnancy and all
pregnant women from covered on-the-job injuries, by definition, while it
did not so categorically exclude all employees affected by other, simi-
larly limiting conditions. In both cases, the covered terms served as
proxies that excluded pregnancy as a matter of definition.
Although both policies might have a disproportionate impact, that
effect is not their central flaw or the flaw of definitional proxies gener-
ally.514 Rather, the problem is their automatic, across-the-board, linguis-
511. For example, a rule limiting light duty to workers with a testosterone level of 600 ng/dl or
higher would exclude some men, but would exclude all women, pregnant or not. See Testosterone,
MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/
003707.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2014) (showing that normal male testosterone levels range from
300 to 1000ng/dl while normal female testosterone levels range from 15 to 70ng/dl); Reference
Values for Testosterone, Total in Pregnancy, PERINATOLOGY.COM, http://perinatology.com/
Reference/Reference%20Ranges/Testosterone.htm (last visited May 14, 2015) (showing that a
pregnant female's testosterone levels can range as high as 309 ng/dl in the third trimester).
512. See, e.g., Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353 (recognizing that Congress's "'unambiguous'
intent in passing" the PDA was to overturn "both the holding and reasoning" of Gilbert (internal
quotation mark omitted)) (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 678 (1983)).
513. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976).
514. There are a number of reasons why disparate impact is typically not the best framework
for analyzing policies containing definitional proxies, like UPS's on-the-job injury requirement.
First, as the analysis in the text reveals, the on-the-job requirement was and is more invidious than
policies typically scrutinized for disparate impact, such as a policy limiting leave to people
employed for a year or more. Such a rule would likely exclude some pregnant employees and some
non-pregnant ones, but it would not categorically eliminate all pregnant employees, by definition,
like an on-the-job injury rule. As noted above, a one-year leave rule may or may not have a disparate
impact under the PDA, depending on the demographics of the workforce, see supra note 457, and
the methodology used to assess impact. Some courts have used an empirical approach to evaluate
disparate impact under the PDA, while struggling with the proper baseline for measuring impact.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 654 & n.10 (N.D. 111. 1991) (discussing
whether to compare pregnant versus non-pregnant, or male versus female, employees for purposes of
measuring impact). Other courts have dispensed with empirical evaluation and concluded that if all
or most pregnant women would be negatively affected by a policy, the policy has a disparate impact.
See Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act's Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 44-46 (2009)
(citing such cases). The latter approach to disparate impact converges with the analysis for
determining whether there is a BFOQ defense justifying a facially discriminatory policy, see, e.g.,
Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969)(employer pleading BFOQ
defense must prove there is a "factual basis for believing[] all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job"); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (citing approvingly to this standard). It seems inappropriate to use the same
analysis in such potentially dissimilar contexts: Ordinarily, employers must satisfy this stringent
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tic pinpointing of a socially identifiable, stigmatized group such as
pregnant women for disfavor-a problem only made worse by the reality
that forcing pregnant women out of their jobs feeds perceptions that they
are unreliable and uncommitted to their work, thus exaggerating their
purported difference from other employees and fueling and justifying
further discrimination.515 In these respects, the on-the-job injury rule is
akin to other laws and policies targeting people for caste-like treatment
by way of definition, rather than by explicit mention, that courts treated
516as facially discriminatory. In cases like Young, however, assumptions
BFOQ standard to defend facially discriminatory policies but may defend policies with a disparate
impact standard under a less onerous business necessity standard, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), a test that seems too lenient for policies that automatically disqualify an
entire class, as do facially discriminatory policies. For these reasons, at least some of the pregnancy-
related cases courts have analyzed as disparate impact would be better analyzed as facial discrimina-
tion by definitional proxy. See, e.g., Garcia v. Woman's Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 813 (5th Cir.
1996) (styling the analysis as disparate impact, but concluding that plaintiff could prove a PDA
violation by presenting testimony that "all or substantially all pregnant women" would be unable to
meet hospital's requirement of lifting more than 150 pounds).
515. See generally Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (noting that
stereotypes create a "self-fulfilling" cycle of discrimination that forces women to "continue to
assume the role of primary family caregiver" and refuels employers' "stereotypical views about
women's commitment to work"); Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of
Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57, 107 (2012) (observing that stereotypes can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy as employers expect women to put less time and effort into their jobs and
therefore offer them lower paying jobs and earnings, and these employment differentials lead women
to assume primary responsibility for household labor); see also MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE
STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S POLITICAL IDEALS 41 (2010) (stating that even
short withdrawals from the labor force create substantial effects on women's economic equality).
516. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593, 2607-08 (2015) (invalidating state
laws that "define marriage between one man and one woman" even though such laws do not
expressly mention same-sex couples or sexual orientation); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013) (invalidating a law limiting the definition of a "marriage" for federal purposes to a legal
union between "a man and a woman"); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating the
Oklahoma constitution's infamous "grandfather" clause which exempted from the state's stringent
literacy test all persons who were entitled to vote on or before January 1, 1866, the effective date of
the Fifteenth Amendment, or their lineal descendants). In some of these cases it seems obvious that
the definitional proxies were subterfuges intended to deny same-sex couples the fight to marry and
Blacks the right to vote, respectively. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (observing that in recent years
many states enacted Defense of Marriage Acts to ensure the continuing exclusion of same-sex
couples, in light of legal developments recognizing same-sex marriage elsewhere); Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2693-94; Guinn, 238 U.S. at 364-65. But in other cases, such deliberately discriminatory
purpose is not clear: Instead, the invalidated laws and policies may simply reflect traditional
assumptions about the naturalness of the governing social order. Here, state laws defining marriage
as a union between a man and a woman that were enacted before gay and lesbian people became
socially and politically visible come to mind. See Obergefell, slip op. at 2596 (observing that by the
time of the Nation's founding, marriage was simply understood to be a voluntary union between a
man and a woman); id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (same); see also Zachary Herz, The
Marrying Kind, 82 TENN L. REV. (manuscript at 43) (forthcoming 2015) (explaining how New
York's marriage law reflected an inability to imagine same-sex unions, rather than specific hostility
toward them). The Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell nonetheless invalidates all laws limiting
marriage to a man and a woman, regardless of whether they were enacted in an era in which the
heterosexual character of marriage was simply taken for granted or were reenacted in recent years in
order to consciously exclude or demean same sex unions. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (holding
that "same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states"). For additional
examples of cases involving definitional proxies, see generally Stephen M. Rich, Inferred
Classifications, 99 VA. L. REV. 1525 (2013) (analyzing numerous cases in which the Supreme Court
has treated classifications that do not explicitly discriminate on the basis of race as suspect racial
classifications in order to promote values underlying the Equal Protection Clause).
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that pregnant women's problems are distinct and less deserving of
accommodation than those faced by workers with on-the-job injuries,
and that these distinctions are rooted in gender-neutral workers' compen-
sation schemes, helped obscure the definitional discrimination.1 7
In overlooking this facial discrimination analysis, judges and stake-
holders missed a method of invalidating UPS's policy that would protect
pregnant workers while avoiding the prospect of preferential treatment
and rejecting the uniqueness view of pregnancy. Courts typically enjoin
further use of a facially discriminatory policy, giving the employer the
choice of extending the policy to apply evenhandedly to all employees
regardless of sex, or eliminating it for everyone.51 8 In Young, applying
the on-the-job requirement to all employees was facially discriminatory,
so the solution was to enjoin its use altogether, forcing UPS to grant (or
deny) light duty to all pregnant and all non-pregnant drivers with similar
lifting restrictions without regard to whether they resulted from an on-
the-job injury. The reasoning and result would prevent UPS and other
employers from discriminatorily excluding pregnant employees from
light duty, while at the same time avoiding a reading of the PDA that
would require accommodating them at the expense of any non-pregnant
coworkers with similarly limiting off-the-job injuries. 519 In promoting
517. Although employers, including UPS in this case, typically defend on-the-job injury
requirements as legitimate nondiscriminatory efforts to hold down the cost of complying with sex-
neutral workers' compensation schemes, see, e.g., Widiss, supra note 382, at 985 & n.94, 1032;
Brief for Respondent at 43-44, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 5464086, social
scientists have noted the sex bias reflected in traditional workers' compensation systems. See, e.g.,
Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen 's Compensation and
Mother's Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE AND WELFARE 123, 133-45 (giving a history of workmen's
compensation in the United States and noting that the program was developed "for the white
northern men employed in heavy industry"). Even today, workers' compensation schemes can
contain considerable sex bias, such as California's which is being targeted for legislative reform
because it penalizes female workers injured on the job by attributing all or most of their disabilities
to preexisting, female-specific health factors such as pregnancy or menopause. See, e.g., Melody
Gutierrez, Gender Bias Rampant in Workers' Comp Cases, Women's Groups Charge, SFGATE
(Mar. 4, 2015, 8:47 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Gender-bias-rampant-in-workers-
comp-cases-6113269.php. A mechanical designer who developed carpal tunnel syndrome had her
award reduced on the ground that she was post-menopausal, for example, while female firefighters
and police officers who develop breast cancer due to exposure to hazardous materials receive far less
compensation than their male counterparts who develop other types of cancer. Id. Even though these
decisions do not explicitly discount disability payments for women, they use health factors as defini-
tional proxies, thus providing additional examples of facial discrimination.
518. See, e.g., Manhart v. L.A. Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 980, 984 (C.D. Cal.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (granting permanent injunction against use of
facially discriminatory policy requiring larger contributions to pension plans from women, an aspect
of the injunction not appealed and not in controversy before the Supreme Court); Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (granting prospective injunction,
upon vacation and remand from the Fifth Circuit, against further application of a facially discrimina-
tory policy refusing to hire men as flight attendants).
519. Although the facial discrimination analysis by definitional proxy in the text focuses on the
on-the-job injury requirement, UPS's rule limiting light duty to drivers whose conditions temporarily
disqualified them from DOT commercial driver certification was similarly facially discriminatory.
The DOT's policy explicitly included numerous medical conditions that result in temporary lifting
restrictions, but it did not include (and thus effectively excluded) pregnancy as such a condition.
Petitioner's Brief at 44 n.17, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4441528 [hereinafter
2015] TAKING SEX DISCRIMINATION SERIO USL Y 1093
such an even-handed, inclusive result, the approach would not only
honor the PDA's command to treat pregnancy "the same . . . as" other
conditions that similarly affect the ability or inability to work: It would
also move the law forward in the spirit of a feminist-inspired disability
approach that insisted on linking the interests of pregnant women with
those of other employees with disabilities in a broad and inclusive
fashion.
Despite these virtues, neither the advocates for Young, the United
States, nor the major women's rights groups advocated such an approach
in the Supreme Court. Instead, these groups argued that the PDA requires
an employer who provides accommodations to employees injured on the
job (or any other subset of employees), to do so for pregnant employees
with similar work restrictions-even if the employer does not accommo-
date non-pregnant workers not injured on the job. Thus, in their view,
UPS's formal policy alone violated the PDA, even without further
evidence.5 20 Their amicus briefs relied on Congress's authority to provide
pregnant women protections not given other non-covered workers, citing
the EEOC's 2014 enforcement guidance5 21 and the Court's decision in
Petitioner's Young Brief]. Thus, UPS's rule restricting light duty to DOT-disqualifying conditions
automatically excluded all pregnant drivers, as matter of definition, while it did not so exclude all
non-pregnant drivers with similar lifting restrictions.
Whether UPS's rule limiting light duty to drivers whose restrictions resulted from ADA-
covered disabilities was similarly facially discriminatory is a more complex question beyond the
scope of analysis here. It is true that normal pregnancy itself was not and is not considered a
disability under the ADA. But under the version of the ADA that prevailed at the time, temporary
impairments like those typically resulting from normal pregnancy apparently were not considered
disabilities generally. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20-21,
Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 2089966 [hereinafter Solicitor General's Young
Brief]. Thus, even though UPS's ADA-disability requirement categorically disqualified from light
duty all women with temporary work restrictions resulting from normal pregnancy, it may have also
categorically excluded all non-pregnant employees with similar work temporary restrictions, in
which case it would not be facially discriminatory. The issue has been rendered moot by subsequent
amendments to the ADA. See infra note 535.
520. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and a Better Balance
et al., in Support of Petitioner at 12-15, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4536938
[hereinafter ACLU Young Brief]; Brief of Law Professors and Women's Rights Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10-11, 13, 21-23, 27-28, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No.
12-1226), 2013 WL 2103656 [hereinafter Law Professor Young Brief]; Brief of the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10-11, Young,
135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4631950; Petitioner's Young Brief, supra note 519, at 28-
30, 41-42; Solicitor General's Young Brief, supra note 519, at 19 n.3, 21-23.
521. The EEOC issued Pregnancy Discrimination Guidance on July 14, 2014. See EEOC 2014
Pregnancy Discrimination Guidance, supra note 387. The guidelines prohibit an employer from
refusing "to treat a pregnant worker the same as other employees who are similar in their ability or
inability to work by relying on a policy that makes distinctions based on the source of an employee's
limitations (e.g., a policy of providing light duty only to workers injured on the job)." Id. § I.A.5; see
also § I.C.l.b. & Ex. 10 on light duty). The guidelines also provide that a plaintiff need not always
proceed through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and clarified that employees
with on-the-job injuries or ADA-covered disabilities are indeed proper comparators for PDA
plaintiffs. Id. § I.C. I.c.
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Cal. Fed., but failing to address the fairness issue in substantive terms.522
None of the groups urged the Court to extend the PDA to require
employers to grant protections to these other uncovered workers, as the
champions of the functional disability approach had done in an earlier
era.
523
The Supreme Court rejected these groups' reading of the PDA and
declined to defer to the EEOC's recently released guidance,524 holding
instead that Congress did not intend to favor pregnant employees over
other non-covered workers and thus the policy itself was not discrimina-
525tory. Justice Breyer's opinion for the majority carefully preserved
rights for pregnant women, however, by permitting Young and other
pregnant workers to prove individual disparate treatment by showing that
apparently neutral policies or decisions like UPS's were adopted or
applied with discriminatory purpose.526 Courts typically enjoin further
use of such covertly discriminatory policies for all employees, just as
they do overt or facially discriminatory ones.527 Thus, the Court's
approach will not require employers to give pregnant women benefits not
given other non-covered employees with similar work restrictions, or
vice versa, by way of either liability or remedy. Yet, in contrast to the
facial discrimination by definitional proxy approach outlined above, the
Court's method of honoring the spirit of the disability approach came at
what is likely to be a considerable cost to pregnant workers. As commen-
tators have noted, individual disparate treatment cases of all types are
notoriously difficult to prove.528 Notwithstanding the majority's effort to
522. See, e.g., ACLU Young Brief, supra note 520, at 14-15; Law Professor Young Brief,
supra note 520, at 10-12, 21-22, 27-28; Petitioner's Young Brief, supra note 519, at 28-30, 41-42;
Solicitor General's Young Brief, supra note 519, at 22-23, 27-28.
523. Compare ACLU Young Brief, supra note 520, at 14-15 (arguing that the Court need not
be concerned about adopting a reading of the PDA's second clause that would allow employers to
give pregnant women accommodations that are not given other employees with similarly restricting
off-the-job injuries because such workers are, "unlike women, [] not subject to systemic, class-wide
economic discrimination"), with ACLU Cal. Fed. Brief, supra note 423, at 48-64 (arguing to the
Court that if employers are required by law to give pregnant workers accommodations not available
to other similarly restricted employers, Title VII's basic remedial principles require the employers to
extend such accommodations to all such workers).
524. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1351 (2015).
525. Id. at 1350.
526. Id. at 1353-54.
527. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 73 (1982) (stating that the remedy
for an apparently neutral system that was adopted with a discriminatory purpose would include "an
injunction against the future application of the system"); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977) (stating that a broad, class-wide injunction against the continuation of a
discriminatory practice is justified when a pattern or practice of discrimination is found).
528. For discussion of the many problems Title VII plaintiffs face in proving individual
disparate treatment, see generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE
L.J. 728 (2011); see also LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., CONTESTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION 1987-2003 (2008), showing that employment discrimination cases are almost univer-
sally disparate treatment cases, id at 3, 17, that although most disparate treatment cases are settled,
over one third are dismissed or disposed of on summary judgment for the employer, id. at 40, that of
those that go to trial, plaintiffs win in only 7% of cases decided by judges and 30% of those decided
by juries, id. at 47, and that outcomes in individual cases are much less favorable to plaintiffs than
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ease the standards of proof in these cases,529 the evidentiary framework
leaves trial courts more than ample leeway to undermine the PDA by
importing old biases about pregnant women's unique liabilities.
4. Implications for Reform
These decisions show that the practical failures of the PDA cannot
be separated from the normative and theoretical failures of the unique-
ness view of pregnancy. Notably, the major legal reforms feminists
currently propose to address the negative lower court rends all involve
identifying pregnancy more closely with disability.530  One approach
would define "normal" pregnancy as a "disability" entitled to reasonable
accommodation under the ADA, 531 a strategy urged by some feminist
commentators long ago532 but rejected by the EEOC and the courts when
women's rights groups failed to advocate for it. 533 A second would define
those in cases brought by multiple plaintiffs or the EEOC, id. at 41, 44, 46. For discussion of some
of the difficulties pregnancy discrimination complainants in particular face in proving disparate
treatment, see Goldberg, supra, at 759, 762-64; Greenberg, supra note 480, at 232-47; Grossman &
Thomas, supra note 514, at 34-36, 39-41. For criticism of the McDonnell Douglas framework
generally, see Widiss, supra note 382, at 1017-18. For a discussion of plaintiffs' low success rates in
Title VII cases and the biases judges bring to their evaluation of these claims generally, see Michael
Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
529. The Supreme Court made an effort to ease the evidentiary requirements for PDA plaintiffs
in Young. The Court concluded that for purposes of a prima facie case, pregnant women may
compare their treatment to that of any class of employees "similar in their ability or inability to
work," including, for example workers with on-the-job injuries, and not only other non-covered
workers such as those injured off the job. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355
(2015). In addition, the Court emphasized that proof that the employer's policy imposes a
'significant' burden or disparate impact on pregnant women without a "sufficiently strong"
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to justify the burden may support a finding of purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 1354. Notwithstanding these efforts, under the Court's framework, the ultimate
question of whether the employer acted for the purpose of discriminating against pregnant women is
a question of pure fact committed to the discretion of the trial court that can be reversed only for
clear error. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1982) (labeling the question
of whether a policy reflects an intent to discrimination a "pure question of fact, subject to ... [a]
clearly erroneous standard").
530. As noted above, some feminists still maintain that pregnancy is fundamentally different
from disability. See supra text accompanying note 443. The tide seems to have turned, however;
more recent scholarship accepts or even embraces associating pregnancy with disability under the
ADA or the PDA or both. Cox, supra note 443, at 449 (challenging "the prevailing assumption that
characterizing pregnancy as 'disability' for ADA purposes is inappropriate, unwise, and harmful to
women" and arguing explicitly that feminists and the law should embrace that characterization);
Widiss, supra note 382, at 965 n.1 1, 1008-10 (urging courts to compare to pregnant workers under
the PDA people with conditions reasonably accommodated under the amended ADA, which now
covers minor and temporary impairments); Simon, supra note 501 (manuscript at 8-9) (arguing that
ADA-covered employees hould be comparators for PDA plaintiffs); see also Brake & Grossman,
supra note 382, at 117 (agreeing that here are good reasons to cover pregnancy as a disability under
the ADA, thus defining pregnancy discrimination as a form of disability discrimination, and also
arguing for continuing to challenge disparate treatment of pregnancy as a form of sex discrimination
under the PDA, implicitly accepting the PDA's disability approach).
531. See generally Cox, supra note 443.
532. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25
STETSON L. REV. 1, 27, 51 (1995); Matzzie, supra note 382, at 193.
533. See Matzzie, supra note 382, at 195 (explaining that women's rights groups failed to
advocate for the inclusion of pregnancy under the scope of the ADA when the EEOC engaged in
rulemaking proceedings for regulations under the ADA); see also Cox, supra note 443, at 448 n.25
(documenting that such groups also failed to urge the EEOC to consider pregnancy a disability in
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not pregnancy itself, but the impairments that arise as a result of preg-
nancy, as disabilities covered by the ADA.534 Since Congress amended
the ADA in 2008 to cover even temporary and minor impairments,
535
including temporary lifting restrictions, this position has become even
more plausible.36 A third approach argues that, just as employers must
accommodate these temporary and minor impairments under the
amended ADA, employers must accommodate pregnancy-related
impairments of the same sort in order to satisfy the PDA's command to
treat pregnant women the same as other similarly disabled employees.
5 37
The fourth strategy seeks to enact a new federal law that would give
pregnant workers the right to reasonable accommodations, thus affording
them a right already available to other employees with disabilities under
538the ADA . Research suggests most pregnant women do not want
special treatment539 and would thus be likely to support such strategies.
Thus, many women's rights advocates implicitly acknowledge that the
uniqueness view of pregnancy has backfired and now seek to help
pregnant workers by relying on the very identification with disability that
troubled some feminists in the past.
History suggests that these efforts will only succeed, however, if ad-
vocates can remain united in their vision and can rally visible public
support for such an approach, challenging pregnancy's presumed
distinctiveness and repudiating arguments that privilege women's special
reproductive or familial roles. Success under the PDA requires vigor-
ously challenging pregnant women's, and all women's, difference-
refusing to distance the problems of pregnant workers from those faced
by employees with other disabilities and advancing approaches that
expand the circle of identification and inclusiveness wider.
The Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Automotive Workers v. John-
2009, when the EEOC issued revised regulations to address the 2008 amendments to the ADA, and
that in fact the only letter submitted to the EEOC by a women's rights organization, Legal
Momentum, implicitly conceded that pregnancy was not a disability).
534. See Joan C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation after the
ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 114 (2013).
535. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
536. See Solicitor General's Young Brief, supra note 519, at 24-25.
537. See Widiss, supra note 382, at 1006-09; Simon, supra note 501 (manuscript at 8-10); see
also NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & A BErER BALANCE, supra note 481, at 14, 16 (explaining that
individuals with pregnancy-related impairments that fall under the new ADAAA should be protected
but that courts and the EEOC have not yet had strong moves in this direction).
538. See, e.g., Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 942, 113th Cong. (2013) (extending to
employees with pregnancy or childbirth-related restrictions the ADA's requirement of reasonable
accommodation unless there is an undue hardship to the employer); see also NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW
CTR. & A BETrER BALANCE, supra note 481, at 21 (describing the potential benefits of the act).
539. See, e.g., Laura M. Little et al., Professional Image Maintenance. How Women Navigate
Pregnancy in the Workplace, ACAD. MGMT J., Feb. 2015, at 8, 23 (reporting that interviewed
pregnant employees perceived their pregnancies as a threat to their professional image and that the
majority strongly agreed that "I want others to know that who I am at work is the same as before the
pregnancy," kept up the same pace of work, and avoided asking for special accommodations in order
to prove their continued work commitment and competence).
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son Controls, Inc. ,540 confirms these themes, showing how ideas about
pregnancy's uniqueness can harm all fertile women and men and
reiterating the key role of unified feminist efforts to repudiate such
assumptions in achieving effective legal change. Johnson Controls
involved the validity of a policy that excluded all women "capable of
bearing children" from jobs requiring exposure to lead, nominally for the
purpose of fetal protection. 54 1 The policy was overtly sex-based: It
applied to all fertile women (including those well past reasonable
childbearing age),542 while permitting all men to work with lead despite
evidence of harm to offspring caused by lead exposure in males.543 The
policy seriously restricted women's opportunities, banning women from
all jobs from which they might eventually be promoted into battery-
making and relegating them to jobs that paid less.
54 4
The case raised the prospect of a far-reaching judicial retrenchment,
but the Court refused to rely on old ideas about women's difference and
pregnancy's uniqueness to uphold the employer's policy. Instead, the
Justices unequivocally invalidated sex-specific fetal protection poli-
cies,545 holding that under Title VII and the PDA, employers may not
discriminate against women based on reproductive capacity unless
female, but not male, reproduction interferes with the ability to do the
essential function of the job of battery making.546 Noting that "[c]oncem
for a woman's existing or potential offspring historically has been the
excuse for denying women equal employment opportunities,547 the
Court concluded that "[i]t is no more appropriate for the courts than it is
540. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
541. Id. at 192.
542. Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners by Trial Lawyers for Public Justice at 8-9,
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (No. 89-1215), 1990 WL 10022470 [hereinafter Trial Lawyers
Johnson Controls Brief]. The UAW, represented by Marsha Berzon, carefully chose plaintiffs who
called attention to this point, including a 50-year-old woman who was excluded based on the risk to
a potential fetus, as well as a man who wished to be excluded because of the harmful effects of lead
on his own fertility. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192; Trial Lawyers Johnson Controls Brief,
supra, at 8-9.
543. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 221 (citing Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
886 F.2d 871, 889-90 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991)).
544. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 907 (stating that "it is clear that the defendant's fetal
protection policy is excessively cautious," partly because it excludes "a presumptively fertile woman
from any job from which she might ultimately be promoted into battery making, even if her present
job does not expose her to lead"); Trial Lawyers Johnson Controls Brief, supra note 542, at 4
(noting that while the link between Johnson Controls' policy and fetal health is tenuous, it is not
tenuous that "[e]xisting women are denied well-paying jobs and advancement opportunities and are
branded with the stigma of being regarded as marginal, expendable workers"). As the Seventh
Circuit observed, rigorous implementation of such fetal protection policies nationwide could have
excluded women from more than twenty million jobs. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 914 (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting).
545. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211 (holding "that Title VII, as so amended [by the PDA],
forbids sex-specific fetal-protection policies").
546. Id. at 206.
547. Id. at 211.
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for individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role
is more important to herself and her family than her economic role."
548
Johnson Controls confirms the continuing cultural resonance and
conservative valence of the uniqueness view of pregnancy. In fact, in
Johnson Controls, it was not feminists, but anti-feminist groups such as
Concerned Women for America who appealed to the idea of pregnancy
as a unique marker of female difference, arguing in an amicus brief that
the company's broad sex-specific exclusion was a justifiable reaction to
the "natural difference" between the sexes that pregnancy represents.
549
The brief filed by the Bush administration's EEOC also endorsed
pregnant women's difference, urging that narrowly drawn fetal protec-
tion policies, such as those limited to already pregnant women, should be
permitted under Title VII's BFOQ exception.
550
The case also corroborates the continuing importance of unified
feminist efforts to challenge difference. In Johnson Controls, women's
rights organizations were united in explicitly attacking any special
connection between womanhood and childbearing.551 They argued that
pregnancy was not universal; that women experienced reproduction
differently; and that the PDA forbids employers from relying on assump-
tions about women's reproductive goals and capacities, directing them to
consider only women's ability to perform the work before them.552 These
feminists also endorsed the PDA's comparative framework, emphasizing
that, under both the PDA and Title VII, fertile women must be compared
548. Id.
549. Brief Amicus Curiae of Concerned Women for America in Support of Respondent at 16,
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (No. 89-1215) ("There are real differences between men and
women and these differences do not simply disappear because a case is brought under Title VII. The
policy at issue in this case focuses on this 'natural difference' between men and women. There is no
myth; there is no stereotyping.").
550. For the EEOC's general argument that a sex-based fetal protection policy can be justified
as a BFOQ, see Brief for the United States & the EEOC Supporting Plaintiffs at 31-45, Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (No. 89-1215). For the EEOC's specific argument that it would be "harsh
and incongruous" to deny the BFOQ defense to an employer excluding only actually pregnant
women, see id. at 37-39.
551. See Brief Amici Curiae of Equal Rights Advocates, The NOW Legal Defense &
Education Fund, National Women's Law Center, & Women's Legal Defense Fund in Support of
Petitioners at 12 n.3, Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (No. 89-1215) [hereinafter ERA Johnson
Controls Brief] ("The Johnson Controls-type stereotype undoubtedly arises because of the centrality
and strength of the mother-infant relationship in our culture, leading employers simply to forget
about fathers. This is especially so during pregnancy, when the fetus is enclosed in the woman's
body, and the father's connection to the fetus has no such visible and obvious manifestation.").
552. See ERA Johnson Controls Brief, supra note 551, at 40-41 (arguing that, "far from
allowing courts to consider fetal health concerns which have no impact on the woman's job
performance abilities, Congress mandated equal treatment"); Brief Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners by American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 41-42, Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (No.
89-1215) [hereinafter ACLU Johnson Controls Brief] (arguing that, even if it substantively disagrees
with it, the Court is bound by Congress's conclusion "that employers may not substitute their
evaluation of the risks and benefits of work (including the risks and benefits to current and future
children) for the decisions of women themselves").
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to fertile men in terms of their ability to make batteries and cannot be
treated as the guardians of the next generation.553
At the time, women's rights groups were working to build support
for a new law, enacted two years later as the Family and Medical Leave
Act,554 that would affirm the PDA's logic and extend its reach by
granting unpaid leave not only to pregnant women and temporarily
disabled employees, but also to new mothers and fathers and to men and
women caring for sick or disabled family members.555 Feminists were
also actively pursuing legislation that would overrule Supreme Court
decisions that interpreted Title VII narrowly.556 Their efforts would soon
culminate in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.55' Although the bill said
nothing about fetal protection policies specifically, the fact that Congress
was prepared to override restrictive Supreme Court decisions in response
to feminist organizing and public outcry may well have contributed to
the resounding plaintiff victory in Johnson Controls.558 Thus, in Johnson
Controls, as in early pregnancy discrimination developments, progress
occurred because feminists exerted concerted pressure on Congress and
the courts to reject still-prevalent stereotypes assuming women prioritize
their reproductive roles over their work roles.
This lesson was only partially heeded in Young v. UPS. It is true that
women's rights groups presented a similarly united front, galvanizing a
broad coalition of interested groups and rallying public opinion generally
in an effort to persuade the Supreme Court to construe the PDA to
553. See ACLU Johnson Controls Brief, supra note 552, at 16-17 ("Because women are as
capable of producing batteries as men are, the plain language of Title Vii, as amended by the
PDA, clearly prohibits Johnson Controls' policy .. "); ERA Johnson Controls Brief, supra note
551, at 41 ("Congress intended to prohibit employers from considering anything other than the
employee's actual ability to perform the job-concerns about the health of fetuses or potential
fetuses are simply not relevant.").
554. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.
555. See, e.g., DONNA R. LENHOFF & LISSA BELL, NAT'L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN &
FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR WORKING FAMILIES AND FOR COMMUNITIES: FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE AS A CASE STUDY 3-11, available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-
library/work-family/fmla/fmla-case-study-lenhoff-bell.pdf (describing the extensive efforts to pass
the FMLA, which was first drafted in 1984).
556. Women's rights and civil rights groups were particularly concerned about aspects of the
Court's decisions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 881 (2014), and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon
Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
557. Although the first bill they supported was vetoed by President Bush, 136 CONG. REC.
S16,418-01 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990), feminists and other groups soon persuaded Congress to
overrule these and other decisions narrowing Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
558. See, e.g., Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2137 n.374 (arguing that the Supreme
Court was "[c]hastened by Congress's immediate and angry override of Geduldig and Gilbert" when
it applied the PDA expansively in Johnson Controls). For a general discussion of this constitutional
override process, see Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides
of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1336-37
(2014).
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provide strong protections for pregnant women.55 9 Women's rights
advocates and agency officials agreed that the law forbids artificial
distinctions treating pregnant women less favorably than other classes of
similarly disabled employees. Feminists urged the Court not to fall back
on older views of pregnancy as a marker of women's workplace margin-
alization.560 They persuaded the EEOC to issue new guidance adopting
this position561 and galvanized public support and sympathy for pregnant
workers .562
These efforts showed admirable unity but they did not coalesce
around challenging pregnant women's difference. In fact, as discussed
above, these groups advocated an interpretation of the PDA that would
require employers to give pregnant women accommodations not availa-
ble to all their coworkers with similar work restrictions-leaving it to
conservative EEOC commissioners to voice concerns about fairness to
these other employees.563 Apparently, over time, the contemporary
inheritors and presumed defenders of the functional disability approach
had internalized some aspects of the uniqueness view of pregnancy,
559. Beyond the usual women's rights organizations and the federal government, other groups
that filed amicus briefs in support of Young included members of Congress, some of whom were in
Congress when the PDA was passed, state and local legislators, pro-life organizations, labor
organizations, healthcare providers, mall businesses, local chambers of commerce, and human
rights groups. Young v. United Parcel Service, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/young-v-united-parcel-service (last visited July 24, 2015); see also Brigid Schulte,
Lawmakers, Civil Rights Leaders Tell Supreme Court to Support Pregnant Workers, WASH. POST
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://wwwwashingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2014/09/l1/lawmakers-civil-
rights-leaders-tell-supreme-court-to-support-pregnant-workers.
560. See, e.g., Law Professor Young Brief, supra note 520, at 3, 14-20 (arguing that
employers' failure to accommodate pregnancy as generously as other conditions similarly affecting
work is based upon and perpetuates gender stereotyping of pregnancy as unique and women as unfit
for the workplace); ACLU Young Brief, supra note 520, at 15-32 (same); Brief of Amicus Curiae 23
Pro-Life Organizations and the Judicial Education Project in Support of Petitioner Peggy Young at
19, 27-29, Young v. United Postal Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL
4536934 (arguing that Congress passed the PDA because it thought that pregnancy "warrants at least
as much protection as other significant interests" and did not intend for pregnant women to receive
preferential treatment).
561. See Chai R. Feldblum, Commissioner, EEOC, Statement on Approval of the Enforcement
Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, at app. A (July 14, 2014), available at
http://chaifeldblum.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Feldblum-Statement-on-Pregnancy-Guidance-
07.14.14.pdf) (showing support for the EEOC's 2014 guidelines by various women's rights groups).
562. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, A Pregnant Worker's Right to Sue, SLATE (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/jurisprudence/2015/03/young-v-ups upreme cou
rt decision a victory_for pregnantwomen facingdiscrimination.html (explaining that the Young
case "has garnered an enormous amount of attention from women and women's rights groups, and
from across the ideological spectrum"); Stand with Peggy Young and all Pregnant Workers, A
BETTER BALANCE, http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/blog/entry/stand-with-peggy-young-and-all-
pregnant-workers (last visited May 26, 2015) (describing a partnership between at least three
women's rights organizations for a rally in front of the Supreme Court during the oral argument for
Young and social media engagement using the hashtag #StandWithPeggy).
563. See Constance S. Barker, Commissioner, EEOC, Statement on Issuance of EEOC
Enforcement Guidance and Other Related Issues (July 14, 2014), available at
http://www.disabilityleavelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/1 73/2014/07/Commissioner-Barker-
Public-Statement-July-14-2014.pdf; Hon. Victoria A. Lipnic, Commissioner, EEOC, Statement on
Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (July 14, 2014), available at
http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/kmgn-91znpp/$File/lipnic.pdf.
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implicitly regarding pregnant women's situation as sufficiently distinc-
tive to merit protections not conferred on some other employees. This
time, a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vision of equality
animating the disability approach, but, in the absence of clear unified
guidance from feminist advocates and the agencies for how to honor that
approach, the Court's analysis avoided reinforcing pregnant women's
distinctiveness only by abandoning them to evidentiary pitfalls. Perhaps,
in their zeal to protect vulnerable women like Peggy Young, participants
in the litigation failed to pay sufficient homage to the message conveyed
by an earlier generation who had repudiated arguments rooted in differ-
ence and fought to establish the disability approach in the law: Challenge
difference, identify with others, and leave no one behind. For ultimately,
it is not pregnant women or women, but people, whose uniqueness
should be recognized.
IV. PAST LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
What can be learned from this sweeping summary of legal devel-
opments since Title VII began prohibiting sex discrimination? Does the
past hold any lessons for the future?
In this Part, I draw the key conclusions and sketch some implica-
tions for the future. Building on insights from the literature on social
movements and legal change, I begin by proposing some conclusions
about how women's rights activism influenced the development of Title
VII sex discrimination law. I then draw inspiration from this history to
chart a new direction for the future.
A. The Continuing Need to Challenge Difference
The history of Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination tells an
important story about legal change: Progress toward workplace equality
under the law has depended on the presence of strong, unified feminist
activism challenging sex difference. The first decade of Title VII's
development saw genuine legal progress, but only because the leaders of
the new women's rights movement pulled together and presented a clear,
compelling vision and demand for equality that galvanized popular
support and pressured legal institutions to change. They fought for and
won interpretations of Title VII that repudiated sex stereotypes and
eroded sex segregation.
Later, however, as the women's movement matured, faded, and dis-
sipated due to rising opposition and renewed feminist division, the courts
retreated to older biases about women and work, and Title VII's progress
reversed or stalled. The parallel trends in both the lack of interest cases
and in pregnancy discrimination law suggest that, when activists fail to
make visible, energetic, popularly-supported efforts to push the law
forward, or when internal divisions convey a mixed message about the
preferred direction for change, legal institutions can escape accountabil-
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ity to a unified constituency. As a result, courts and policymakers have
greater freedom to retain or return to earlier views that attribute work-
place inequality to preexisting sex differences.
History suggests, then, that future progress under Title VII depends
on renewed activism that puts forward a clear, compelling vision, garners
public support, and creates pressure for change. But history also suggests
that the content of that vision makes a difference. Consciously or
unconsciously, social activism and legal advocacy are always guided by
a normative vision. Early feminists dreamed of a society in which people
would no longer be limited or divided by rigid sex differentiation; they
envisioned workplaces in which women and men could work shoulder to
shoulder as equals across lines of previously assumed difference. To
create that world, they challenged the existence of sex differences,
arguing that women were no different from men in ways that mattered to
employment or to equality.
Future progress toward workplace sex equality will require renewed
determination to challenge assumptions about difference that justify the
status quo-this time, challenging not the reality but the self-reinforcing
quality of alleged differences by focusing attention on how employers
help create the differences they cite to justify discriminatory policies.
Today's barriers to workplace equality are updated versions of the
ones targeted by early women's rights groups-practices, which, as we
have seen, can produce sex differences. Early feminists mobilized Title
VII and the Constitution to overturn laws and customs that prescribed
different roles for women and men based on sex, reinforcing a male-
breadwinner, female-caregiver system in which women were expected to
be only secondary earners, if they worked at all. 564 Such separationist
practices may be less explicit today,565 but they continue. Employers still
564. See supra notes 160-66, 251-65 and accompanying text.
565. Many commentators have emphasized the less explicit, less conscious nature of
contemporary employment discrimination. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair
Measures. A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action, " 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1071-81
(2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164-65, 1199-1216
(1995). Nonetheless, many explicit forms of sex discrimination do continue. See, e.g., Int'l Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991) (involving a policy explicitly excluding
fertile women from a category of jobs); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077-
78 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving appearance standards that required women, but not men, to wear
stockings, colored nail polish, makeup, and particular hairstyles); Press Release, Ruby Tuesday Sued
by EEOC for Sex Discrimination, EEOC (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/I -22-15.cfm (involving explicit exclusion of men for a
temporary job opportunity out of "fears about housing employees of both genders together"); see
also NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE STILL A
FACT OF LIFE (July 1, 2000), available at http://www.nwlc.org/resource/sex-discrimination-
american-workplace-still-fact-life (collecting "just a few egregious examples" from "the large
number of cases demonstrating the sex discrimination women continue to face in our country
today"). Because sex stereotypes are so widely accepted and believed to justify discrimination, sex
discrimination may be more likely than other forms to assume an explicit form.
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assign people to different work roles based on sex, as Part III showed,
overtly or covertly denying women and men jobs regarded as sex-
inappropriate,566 for example, and denying jobs, benefits, and other
protections to certain people based on sex, such as pregnant women;
567
employers also continue to single out various subsets of men and women
for less favorable treatment, such as women of color and gay and lesbian
employees, based partly on their sex.568 Other practices may be more
understated, but they also reinforce sex-differentiated roles. Employers
impose differential standards for dress and behavior based on sex, for
example, penalizing women and men who fail to conform to sex- or
gender-based expectations for how they should look or act at work.569
Supervisors and co-workers continue to subject people to hostile treat-
ment based on sex, warning women and men away from sex-atypical
jobs and reproducing sex-segregated employment.570 Although discrimi-
566. See, e.g., supra notes 271-381 and accompanying text.
567. See, e.g., supra notes 475-96 and accompanying text.
568. See, e.g., supra notes 48-53, 181 and accompanying text; see also infra note 569
(discussing cases where race and sexual orientation are implicated alongside sex).
569. Examples from Title VII caselaw are too numerous to cite. For more recent examples, see
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232-33, 235 (1989) (involving a national accounting
firm with only 1% female partners denying partnership to a woman after telling her she needed to
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry"); Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., LLC, 591 F.3d 1033, 1036-37 (8th Cir.
2010) (involving a hotel dismissing a female receptionist for appearing too "tomboyish" and lacking
the "pretty," "Midwestern girl look" the hotel "considered especially important for women working
at the front desk"); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2009) (involving
coworkers who harassed a male machine operator for speaking in a high voice, walking and sitting
in an effeminate manner, being well-groomed, refusing to curse, and discussing "art, music, interior
design, and decor"); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001)
(involving coworkers harassing a male waiter for walking and carrying his tray "like a woman" and
not engaging in heterosexual sex with a female coworker); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d
293, 295-300, 305-06 (D.D.C. 2008) (involving a federal agency rescinding job offer after leaming
that the candidate was in the process of transitioning from male to female, partly because the
candidate looked like "a man in women's clothing" and would not seem credible when testifying
before Congress); Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *1-3
(D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (involving a theme park firing a Black female worker for refusing to comply
with requests to change her comrow hairstyle). For earlier cases, see Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766
F.2d 1205, 1207-10 (8th Cir. 1985) (involving a news station reassigning female television news
anchor due to what the judge described as a "below-average aptitude" regarding clothing and
makeup and a telephone survey of viewers ranking her last among her peers in good looks (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1982)
(involving an airline firing female flight attendants for exceeding weight requirements because they
were supposed to be thin and attractive); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir.
1978) (involving an insurance company refusing to hire a male mail room clerk applicant because
his interviewer found him to be "effeminate"); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir.
1975) (involving an industrial plant firing Black female employees who refused an order to clean
their department, even though other workers were not required to do such janitorial tasks, because
"Colored people should stay in their places" and "Colored people are hired to clean because they
clean better" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
570. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (involving a
railroad company supervisor telling the only woman in his department that women should not be
working there and making insulting and inappropriate comments o her in front of other coworkers);
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76-77 (1998) (involving oil platform crew
members who forcibly subjected another male worker to sex-related, humiliating actions before the
rest of the crew and threatened to rape him); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
(involving an equipment rental company president who made repeated sexual innuendos towards
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nation is now understood to include sex and gender biases that extend
beyond the male versus female dyad571 and influence institutional
dynamics and individual behavior in subtle ways, the basic separationist
structure of discrimination has not fundamentally changed: Discrimina-
tory employment practices still identify people according to predefined
social groups and foster interactions that treat them differently based on
572preconceptions about those groups.
Defenders still justify such practices, and the resulting employment
patterns, by claiming they simply reflect preexisting sex differences.
Sex-based disparities in hiring, pay, promotion, retention, the treatment
of pregnant women-"the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women"573 _are all justified as the natural reflection of women's
different capacities, choices, or competences. But these appeals to the
alleged facts rely on inaccurate descriptive stereotypes, while obscuring
the prescriptive component and self-reinforcing quality of the underlying
practices.574 The military still prevents women from fully engaging in
combat roles, for example, both because men simply are more aggressive
and war-like and because they should be.575 Employers adopt grooming
female manager in the presence of customers and other employees); see also Schultz, Reconceptual-
izing, supra note 27, at 1755-74 (arguing for a new understanding of hostile work environment sex
harassment as an attempt to wam women away from the work sphere and define work and work
competence as masculine); Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2140-44 (2003)
[hereinafter Schultz, Sanitized Workplace] (explaining how sexuality is used against women in both
male-dominated and female-dominated fields); Ann C. McGinley, Harassing "Girls" at the Hard
Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized Environments, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1229, 1262-63 (2007)
(applying Schultz's argument to harassment by customers and the way employers and supervisors
encourage such harassment hrough inaction).
571. Evidence shows that men can exercise gendered expectations toward other men. See, e.g.,
Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment
Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 721-26 (2010); Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra
note 27, at 1774-88. Women also exercise similar gender bias toward other women. See Ramit
Mizrahi, Note, "Hostility To the Presence of Women ": Why Women Undermine Each Other in the
Workplace and the Consequences for Title VII, 113 YALE L.J. 1579, 1594-97 (2004). The form and
content of gender bias often differs by other axes of inequality such as race, see, e.g., Crenshaw,
supra note 181, at 152-60; Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 313-14 (1996); Kessler-Harris, supra note 302, at
67-71; Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2787, 2787 (2007), and sexual orientation, see, e.g., Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking
Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U.L. REV. 715, 731, 766-67 (2014); Zachary R. Herz, Note,
Price's Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396,
422-23, 425-26 (2014). We have more nuanced views and debates about the nature and significance
of stereotyping and performance expectations based on sex, race, sexual orientation, and other axes
of inequality. For examples, see Case, supra note 434, at 2-3; Herz, supra, at 443; and see generally
DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN "POST-RACIAL"
AMERICA (2013).
572. See, e.g., CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 571, at 1-45; Kang & Banaji, supra note 565,
at 1071 90; Krieger, supra note 565, at 1199-1217; Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1824-
39.
573. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
574. For an illuminating discussion of the prescriptive and descriptive elements of sex
stereotyping, see generally Herz, supra note 571.
575. Although the Department of Defense rescinded the regulation precluding women from
combat roles in 2013, Memorandum from the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff & Secretary of
Defense on the Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule to
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codes requiring women to wear makeup and men to cut their hair short,
both because women and men allegedly already do these things and
because they should do them.576 Firms hire few if any women for the
male-dominated jobs, both because women are purportedly too feminine
to do a "man's job" and because women shouldn 't do such jobs.577
Medical practices refuse to hire male obstetrician-gynecologists, both
because female patients are said to have "a natural ... human inclination
toward [sexual] modesty,' 578 and because women are supposed to be
sexually modest. Gay men are harassed or ostracized by their heterosex-
ual male colleagues both because they aren't seen as sufficiently mascu-
line and tough to be, say, football players,579 and because, if the straight
the Secretaries of Military Dep'ts I (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/WlSRJointMemo.pdf, female soldiers still do not have the same combat opportunities as
males, as "the military reserved for its commanders the continued right to exclude women from
combat if the commanders could assert a particular military necessity as a justification." Tim
Bakken, A Woman Soldier's Right to Combat: Equal Protection in the Military, 20 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 271, 272 (2014). See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding
male-only registration for the draft). For explanations for these policies, see Kenneth L. Karst, The
Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 557-59
(1991) (arguing that military restrictions are designed to enforce "traditional images of mascu-
linity"); Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 62, 65-66, available
at http://www.hendrix.edu/uploadedfiles/admission/naked citadel.pdf (making a similar argument
about a military school's male-only admission policy).
576. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077-78, 1083 (9th
Cir. 2004) (upholding a casino's decision to fire a female bartender for refusing to comply with a
new policy requiring women, but not men, to wear makeup); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co.,
507 F.2d 1084, 1087, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding a publishing company's decision not to hire a
male display artist with shoulder length hair on the grounds that grooming codes that merely reflect
"generally accepted community standards" are not discriminatory).
577. See, e.g., Mazus v. Dep't of Transp., 489 F. Supp. 376, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that
a state transportation department did not discriminate against women in its hiring patterns because
the idea that "very few females seek this type of outside laboring work because it is physically
demanding and generally unappealing to them" is an "obvious fact [that] does not carry with it the
imprint of attributing to women a stereotyped role in our society"); Logan v. Gen. Fireproofing Co.,
6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 140, 144 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (upholding a chair manufacturer's refusal
to hire a Black woman and stating that "[c]ommon sense tells us that few women have the skill or
the desire to be a welder or a metal fabricator, and that most men cannot operate a sewing machine
and have no desire to learn. The evidence clearly establishes this pattern in Rutherford County").
578. Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposal for Expansion of the
Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 357, 376 (2004); see also id. at
382-834, 387-88, 391-92 (arguing that being female should be a BFOQ for OB-GYNs under Title
VII because female patients prefer same-sex doctors for p ivacy and therapeutic reasons, rather than
due to malignant gender biases). But see Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits
of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1261-62 (2003) (arguing that BFOQ caselaw
adopting such reasoning "casts [women] as ... essentially and necessarily modest in a way that
resonates with tendencies to propertize women and eny them sexual agency").
579. See, e.g., Melissa Jeltsen, Former NFL Coach: Openly Gay Player Michael Sam
'Bringing Baggage' to Locker Room, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2014, 2:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/10/michael-sam-herm-edwards-n 4760565.html (reporting
that when Michael Sam, the first openly gay football player to be drafted into the NFL, disclosed his
homosexuality in the New York Times, he was promptly condemned by a former NFL coach as a
potential disruption who could complicate his team's image and locker room unity); Ty Schalter,
How Can Gay NFL Prospect Michael Sam Fit into Homophobic Locker-Room Culture?, BLEACHER
REPORT (Feb. 15, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1960845-how-can-gay-nfl-prospect-
michael-sam-fit-into-homophobic-locker-room-culture (reporting that an NFL investigation
uncovered homophobia and racism in a team locker room, prompting commentators to question how
Michael Sam would be received).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
men are to maintain their image, the gay men can't be.
580
Once such discriminatory practices are in place, they interact dy-
namically with the underlying stereotypes to set in motion self-
perpetuating and self-justifying cycles.58 ' Requiring women to wear
makeup at work, where they tend to be visible, strengthens the percep-
tion that most women (or working women) wear it. This perception in
turn leads more women to wear makeup, an increase that further fuels
and validates the idea that women do and should; the requirement thus
entrenches makeup as a female professional norm. By the same token,
requiring women who work in mostly-male fields to wear makeup can
highlight the perception that they are different and out of place, further
marginalizing them and reinforcing the masculine image of the job.
582
Restricting women from equal military combat roles similarly preserves
the image of combat as an inherently masculine activity, warning women
away, lowering their rates of application, denying them access to
required skills, and refueling the perception that only men are really
interested in and fit for combat roles. The restrictions mark the women
who defy prescriptive stereotypes by going into combat roles as deviant
and less competent, regardless of their qualifications, further feeding the
stereotypes.583 These processes shore up men's sense of superiority and
ownership over combat roles, strengthening their traditional protective
stance toward the (weaker, less aggressive) women in society. Ulti-
mately, the stereotypes and the restrictive standards take on a life of their
own, producing a mostly male pool of qualified candidates who are
combat roles. and confirming the truth of the underlying stereotypes.
Thus, challenging both descriptive and prescriptive ideas about sex
difference remains crucial to ending workplace discrimination and
fulfilling Title VII's aims.
The normative defense for challenging difference for the purpose of
580. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 571, at 722 (observing that dominant conceptions of
heterosexual masculinity project images of homosexuals as "other" in order to establish a certain
view of heterosexual manhood); Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 27, at 1774-89 (observing
that heterosexual men often denigrate their gay male co-workers as a way of shoring up their own
fragile senses of masculinity and preserving the image of the job as suitably masculine); Soucek,
supra note 571, at 728-29 (making a similar observation).
581. See infra notes 586-92 and accompanying text.
582. See McGinley, supra note 570, at 1262 (explaining that in jobs that are no longer sex-
segregated but retain a masculine identity, such as that of a blackjack dealer or bartender, when
employers sexualize female employees through appearance and grooming codes, they subjugate
them within the power structure of the job and encourage harassment).
583. See, e.g., Glick & Rudman, supra note 41, at 334, 338 (citation omitted) (noting that
gender role subcategories are used to "' isolate' or 'encapsulate' people who 'deviate' from gender
prescriptions" and that that those who show that they are exceptions to a stereotype are "at serious
risk of social rejection"); id. at 335 (citing to and discussing studies that show that in masculine
domains, lowered expectations for female competence lead to evaluations where a woman is
considered to be performing well-for a woman); Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 27, at
1762-69 (showing that women who work in male-dominated jobs are frequently regarded as less
competent, regardless of how they perform); Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1832-39
(same).
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eroding workplace discrimination is the same today as it was for early
women's rights activists: Gender-biased expectations violate both
freedom and equality interests. Early feminists understood that work-
place discrimination constrained women's choices and consigned them to
an inferior social and economic status, but they also saw how it limited
men's lives. By attacking sex discrimination and the ideology of sex
difference, they sought to expand the law in both equality and freedom-
584enhancing directions. These goals remain important, but unfulfilled.
Many women and men still experience sex or gender-based employment
discrimination that limits their access to good jobs, lowers their wages,
and prevents them from achieving economic parity.585 At the same time,
discrimination also prevents people from achieving more intangible
goals, such as doing the types of work they love, working with their
preferred associates, earning enough to live the lives they want to live,
assuming the social roles and identities they desire, and even enjoying
the types of intimate relationships they value-let alone choosing a sex-
atypical job for the thrill of violating social taboos. Challenging discrim-
ination and difference gives both women and men more freedom to craft
their own lives, unconstrained by government or industry prescriptions
and pressures.
Challenging difference for these purposes does not mean denying it:
It means denaturalizing difference by questioning its origins and stabil-
ity. Under Title VII, it means critically examining claims that workplace
inequalities are attributable to sex differences in job preferences or
abilities-or asking whether those differences are the cause or the
consequence of the inequalities.
Over the past few decades, extensive research in the social sciences
has given us a better understanding of how institutional processes can
actually evoke group-based differences that later appear to be exogenous
and natural.586 Basic features of the institutions in which people spend
time and energy, such as workplaces and universities, may in a very real
sense produce group-based differences by shaping the way their inhabit-
ants perceive, express, and react to each other's social identities. Differ-
ences that appear to be stable and independent are in fact quite malleable
584. See, e.g., supra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
585. For an analysis of how earning capacity affects bargaining positions, thus influencing
many aspects of heterosexual relationships, see, for example, Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction Cost
Approach to Families and Households, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 581, 598-603 (1985). For an
analysis of how this literature applies to same-sex couples, see Vicki Schultz & Michael Yar-
borough, Will Marriage Make Gay and Lesbian Couples Less Egalitarian? A Cautionary Tale 23-29
(June 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
586. For a description of relevant social science research, see Vicki Schultz, Antidiscrimination
Law as Disruption: The Emergence of a New Approach to Understanding and Addressing
Discrimination (Mar. 2013) [hereinafter Schultz, Antidiscrimination] (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). For a recent, comprehensive analysis of the social science by researchers in the
field, see generally SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 40.
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and context specific.587 Institutional practices that highlight certain
aspects of people's social identity, such as their sex, and assign negative
stereotypes to them can actually elicit from the targeted group the lower
performances and negative behaviors that were predicted, thus lending
588confirmation to stereotypes. Institutions can also subtly pressure
people into behaving in ways that conform to prescriptive stereotypes,
thus making the stereotypes a self-fulfilling prophecy.589 Such practices
naturalize group-based differences, making it appear that they are
preexisting properties of the employees involved and justifying further
distinctions in opportunity and reward (such as job assignment, promo-
tion or pay). 590 Thus, work organizations can actually create difference
by making sex matter in ways that simultaneously reinforce negative
stereotypes and rationalize inequality.591 Such research confirms the
intuitions of far-sighted judges like Justice Brennan, who acknowledged
early on that observed differences in women's work patterns or prefer-
ences can be produced by the employment disparities they are thought to
explain.592
B. Toward a More Expansive Approach to Title VII
Title VII can and should take these insights into account. A new ap-
proach to discrimination law can recognize and address discrimination's
self-reinforcing quality.593 To ensure further progress, the law seeks to
(1) identify, and change, discriminatory employment practices that
reinforce negative stereotypes and foster unnecessary difference and
division, and (2) endorse practices that encourage people to relate to each
587. Schultz, Antidiscrimination, supra note 586, at 42.
588. Research on stereotype threat provides a particularly vivid illustration, showing that in a
wide range of situations in which negative stereotypes about a group may be applied and that group-
based identity is made salient, people who are the targets of the stereotype predictably react in ways
that lower their performance and lend confirmation to the stereotype. See CLAUDE M. STEELE,
WHISTLING VIVALDI AND OTHER CLUES TO How STEREOTYPES AFFECT Us 5-13 (2010) (explaining
the general concept of stereotype threat and describing the research). In one classic example, women
who are told that a difficult math test is not associated with any sex difference in performance
perform as well as men, but when they believe the test is associated with past sex differences, they
significantly underperform, confirming the stereotype that women are not as good at math as men.
Steven J. Spencer et al., Stereotype Threat and Women 's Math Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 8-22 (1999). For further discussion, see Schultz, Antidiscrimination, supra note
586, at 53-56.
589. See, e.g., SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 40, at 8, 217, 280, 336-37; Kang & Banaji, supra
note 565, at 1086-90.
590. Schultz, Antidiscrimination, supra note 586, at 42.
591. See KANTER, supra note 21, at 263 ("[P]redictions get made on the basis of stereotypes
and current notions of who fits where in the present system; people are then 'set up' in positions
which make the predictions come true.").
592. See supra notes 403-08 and accompanying text.
593. For a sustained account of this new approach, see Schultz, Antidiscrimination, supra note
586; and see also Vicki Schultz, Reimagining Affirmative Action 23-24 (Feb. 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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other as equals across boundaries of sex and race.594 Title VII law and
policy can play an important role by making these two goals explicit and
marshaling public and private expertise to help institutions meet them.
Title VII enforcement can play another important role by pointing toward
the need for broader structural solutions when anti-discrimination law
alone proves inadequate to achieve these important aims.
Recognizing that discriminatory employment practices create
group-based differences through feedback loops would inject a dose of
healthy realism into Title VII law and produce fairer, more accurate
outcomes. Cases raising the lack of interest argument provide a prime
illustration. Arguments that sex-based employment disparities reflect
women's lack of interest in higher paying jobs assume that women hold
stable, sex-linked job preferences that are rooted in female nature or
family roles.595 Research shows, however, that women, like men, form
their work aspirations primarily in response to labor market and work-
596place dynamics. Discriminatory employment practices can reduce
women's incentive to pursue fields historically closed to them, steering
women instead to stereotypically female employment and leading them
to display the gendered work attitudes and behaviors that come to be
viewed as preexisting female attributes.597 Explicitly gendered job
descriptions and test questions can drive women from the workforce or
from better jobs, but so can purportedly more neutral methods like word-
of-mouth recruiting, tap-on-the-shoulder promotional systems, and
highly subjective selection processes.59 The resulting dearth of women
can increase the risk of sex stereotyping and harassment on the job,599
warning women away, reducing their performance, and refueling the
stereotypes. Acknowledging that such employment practices can shape
women's job preferences along gendered lines would frame cases raising
the lack of interest argument differently, leading courts to evaluate the
evidence with better informed judgment and to insist on more objective
documentation that employers have not created the sex differences they
cite.
An approach that highlights how discriminatory employment prac-
tices can produce harmful sex differences and divisions can also cast new
light on pregnancy discrimination cases and other situations involving
594. For an illuminating discussion of the tradeoffs between the targeted remedies offered by
anti-discrimination law and the more universal ones offered by broader forms of labor and
employment law, see generally Clarke, supra note 463.
595. For detailed documentation of this assumption in the caselaw, see Schultz, Telling Stories,
supra note 27, at 1799-1814.
596. For an extended discussion of this point and the supporting social science literature, see
id. at 1815-39.
597. Id.
598. See supra notes 360-62, 370 and accompanying text.
599. See Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 570, at 2140-44; Schultz, Reconceptualiz-
ing, supra note 27, at 1760 n.407, 1800-01.
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workplace standards that are criticized as androcentric. Just as such an
approach does not require denying difference, neither does it neither does
it require accepting workplace standards that mask hidden bias, as some
feminists have feared. Indeed, the point is to target and change practices
that produce inequality by marking some people as different and inferior
employees. But the approach does clarify the importance of framing and
addressing such bias with the conscious aim of denaturalizing difference.
As other scholars have observed, terms like "male norm"600 risk reinforc-
ing sex and gender roles by oversimplifying and taking for granted the
complex social patterns described as typically male (and female).60'
Thus, referring to fields occupied mostly by men, such as engineering or
firefighting, as "male" may reify the work as somehow inherently
masculine and signal agreement that it is more suitable for men. Simi-
larly, referring to prevalent workplace norms, such as full-time work
schedules or inadequate leave policies, as male-oriented not only risks
communicating that such work patterns are somehow more fitting for
men: It also obscures commonalities between the working patterns of
many men and women,60 2 differences within each group,60 3 and shifts
over time in a way that portrays average white, middle-class tenden-
cies6° toward male market and female home specialization as universal
and unchangeable.605 Conversely, asserting that inadequate leave policies
600. See supra note 444; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 213-14 (explaining the male
norm as a staple of feminist analysis and describing her ideal-worker concept as an updated version).
601. As Catherine Albiston puts it: "To state that the structure of work is 'male' merely pushes
the reification back one step, ... recreat[ing] new versions of the same gender divisions.
ALBISTON, supra note 466, at 78.
602. The term may obscure similarities in the hours of many men and women, such as the fact
that married women work thirty-five hours a week or more, at rates roughly equivalent to single
men. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Persons at Work in Nonagricultural Industries by Age, Sex, Race,
Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, Marital Status, and Usual Full- or Part-Time Status, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat22.pdf (last visited Sep. 26, 2014).
603. The term may obscure racial differences between employed women, such as the fact that
Black and Asian women are more likely white or Hispanic women to work thirty-five hours per
week or more, see id., as well as racial differences between employed men, such as the fact that
Black and Latino men have more difficulty than white men finding full-time work. See, e.g., BARRY
BLUESTONE & MARY HUFF STEVENSON, THE BOSTON RENAISSANCE: RACE, SPACE, AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN AN AMERICAN METROPOLIS 222-25 (2000); DEIRDRE A. ROYSTER, RACE AND THE
INVISIBLE HAND: How WHITE NETWORKS EXCLUDE BLACK MEN FROM BLUE-COLLAR JOBS 65-67
(2003); James M. Quane et al., The Urban Jobs Crisis: Paths Toward Employment for Low-Income
Blacks and Latinos, HARV. MAG., May-June 2013, at 42-44, available at
http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2013/05-pdfs/0513-42.pdf.
604. In today's economy, the term may also misleadingly overlook common patterns among
low-wage women, who frequently patch together multiple, contingent jobs with varying, unpredicta-
ble schedules. Vicki Schultz, Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203, 1217
n.39 (2009) (collecting sources); Liz Watson et al., Collateral Damage: Scheduling Challenges for
Workers in Low-Wage Jobs and Their Consequences, NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. (Apr. 2014),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/collateradamage scheduling-fact sheet.pdf.
605. Although some such workplace standards are rooted in historical family-wage ideals, see
Dinner, supra note 16, at 437, those ideals always applied unevenly by race and class and were never
realized fully even for the white middle classes. See Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for
a Reduced Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 131-32 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owen eds.,
2006).
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or rigid time schedules privilege males may convey a belief that those
policies are somehow good for men or that men prefer them, providing
another example of how descriptive statements can carry normative
implications and overlooking the significant bias against men who take
leave from work for family or disability-related reasons.606 Such claims
also disregard the ways in which such biases against heterosexual men
may combine with their higher relative earnings to discourage them from
taking time off, while encouraging their female partners to do SO,6 07 thus
helping create the sex-based employment patterns that are commonly
attributed to preexisting preferences.
Emphasizing how exclusionary workplace standards help create
sex-based work patterns through such feedback effects avoids naturaliz-
ing them, while creating pressure for change. From this perspective, the
problem is not that women are forced to comply with male-oriented
workplace standards that fail to accommodate their preexisting differ-
ences: The problem is that stereotypes and discriminatory practices help
create the perceived and actual group-based differences that prevent
women and many men from succeeding at work. Women who work in
jobs held predominantly by men are often regarded as less capable and
are therefore denied access to the training needed to succeed regardless
of whether they comply with organizational norms,608 just as mothers
who leave work early are presumed to do so for family reasons and are
therefore treated as less reliable employees regardless of their actual
motivations.69 Men who leave work for more than a week or two to
bond with their newborns are similarly perceived and treated as shirk-
606. For evidence of such significant bias, see ALBISTON, supra note 466, at 169-78; Julie
Holliday Wayne & Bryanne L. Cordeiro, Who is a Good Organizational Citizen? Social Perception
of Male and Female Employees Who Use Family Leave, 49 SEX ROLES 233,242 (2003).
607. Rosenblum, supra note 515, at 106 (noting the many reasons given for "men's failure to
take parental leave" and arguing that the two that "stand out" are money and stigma, because "[i]n a
heterosexual two-parent household, financial incentives heavily favor the man working and the
woman caretaking," since "men earn more money and the family cannot afford to lose this income
through unpaid leave"); see also Chuck Halverson, Note, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not
Taking Paternity Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 264-
65 (2003) (explaining that financial inability is the leading reason why men and women do not take
FMLA leave, that in households with a working man and woman, the man is the higher wage earner
80% of the time, and that low-income fathers face even more difficulty in attempting to take FMLA
leave).
608. Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 27, at 1762-69; Schultz, Telling Stories, supra
note 27, at 1836-37. For additional research, see Glick & Rudman, supra note 41, at 335 (citing to
and discussing studies that show that in masculine domains, lowered expectations for female
competence lead to evaluations where a woman is considered performing well-for a woman); Janet
T. Spence & Robert Helmreich, Who Likes Competent Women? Competence, Sex-Role Congruence
of Interests, and Subjects' Attitudes Toward Women as Determinants of Interpersonal Interaction, 2
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 197, 210-12 (1972) (showing that negative stereotypes of women render
evaluations that they are less competent than men).
609. Cf Joan C. Williams, Hitting the Maternal Wall, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 16, 19
("Academic mothers also often report a form of attribution bias: colleagues who before they had
children used to assume that the women were writing or at a conference when they were not in the
office may well assume after they return from maternity leave that they are taking care of kids-
even if they are at the library working on a book.").
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ers, 61 as are employees who take time off to attend to personal illnesses
or disabilities,61' regardless of their actual dedication to their work.
An approach that targets and seeks to prevent stereotyping and the
negative sense of difference and division that result from exclusionary
employment practices can unify these cases and help guide the law
toward fairer, more inclusive solutions. Reconsidering pregnancy law
from such a perspective, for example, clarifies the virtues of framing
pregnancy as a condition comparable to disability, a position endorsed by
Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),612 and extending
the comparison to cover other analogous conditions and circumstances as
Congress did in the subsequent Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).6 3 In each case, the law's comparative logic not only pushed
outward toward broader comparisons that increased protections for other
employees in need; the logic also makes it possible to challenge the
notion that each targeted group is essentially different and to promote a
sense of common identity among covered employees.
Properly understood and deployed, the PDA's comparative ap-
proach can disrupt settled stereotypes. Comparing pregnant women to
other employees, and showing that the same employment practices and
policies harm all of them in similar ways, undermines essentialist
thinking that would attribute each group's allegedly distinctive harms to
preexisting differences; highlighting these shared harms also creates a
basis for empathy and identification among previously unaffiliated
groups. As the pregnancy discrimination cases reveal, inadequate
disability leave or light duty policies may harm women who are preg-
nant, but they also harm male and female employees with other tempo-
rary illnesses or disabilities who want to hold onto their jobs. Once such
a practical frame of reference has been adopted, it becomes clear that
pregnant women may be compared not only to ill or disabled employees,
but to many other people who have similar needs for leaves or accom-
modations: the partners or parents of pregnant women, for example, who
assist them and accompany them to medical appointments, and attend to
them during childbirth; new mothers and fathers, who feed and care for
infants; parents, who care for sick children; grown children, who care for
ailing parents; sick or disabled employees, who care for themselves; and
610. ALBISTON, supra note 466, at 169-70 (reporting from interviews with workers who had
called a state-wide legal assistance hotline with family and medical leave questions that men who
took more than a week or two off from work to bond with their newborns were widely criticized and
perceived as hirkers).
611. Id. at 170-71 (reporting from the same set of interviews that men who took leave to care
for ill family members encountered sexism and assumptions that they were not committed to their
work, and citing a man who was criticized by coworkers and given a disciplinary letter by his
employer when he took leave to care for his terminally ill wife); id. at 174-78 (reporting from the
same set of interviews that employees who took time off to attend to personal illnesses or disabilities
were also frequently perceived as shirkers).
612. See supra notes 413-27 and accompanying text.
613. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, 6-7.
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even healthy people who simply need frequent bathroom breaks just like
many pregnant women. Considering the long list of employees who
could benefit from more generous policies, it becomes impossible to
argue that the problem lies with pregnant women's unique condition,
rather than with inadequate policies. The brilliance of equating preg-
nancy with other illnesses and disabilities lies partly in its power to
unsettle such preconceptions.
Properly applied, a comparative approach of the sort embodied in
the PDA not only challenges biased perceptions, but can also help
change the discriminatory practices that can reproduce pregnancy-related
differences and inequalities over time. As emphasized above, the PDA
has a simple mandate: It requires employers to treat women affected by
pregnancy and childbirth the same as other employees who are similarly
affected in their ability or inability to work.61 4 Now that amendments to
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) have clarified that employers
must provide reasonable accommodations to covered employees who
have only temporary and minor illnesses,615 a properly construed PDA
would require employers to give pregnant women similar accommoda-
616tions. Faithful application of the PDA and its underlying principles
would go a long way to prevent employers from singling pregnant
women out for accommodation denials that force them out on leave or
out of the workforce-let alone from refusing to hire women in the first
place or firing them due to their pregnancies.617 Thus, properly inter-
preted, the PDA could invalidate many employment practices that
contribute to the unequal, intermittent employment patterns employers
cite as justifications for treating pregnant women less favorably in the
first place.
Yet the PDA has its limits. Over time, experience under the PDA
revealed problems that could not easily be addressed within a Title VII
framework. For example, under the PDA, employers are only required to
grant pregnant women the same protections given similarly disabled
employees. Firms need not create or improve protections such as leave
policies for their workers unless existing ones cause an unjustified
disparate impact. Absent or inadequate leaves are not presumed, but
rather must be proven, to have a disparate impact on women based on
numerical analyses of the needs of actual employees.618 Thus, as in other
areas of Title VII law, the PDA does not require employers to create jobs
or employment benefits, but only to distribute existing ones equally.
Similarly, the PDA protects only pregnant women; it provides no help to
614. See supra notes 418-27 and accompanying text.
615. See supra note 535 and accompanying text.
616. See supra note 537 and accompanying text.
617. For a description of the rising number of pregnancy discrimination claims, see supra note
387.
618. See, e.g., EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 651-55 (N.D. III. 1991).
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employees who need leaves of absence for parenting or other important
reasons. Some courts have further limited the PDA's reach, as discussed
above.
619
Despite these limits, the PDA's logic of comparing pregnancy to
other conditions that interfere with the ability to work paved the way for
expanding the law to provide more affirmative protections for pregnant
women and other groups. Drawing on this approach, activists created the
momentum for broader legislation to address some of the PDA's re-
vealed inadequacies. The FMLA, enacted in 1993, expands on the PDA
and offers a more universalistic, inclusive approach.62 ° It categorizes
pregnancy as a "serious health condition" for which any covered em-
ployee is granted twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave when the
condition renders the employee unable to perform the functions of the
job.621 Like the PDA, this approach demystifies the allegedly distinctive
nature of pregnancy and situates pregnant employees alongside others
who have health issues that require time away from work. In addition,
the law allows covered workers, regardless of sex, to take leave to care
for new children or sick family members.622 Thus, like the PDA, the
force of the FMLA lies not in its accommodation of any group's unique
differences, but rather in the law's recognition that, when viewed from a
pragmatic perspective, pregnancy is no different from other serious
health conditions or important life circumstances that many, if not all,
employees will face at some point at risk of losing their jobs. Although
the FMLA has serious shortcomings,623 the law's sex-neutral, more
619. See supra notes 475-529 and accompanying text.
620. For more on activist efforts to pass the FMLA, see infra notes 628-33 and accompanying
text.
621. Family & Medical Leave Act § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012); see also H.R. REP.
No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 40 (1993) ("Examples of serious health conditions include but are not limited
to . . . ongoing pregnancy, miscarriages, complications of illnesses related to pregnancy, such as
severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal care, childbirth and recovery from childbirth."); S.
REP. No. 103-3, at 29 (1993) (same); 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(4) (2013) ("The mother is entitled to
FMLA leave for incapacity due to pregnancy, for prenatal care, or for her own serious health
condition following the birth of the child."). An employee is only "covered" by the FMLA and
eligible to take leave if the employer employs more than fifty people and the employee has worked
at the employer for at least twelve months and worked at least 1,250 hours during the previous
twelve- month period. Family & Medical Leave Act § 101,29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012).
622. In addition to workers with serious health conditions, the FMLA also requires covered
employers to provide covered employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for
the birth of a child or care of a newborn or newly adopted child or foster child or for care of a
spouse, child, or parent who has such a serious health condition. Family & Medical Leave Act § 102,
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012).
623. Commentators have observed numerous limitations. For example, the FMLA's statutory
definitions of employer and employee coverage disproportionately exclude low-wage workers from
coverage. ALBISTON, supra note 466, at ix; Dinner, supra note 16, at 442. In addition, the unpaid
nature of the leave makes it more difficult for low-income workers, single parents, or other people
lacking partners who can provide financial support to take leave, and, within heterosexual unions
where the woman earns less than the man, perpetuates the gender-biased patterns the statute was
meant to unsettle. Rosenblum, supra note 515, at 106. For discussion of other limitations, see
ALBISTON, supra note 466, at 142-46; ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 58-59; HELENE
JORGENSEN & EILEEN APPELBAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, EXPANDING FEDERAL
FAMILY AND MEDICAL COVERAGE: WHO BENEFITS FROM CHANGES IN ELIGIBILITY
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universalist approach also aims directly to disrupt sex stereotypes: By
providing more generalized access to leave, the FMLA challenges the
widely held notion that women-who are pregnant, who may become
pregnant, or who are working mothers-are somehow less reliable than
other workers.624
Overall, the broad comparative approach taken in the PDA and the
FMLA creates new possibilities for breaking down stereotypes, altering
discriminatory working dynamics, and fostering cross-group bonds that
discrimination often undermines. The FMLA's expansion of the circum-
stances meriting leave enables new cross-cutting alliances among
previously unaffiliated employees, including some employees not
associated with historically disadvantaged groups. In some workplaces or
situations, for example, pregnant women may identify with coworkers
with disabilities, creating an alliance that challenges common stereotypes
of both groups as passive, dependent, weak, and lacking in competence
and capacity; they might also form a broader association with other
women, who are also frequently perceived in those terms. In other
circumstances, pregnant women might choose affiliations centered
around sex, gender, and family caregiving, challenging common stereo-
types of pregnant women, mothers, and involved fathers, for example, as
overly devoted to domestic life and less dedicated to work. People with
disabilities can also make multiple connections, bonding with pregnant
women to challenge stereotypes about dependency, or with men who
care for family members to challenge stereotypes about lack of work
commitment, or with employees who care for disabled people to combat
misperceptions about disability, and so on. Indeed, as with the PDA, the
FMLA's cross-cutting logic and well-rehearsed limits push toward even
broader remedies to alleviate the gender, race, and class biases that
currently restrict coverage and leave-taking under the statute,625 ulti-
REQUIREMENTS? (2014); Clarke, supra note 463, at 1233-37; Rosenblum, supra note 515, at 103
08; Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395,
406-10 (1999); Widiss, supra note 382, at 1005-06; Halverson, supra note 607, at 261-70.
624. See Family & Medical Leave Act § 2(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2012) (stating that
one purpose of the FMLA is to "minimize[) the potential for employment discrimination on the basis
of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons . . . and for
compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis") (emphasis added); see also Coleman v. Ct. of
Appeals of Maryland, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1350 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the
FMLA's universality was "essential to its design" and that Congress "assiduously avoided a
legislative package that, overall, was or would be seen as geared to women only" and thus "reduced
employers' incentives to prefer men over women, advanced women's economic opportunities, and
laid the foundation for a more egalitarian relationship at home and at work").
625. For a discussion of the FMLA's class and gender bias, see supra note 623. For a
discussion of FMLA's race bias, see Amy Armenia & Naomi Gerstel, Family Leaves, The FMLA
and Gender Neutrality: The Intersection of Race and Gender, 35 Soc. SCI. RES. 871 (2006). In
recent years, legislation has been proposed to amend the FMLA to deal with some of these perceived
shortcomings. See, e.g., JORGENSEN & APPELBAUM,, supra note 623, at 9-1I (proposing various
changes to expand coverage, such as covering smaller employers, reducing the work hours or tenure
required for employee eligibility, converting to a system of employee eligibility based on earnings,
and providing partial income replacement during leave); NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES,
FACT SHEET: THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL INSURANCE LEAVE ACT (THE FAMILY ACT) (2015),
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mately pressing toward even greater expansion by encouraging uncov-
ered employees to compare themselves to covered employees, and vice
626versa.
The FMLA, then, holds promise for denaturalizing pregnancy, disa-
bility, caretaking, and perhaps even wider categories of human experi-
ence by fostering new affiliations that permit people to see each other,
and to work together, in new ways that disrupt previously settled bounda-
ries and understandings. In this regard, it is worth noting that comparing
pregnancy to disability has not suggested that it is somehow not normal,
as some feminists feared. In fact, under FMLA, disability has emerged as
normative: Contrary to expectations, both women and men take leave
most often not to care for children or families, but to attend to their own
personal disabilities or illnesses.
627
The FMLA is important for another reason. Like other successful
initiatives to promote workplace equality, its successful passage was the
result of an engaged, unified feminist effort to exert sustained public
pressure for legal reform.628 The effort began as early as 1984 when
representatives of the organized women's movement, including Wendy
Williams, an architect of the PDA, met with Congressman Howard
Berman and then-state legislator Maxine Waters to discuss a gender-
neutral medical leave bill. 629 The following year, the Women's Legal
Defense Fund (WLDF) worked with Berman's office to write the
legislative proposal that would eventually become the FMLA. Over the
available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/paid-leave/family-act-
fact-sheet. pdf (discussing H.R. 1439, the FAMILY Act, which would amend FMLA to cover
eligible employees in all companies regardless of size and provide them with up to 12 weeks of
partially paid leave); Kenneth T. Short, The Employer's Legal Resource: Proposed Bill to Amend
FMLA Introduced, DOERNER, SAUNDERS, DANIEL & ANDERSON (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://www.dsda.com/News-Publications/Newsletters/27603/The-Employers-Legal-Resource-
Proposed-Bill-to-Amend-FMLA-Introduced (describing H.R. 3999, which would amend FMLA to
cover employees in companies with 25 rather than 50 employees and provide up to 24 hours of leave
for "parental involvement" activities).
626. The FMLA has recently been expanded to cover same-sex spouses, for example, see Final
Rule to Revise the Definition of "Spouse" Under the FMLA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.
gov/whd/fmla/spouse/index.htm (last visited July 24, 2015), and immediate family members caring
for covered military service members and veterans, see Fact Sheet #28M: The Military Family Leave
Provisions under the Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.
gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28m.pdf (last updated Feb. 2013). The logic of these expansions
presses toward broader application. If spouses may take time off to care for each other, for example,
why not employees who care for friends or loved ones who are not related by marriage or blood or
bound within nuclear families? Similarly, if people may take time off to care for new children or sick
or disabled family members, why not employees who nurture or mentor young people who are not
family members? And so on.
627. In 2012, an overwhelming 57% of all employees who took leave over the prior year did so
for this reason, compared to only 22% who did so to bond with a new child, and 19% who did so to
care for a sick relative. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: TECHNICAL
REPORT 70 exh. 4.4.2 (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/FMLA-2012-
Technical-Report.pdf. In the same study, 8.7% of all female employees and 7.2% of all male
employees took leave because of a personal illness. Id. at 138 exh. 7.2.3.
628. LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 555, at 4.
629. Id.
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next seven years, the WLDF would lead the push for passage of the
legislation, not only uniting various feminist organizations, but also
building a diverse coalition of backers that included labor, disability,
630children's, religious, and senior citizens' groups.
The gender-neutral, expansive approach embodied in the FMLA
embodied both a normative vision and a strategic choice. By framing
medical leave as a family issue rather than a women's issue, feminist
activists galvanized the support of interest groups that may have other-
wise sat on the sidelines or actively opposed the bill; 631 these unlikely
allies proved instrumental to the Act's ultimate passage. The broadly
inclusive, anti-sex stereotyping capabilities of the FMLA also repre-
sented a new iteration of an older feminist vision: The dream of a world
in which pregnant women and all women would assume their rightful
place alongside men and all other employees-the sick and able-bodied,
the parents and the childfree, the caretakers and the carefree, women and
men of all races, ethnicities, religions, and walks of life-and together
they would create workplaces that met fundamentally human needs to
address life's triumphs and travails. Like their predecessors, they
challenged difference632 -this time, not only sex differences, but other
differences said to make people less fit for employment. Thus, with a
clear vision of equality, active engagement, and a unified message,
women's rights groups achieved an important, if imperfect, victory for
workplace equality. The Supreme Court upheld the statute in 2003, with
Justice Rehnquist, who had written for the majority in Gilbert, now
authoring an opinion recognizing that "mutually reinforcing stereotypes
[create] a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination" that harms both women
and men by locking them into traditional sex roles.
633
CONCLUSION
The history of developments under Title VII's sex discrimination
provision suggests that antidiscrimination law can facilitate progress
toward equality, but change requires continuing, committed, cohesive
activist efforts to challenge essentialist ideas about difference cited to
explain and justify inequality. This conclusion is sobering, because such
social activism is difficult to establish and sustain; much depends on
timing, as well as organization, effort, and vision. Yet, the message is
630. Id. at 5; Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17 (2004) (noting that the FMLA was pioneered by
the Women's Legal Defense Fund and shepherded through seven years on Capitol Hill by a non-
governmental working group they led).
631. LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 555, at 4-7; WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN? THE
ROLE OF CHILD ADVOCATES IN PUBLIC POLICY 158 (Carol J. De Vita & Rachel Mosher-Williams
eds., 2001 ).
632. Many of the feminists involved in the passage of the FMLA had been involved in the
passage of the PDA and had taken the equal treatment approach in the Cal. Fed debate. See
LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 555, at 4; Grossman, supra note 630, at 42-43.
633. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 735-36 (2003).
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also realistic and hopeful, because reform requires forging new connec-
tions that make legal institutions more responsive and durable over time.
Early women's rights activists created a vision and blueprint for
coming together to challenge sex difference in a way that facilitated
these goals. Drawing inspiration from civil rights struggles, these
feminists set aside internal divisions, disavowed gender privileges rooted
in claims of difference, insisted that both men and women stood to gain
from eliminating prescribed sex roles, and fought for a world in which
they would stand shoulder to shoulder, as equals, with an expanded sense
of mutual identification and empathy rooted in a more common experi-
ence.
Future advances toward equality will require renewed, reunited ef-
forts to challenge difference-this time around, contesting not only the
reality and relevance of alleged group-based ifferences, but also their
inevitability and origins, by showing that institutions help create the very
differences they cite to justify discriminatory policies. By targeting and
changing institutional practices that fuel negative stereotyping and foster
an unnecessary sense of difference and division, the law can promote
greater equality and expand individual freedom for women and men from
all walks of life. The history of feminist activism under Title VII suggests
that, in the right circumstances, such challenges can also foster new
forms of identification and solidarity with others who once seemed
essentially different, allowing people to connect across previously settled
boundaries of sex, gender, physical ability, race, and other categories of
perceived difference.
634
Ultimately, then, moving forward under the law requires using new
insights to challenge age-old claims of naturalized difference, as far-
sighted reformers have done from the beginning. Progress means putting
forward a pluralist vision that promotes enhanced equality, freedom, and
solidarity by permitting people greater scope to invent their own lives, do
the work they want to do, craft their own identities and relationships, act
and express themselves as they choose, and affiliate and stand with other
people as equals-free of prescribed expectations based on sex, gender,
or other stereotypical categories. Properly understood, such an approach
to sex discrimination law does not aim to abolish or devalue traditional
forms of femininity or masculinity. But neither does it aim to preserve
634. For an insightful analysis of how short-sighed approaches to employment discrimination
law can set employees against each other in a zero-sum game, and how Title VII can promote greater
solidarity across previously divisive lines of race and sex, see generally Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the
Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 81-82
(2002). For a moving analysis of how such crosscutting affiliation between white women and men
and women of color, brought about by alliances by the Second Wave feminist movement and the
civil rights movement, transformed the legal and social landscape for everyone, see MACLEAN,
supra note 8, at 153-54 ("When white women-so long the beneficiaries of the family wage and
'protection'-demanded to stand on their own two feet and chose African Americans as allies, the
culture of exclusion started to give way as never before.").
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them. The process involves disentangling sex from gender,635 so that
people may take on whatever old or new, conventional or heterodox,
integrated or recombined, or as yet unimagined roles, activities, aspira-
tions, relationships, and personae they desire at work and at home and
throughout society, regardless of the bodies into which they are born.
Taking sex discrimination seriously, in the end, means not simply
taking women seriously, but taking people seriously, searching for new
ways to use law to deliver us all from enforced difference (and conform-
ity), unleashing new potential for individuality and connection and in the
process requiring examination of some of our most deeply held, unex-
amined ideas about each other and about ourselves.
635. Early feminists developed an analytical distinction between sex, by which they referred to
the biological indicia of femaleness or maleness, and gender, by which they referred to the social
roles of femininity and masculinity expected of the people who were perceived as female and male,
respectively. See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of
Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975) (developing this
typology). More recent feminist work suggests that it may not be possible to disentangle sex from
gender, because the categories of female and male are not always clear cut and obvious from
biological or other natural indicia or unmediated by already-gendered social perceptions. See
generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(1990); Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, THE
SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20, 21 (providing biological evidence that the categories of male and
female do not adequately reflect the range of human bodily variation). Despite these important
insights, the aspiration of decoupling gex from gender remains important to the cause of sex equality,
if not wholly within reach. Broadly understood, sex equality also involves unloosening sexuality
from sex and gender, but that larger subject is beyond my scope here. For my own attempt to discuss
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ABSTRACT
The contestation over the Ricci decision largely framed the question
as whether New Haven's action, cancelling the promotional lists for the
fire department, was justified by the desire to avoid disparate impact
liability or was an improper form of discrimination against whites. While
critics cited evidence of racial disparity in the supervisory ranks as legit-
imate grounds for the city's decision, supporters rejected the relevance of
these claims, with both sides largely focused on patterns of underrepre-
sentation of Black and Latino men. However, this analysis rendered in-
visible the interlocking systems of race and gender discrimination that
worked to almost totally exclude women of color from the New Haven
Fire Department, producing patterns even more acutely disparate. This
omission not only overlooked the rights claims of women of color: The
failure to excavate the intersectional impact of the city's employment
practices in Ricci functioned to undermine and discipline anti-racist ad-
vocacy and organizing.
While women of color were invisible in public discourse over Ricci
in one respect, in the context of the debate over the nomination of Justice
Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, the Ricci case became a platform
through which race and gender were rendered highly salient. Her identity
as a Latina and her role in the federal appeals court ruling against the
Ricci plaintiffs before consideration by the Supreme Court, were mobi-
lized to authorize a charge of anti-white bias. During the nomination
hearings, this racial narrative was inadequately contested, as there was
virtually no interrogation of the presumed affiliation between white ra-
cial identity and racial neutrality on one hand, and non-white racial iden-
tity and racial bias on the other. While ultimately Justice Sotomayor's
appointment was confirmed, the "lesson" the public debate conveyed
may be less about majoritarian power and more about the imperatives of
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encouragement, thanks to Devon Carbado and Kimberl Crenshaw. To the faculty affiliated with the
Critical Race Studies Program at UCLA School of Law, thank you for constituting such a vibrant
and inspiring intellectual community. I also acknowledge the research assistance provided by Anna-
belle Harless and Joshua Greer, as well as the excellent staff of the UCLA Law Library. Thanks also
to the editors of the Denver University Law Review for their patience and editorial suggestions.
1121
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
colorblindness and its role in naturalizing whiteness as a form of institu-
tional racial privilege. Resisting this metric required an intersectional
analysis of the ways in which racialized and gendered systems of power
interact to enact and exploit particular vulnerabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Ricci v. DeStefanol is a case that touched a racial nerve, generating
heated debates about merit, fairness, and racial disparities. Doctrinally,
the decision left ambiguous the rules pertaining to disparate impact as a
category of antidiscrimination claims predicated on evidence of disparate
effects, as distinct from disparate treatment claims that rely on proof of
intentional conduct.2 By a five-vote majority, the Supreme Court ruled
that New Haven's decision to cancel fire department promotions because
its evaluation process excluded virtually all the Black and Latino candi-
dates intentionally discriminated against whites who were in line for
promotion.3 Notwithstanding the city's argument that it acted to avoid
incurring disparate impact liability,4 the Court found that the city's reli-
ance on the racially disparate outcomes of the selection process as the
reason for voiding the promotional lists amounted to an impermissible
1. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
2. Title VII proscribes the use of formally neutral criteria and selection devices that produce
significant adverse impact on protected groups, unless the employer can demonstrate that they are
job related and required by business necessity and that there are no available less discriminatory
alternatives. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A) (2012). This differs from the disparate treatment
cause of action, which requires proof of intentional discrimination. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
3. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561-63.
4. Id. at 579.
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racial consideration.5 In effect, the city's efforts to comply with Title
VII's disparate impact provisions were treated as evidence that it violated
Title VII's disparate treatment proscriptions. The decision not only failed
to resolve questions regarding the relationship between disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact under Title VII, 6 it also introduced uncertainty
about the scope and vitality of disparate impact theory itself.7 An ava-
lanche of commentary and analysis ensued seeking to parse Ricci's doc-
trinal and political implications.
8
Yet, despite that voluminous exegesis, there are important aspects
of Ricci that largely have been underexamined. The Ricci case was con-
structed as a debate over whether the disproportionate exclusion of Black
and Latino men from supervisory jobs based on the outcome of the fire
department's selection processes warranted the city's cancellation of the
5. Id. at 592.
6. Kennedy's majority opinion held that the city's cancellation of the test and the promotion-
al lists constituted illegal intentional discrimination-disparate treatment-against the Ricci plain-
tiffs because "the City made its employment decision because of race" and had not established a
lawful justification for its action, as its apprehension that it would be subject to disparate impact
liability had not been established by a "strong basis in evidence." Id. at 579-80, 592. This standard
was adopted purportedly to resolve the "statutory conflict" between Title VII's disparate treatment
and disparate impact provisions, but the quantum of evidence required for an employer to meet a
"strong basis" remained unclear. Id. at 583; see, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon,
Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 101-02
(2010) (noting the uncertainty surrounding how an employer could accomplish voluntary compli-
ance with Title VII disparate impact law). Moreover, the decision was particularly confounding
because even though it held that the city could defend against any future disparate treatment claims
like Ricci's if it could show a strong basis in evidence that it would be held liable for disparate
impact, the ruling for Ricci on summary judgment simultaneously ignored the evidence presented by
the city, and took for granted that no different arguments could have been made by minority fire-
fighters who might have sued for disparate impact. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592-93; see also Mark S.
Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Triumph of White Privilege, 20
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 183-88 (2011) (listing the issues with the Court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in Ricci). Thus, commentators have noted that the decision introduces considerable
doctrinal uncertainty. See, e.g., Harris & West-Faulcon, supra, at 101-02; Richard Primus, The
Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344-45 (2010) (articulating three different
possible readings of the Ricci standard and explaining how the future of the disparate impact doc-
trine hangs on which reading is chosen, as well as the manner in which a future case is presented to
the court); Nancy L. Zisk, Failing the Test: How Ricci v. DeStefano Failed to Clarify Disparate
Impact and Disparate Treatment Law, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 27, 34-46, 49-50 (2011) (analyzing the
difference between the McDonnell Douglas/Griggs standards and the standard set forth in Ricci and
arguing that the Ricci standard is both unclear and highly problematic).
7. Scalia's concurring opinion did so directly by asserting that Title VII's disparate impact
and disparate treatment provisions were or would soon be at "war." Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595-96 (Scal-
ia, J., concurring). The majority opinion did so by asserting that the provisions were "in conflict." Id.
at 580 (majority opinion).
8. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Wild West of Supreme Court Employment Discrim-
ination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 577, 587-88 (2010) (laying out the problems that could arise
in various employment discrimination contexts); Ian Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1779, 1874 (2012) (arguing that Ricci is in effect requiring public actors and employers to
"blind themselves to persistent racial discrimination"); Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate
Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2165 n.39 (2013) (citing several articles criticizing the Ricci
standard); Michael K. Grimaldi, Note, Disparate Impact After Ricci and Lewis, 14 SCHOLAR 165,
179 (2011) (arguing that Ricci created a catch-22 in employment testing); see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text. Joined by a co-author, Kimberly West-Faulcon, I was among those contributing
to the debate. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 101-02.
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promotional lists, or whether the city's actions constituted disparate
treatment of white candidates on the basis of race.9 Necessarily, the
Court's affirmation of Ricci's claim entailed the construction of a racial
narrative that legitimated and endorsed as fair practices that exclude
Blacks and Latinos, notwithstanding less discriminatory and more accu-
rate screening mechanisms.'0 The dispute over the Court's reading of
disparate impact doctrine and its relation to disparate treatment was em-
bedded in a contentious discourse over whether disparate impact, like
affirmative action, offended principles of colorblindness and undermined
merit, or whether attention to racially exclusionary effects is necessary to
combat the "built-in headwinds" of structural inequality.1
However, the terms of this debate rendered invisible the position of
women of color and the interlocking systems of race and gender discrim-
ination that worked to exclude them nearly entirely from the New Haven
Fire Department. Instead, those defending and those challenging the
city's decision focused on the relative position of men of different races
in the fire department's supervisory ranks. While the exclusionary "effect
of the city's selection practices constituted ample evidence of a disparate
impact claim,'2 and indeed, after Ricci, that precise case was brought by
minority firefighters,'3 the underrepresentation of women generally and
of women of color in particular was stark.'4 This gross disparity was not
9. There is at least one noteworthy exception. Ann C. McGinley's article is an extensive
exploration of the gendered dimensions of the case and the construction of firefighting work through
masculinity. See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 581,584-85 (2010).
10. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592.
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). This debate implicated competing
understandings of the asserted racial neutrality of the selection process and the broader racial con-
text, a matter that I have critiqued elsewhere. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 109.
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits plaintiffs to sue employers who discrim-
inate against them on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The statute obviously
applies to employers who intentionally discriminate, but the courts (and later the statute itself) also
give plaintiffs standing to sue if the employer has caused classes of people to be treated differently
even if the employer was using facially neutral employment policies. To prove disparate impact, a
plaintiff must show that "an employment practice or policy has a disproportionately adverse effect
on members of the protected class as compared with nonmembers of the protected class." EEOC v.
Sambo's of Ga. Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 92 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
13. In Tinney v. City of New Haven, seven African-American firefighters in New Haven who
took the same exams at issue in Ricci, set forth four claims against the city and the Union for equal
protection, due process, and Title VII claims for disparate treatment and disparate impact. Tinney v.
City of New Haven, No. 3:11-cv-1546 (SRU), 2014 WL 1315653, at *6-7 (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2014). Briscoe was an intervenor plaintiff. In Briscoe, an African-American firefighter in New
Haven who took the same exam at issue in Ricci, claimed that the city violated the disparate impact
provision in Title VII by weighting the written portion higher than the oral portion of the exam.
Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 3:09-cv-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794212, at *3 (D. Conn. July 12,
2010), decision clarified on reconsideration, 3:09-cv-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794231 (D. Conn.
July 12, 2010), vacated, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011).
14. Only II out of the 411 New Haven firefighters were women. Nicole Allen & Emily
Bazelon, The Ladder. Part 2: Do White, Black, and Hispanic Firefighters in New Haven Get
Along?, SLATE (June 25, 2009, 7:17 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/features/2009/the- ladder/part 2_do_
white blackand hispanicfirefighters in new havengetalong.htm. Of those, four were women
of color. McGinley, supra note 9, at 591.
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the result of "natural" preferences: It was produced by selection process-
es grounded in gendered and racialized presumptions that constructed
firefighting as (white) men's work.'5 Women, and women of color in
particular, have been excluded from firefighting for decades,'6 but this
broader context of entrenched racial and sex based inequality was largely
erased in the legal analysis and public debate. To identify the problems
with the debate implicated in Ricci I draw on Kimberl6 Crenshaw's cri-
tique of traditional antidiscrimination analysis that conceptualizes dis-
crimination along a single axis, such as race or gender, and fails to attend
to the intersectional and interactive nature of discrimination across mul-
tiple categories.17 In Ricci, race was at the core of the case but that did
not make gender irrelevant-indeed, including the experience of Black
women was central to exposing the exclusionary impact and invalidity of
the selection process. Unfortunately, the failure to excavate the intersec-
tional effects of the city's employment and promotional practices in Ricci
functioned to undermine the strength of minority candidates' antidiscrim-
ination claims and to discipline antiracist advocacy and organizing by
narrowing the way issues were framed.
On the other hand, while the legal and popular debate over the Ricci
case lacked any meaningful attention to its gendered implications, those
dimensions became highly salient during the debate over the nomination
of Justice Sonia Sotomayor as the first woman of color and first Latina/o
to serve on the United States Supreme Court.18 Her public affirmation of
her identity as a Latina and her decision against the Ricci plaintiffs, ren-
dered while she served on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, were
mobilized in support of the charge that she was racially biased against
whites.'9 Sotomayor's racial and gender identity and her self-aware sub-
jectivity denied her the presumption of judicial objectivity accorded to
whites. Notably, this presumption obtained even against the background
of past and ongoing practices that favored white candidates and had con-
structed the judiciary as a white male institution for decades.20 While the
Democratic majority in the Senate made it likely that Sotomayor would
be confirmed, the opposition was successful in framing the debate on her
nomination around the presumed affiliation between white racial identity
and racial neutrality on the one hand, and non-white racial identity and
racial bias on the other.2' Left virtually uncontested, these presupposi-
tions reconfigured even a moderate Justice like Sotomayor into a reverse
15. See infra Part 1.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139-40.
18. See infra Part 11.
19. See infra Part 11.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. At the time of Justice Sotomayor's nomination, Democrats comprised a majority of the
US Senate. See infra Part 11 (discussion of the nomination).
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racist and severely circumscribed the terms upon which racial reform and
antidiscrimination law could be defended.
These constraints had implications beyond the Sotomayor nomina-
tion: While presidential nominees to judicial and cabinet positions with
civil rights affiliations have suffered delays and derailments because of
the entrenched political struggle between the President and his political
opponents, a central narrative of that opposition defines those affiliations
as compelling evidence of pro-minority and anti-white bias.22 In this
sense, Sotomayor's confirmation is less an illustration of majoritarian
power and is more demonstrative of the imperatives of colorblindness as
a legitimate litmus test of objectivity and judicial temperament and a
presumed characteristic of whites. Defending Sotomayor did not require
portraying her as "less Latina" but rather challenging the assumption that
whiteness constitutes a race-neutral baseline against which people of
color are legitimately adjudged to be wanting. An intersectional analysis
of racial and gendered power illuminates how these presumptions are
produced and how particular (racialized) identities are constructed as
inherently biased. This would have facilitated the refraining of the debate
over Sotomayor's nomination so as to interrogate the racial presumptions
that align whiteness with objectivity and non-whites with bias. Engaging
this argument was important to Sotomayor's confirmation and to secur-
ing political space for future nominees of color as well as those whose
commitments have aligned with seeking racial justice.
23
I argue that the invisibility of discrimination against women of color
in the public and legal debate over Ricci and the deployment of Ricci as
evidence of the purported threat that Justice Sotomayor posed to judicial
objectivity are symptomatic of the limitations of current racial frame-
works. These constraints also affect dimensions of antiracist and antidis-
crimination advocacy. At one level, both these aspects of Ricci illustrate
why intersectional analysis must be summoned: Exposing systems of
racial and gender power is critical to addressing inequality in all its myri-
ad forms.
In Part I, I map Ricci's invisible intersections, examining the condi-
tions of women of color in the New Haven Fire Department. I situate the
condition of women of color in the context of broader patterns of severe
underrepresentation of women of color in fire departments nationally. I
note particularly how the traditional selection practices of urban fire de-
22. See infra Part 11.
23. See Joel Marrero-Otero, Comment, What Does a Wise Latina Look Like? An Intersection-
al Analysis of Sonia Sotomayor's Confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O
L. REV. 177, 197-99 (2011); Kimberld Crenshaw, In Her Judgment, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2014, at
BR17 (reviewing JOAN BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN: THE RISE OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR AND THE
POLITICS OF JUSTICE (2014)); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Op-Ed., A Failed Conversation-GOP Assertions to
the Contrary, The Sotomayor Hearings Shed Little Light on Either Race or Justice, BALT. SUN, July
23, 2009, at 17A.
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partments, like those in New York and Los Angeles, work to produce
racialized and gendered exclusion. Deploying an intersectional analysis, I
illustrate how the marginalization of the experiences of women of color
in opposition to that exclusion conspires to effectively isolate their rights
claims and enacts a constrained form of antiracist and feminist politics.
This disaggregation is inherent in the structure of antidiscrimination law
and is reproduced in legal and political advocacy that ignores the rela-
24
tionship between racial and gender exclusion.
Part II examines how the Ricci case figured in the debate over the
nomination of Justice Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme
Court. Unlike the invisibility of race and gender intersections in the de-
bate over the case, the hearings on the Sotomayor nomination rendered
race and gender highly visible in service of the charge of racial discrimi-
nation against whites. While initially Sotomayor's nomination was cele-
brated, particularly among Latino communities, she was soon subjected
to the criticism that she held racial animus against whites.25 The Supreme
Court's reversal of her decision in Ricci became evidence of this alleged
bias. In this sense Sotomayor's identity as a Latina, together with her
decision in Ricci, facilitated the invocation of racialist tropes that equated
non-white racial identity and civil rights advocacy with racism against
whites.26
I conclude by considering how the debate over Ricci both as a legal
dispute and its symbolic meaning in the nomination of Sotomayor illu-
minates some of the costs of omitting an intersectional analysis. The
erasure of women of color as legitimate stakeholders in the debate over
equal opportunity undermined the ability to challenge the presumptions
24. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 141-50; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The
Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 708-719 (2001); Judith A. Winston, Mir-
ror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 796-801 (1991); Peggie R. Smith, Comment, Sepa-
rate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 21-25 (1991).
25. Peter Baker, Court Choice Pushes Issue of 'Identity Politics' Back to Forefront, N. Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2009, at A20 ("Critics took issue with her past statements and called her a 'reverse
racist."'); Tom Goldstein, Op-Ed., Her Justice is Blind, N. Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A21 ("Some
infer from [Sotomayor's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano] that Judge Sotomayor must be biased
against whites."); Ifill, supra note 23, at 17A ("[Ricci] involved the inflammatory issue of race...
[a]nd so, ignoring thousands of decisions in which Judge Sotomayor has participated, they undertook
to paint the nominee as a dangerous racial partisan."); Ruben Navarrette Jr., Op-Ed, Latina Had to
Calm Whites' Racial Fears - Watching Sotomayor, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky), July 19,
2009, at D4 ("Republicans have two basic objections to Sotomayor - That she'll make decisions
based on 'empathy,' and that those decisions will reveal what Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell described recently as a racial bias."); Chuck Raasch, Op-Ed., A Different View on Judi-
cial Activism, USA TODAY (July 1, 2009, 1:49 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/raasch/2009-07-01 -raasch-column-
07012009 N.htm ("After the Ricci decision was announced, a coalition of right-leaning lawyers and
activists ... [said] that the decision 'calls into question whether Sotomayor is capable of treating all
Americans fairly and equally."'); Peter Wallsten, Republican Senators Alter Course on Nominee,
L. A. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A 10 ("Republican senators ... have lashed out at conservatives in their
party who branded the would-be justice a racist .... ").
26. See infra Part ILA.
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of colorblindness that legitimated racially exclusionary practices as fair
and affirmed a presumed affiliation between whiteness and neutrality and
objectivity. This omission obscured crucial legal and political terrain,
hampered coalitional possibilities, and diluted the power of civil rights
claims.
I. INVISIBLE INTERSECTIONS
In this Part I review the facts of the Ricci case. Drawing on Kimber-
16 Crenshaw's theoretical framework of intersectionality,27 I consider the
employment record of the New Haven Fire Department in the broader
context of widespread patterns of gender and racial exclusion in fire de-
partments nationally. New Haven's practices, while facially neutral, sys-
tematically excluded women and minorities.28 Like other fire depart-
ments, New Haven's procedures had been successfully challenged under
Title VII's disparate impact framework.2 9 Historically, the experience of
women and women of color was central to efforts to strengthen disparate
impact law in the 1991 Civil Rights Act after the Supreme Court had
weakened it. 30 Thus the erasure of women of color from the public de-
bate over Ricci was deeply ironic. More significantly, the failure to in-
clude the experience of women of color occluded their lived experience
and removed from antidiscrimination advocacy evidence that supported
the city's decision to reject the results of the department's exclusionary
selection procedures. An intersectional analysis would have illustrated
why the disparate impact claim was legally viable and thus justified the
city's rejection of the promotional lists. Not only did the selection proce-
27. See Crenshaw, supra note 17.
28. See infra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
30. The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as
recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), held that in proving disparate
impact liability plaintiffs were required to establish racial disparity in hiring pattems with greater
specificity and that the disparities were the result of specific hiring practices of the employer. The
employer's rebuttal burden was also reduced from a burden of persuasion to a burden of production
and from demonstrating job-relatedness and business necessity o "a reasoned review of the employ-
er's justification." Id. at 659. This case was widely viewed as dramatically increasing the burden of
proof on plaintiffs in discrimination cases and undermining the ability of plaintiffs to secure relief.
See Michael K. Braswell, Gary A. Moore & Bill Shaw, Disparate Impact Theory in the Aftermath of
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: Burdens of Proof Statistical Evidence, and Affirmative Action,
54 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1989); John Shavers, Jr., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: A Departure
From the Intent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 17 S.U. L. REV. 133, 145-47 (1990).
Congress responded to Wards Cove and other decisions weakening civil rights laws by enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Peter M. Leibold, Stephen A. Sola & Reginald E. Jones, Civil Rights
Act of 1991: Race to the Finish-Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1043, 1083-84 (1993). Hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 included and relied heavily
on the testimony from women and minority firefighters who recounted discriminatory practices that
continued well after the enactment of the 1972 amendments. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the H.R. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 102d Cong. 379-87 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Civil Rights Act Hearings] (reporting the testimony of Brenda Berkman, President of the United
Women Firefighters, regarding the history of litigation against the New York fire department for the
use of criteria that unnecessarily screened out qualified women candidates and her subsequent ermi-
nation in retaliation for playing a role in the lawsuit).
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dures negatively impact Black and Latino males on the New Haven Fire
Department, women and women of color were severely affected as
well.31 This analysis was crucial to making the case that the underrepre-
sentation of minorities and women was symptomatic of discrimination
and not simply the product of natural distribution or individual prefer-
ences.
A. Intersectionality: Exposing the Interactive Mechanisms of Exclusion
The erasure of the experience of women of color from legal and po-
litical narratives of discrimination is related to, and is in part a product
of, the limitations of antidiscrimination law and discourse. Kimberl6
Crenshaw's work has critiqued the ways in which the framework of anti-
discrimination law and politics has depended upon a conception of rac-
ism and sexism that marginalizes Black women. In Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimi-
nation Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Policies, she pointed
out that courts disallowed the employment discrimination claims of
Black women as Black women and further disallowed Black women
from serving as class representatives in suits involving race or sex dis-
crimination.32 Both traditional legal frameworks and organizational poli-
tics tended to be based on narratives that disaggregated race and gender
identities and experiences.33 Thus, not only were Black women's specific
injuries invisible within the given structure of antidiscrimination law,
but they were deemed unable to represent women in sex discrimination
claims or to represent Blacks in race discrimination claims- they were
different from how difference had been doctrinally categorized-.
precisely because their experience could not be marked along a single
axis.34 This not only obscured the experience of women of color but the
interactive and interlocking nature of forms of oppression as well.
Crenshaw's move to bring the politics of Black feminism into law
was a crucial part of Critical Race Theory's challenge to limited concep-
31. See infra notes 53-60.
32. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 141-50 (describing case law in which Black women's
charges of employment discrimination were rejected).
33. See id at 150.
34. See id at 148-49. As Crenshaw put it:
Black women were harmed both by being treated as though they were the same and by
being treated as though they were different. There was no simple, once and for all, solu-
tion because the nature of the discrimination faced by these Black female plaintiffs was
not a simple, once and for all, event. Indeed, as the cases revealed, there were numerous
ways that Black female plaintiffs experienced discrimination; the point of the intersec-
tional metaphor was to draw attention to the multiple ways that patterns of power can
converge. Its corollary was to argue both against the elision of difference where it makes
a difference, and against fetishizing difference where it does not.
Kimberl W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism and
Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151, 165 (2010).
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tions of antidiscrimination law itself.35 Intersectionality constituted a way
to describe how Black women were positioned-or more specifically,
marginalized-under Title VII, not as a way of marking particularity for
its own sake, but as a predicate to addressing a set of conditions that ren-
dered multiple social groups vulnerable to subordination. Dismantling
these interlocking forms of subordination required a fundamental chal-
lenge to prevailing legal and political conceptions of discrimination.
Broadly put, the dominant paradigm of antidiscrimination law defined
discrimination as race- or sex-based departures from otherwise neutral
baselines and processes.36 This bias-focused model ignored, and largely
obscured, the way that racism and patriarchy worked in tandem to ex-
clude women of color and to embed and normalize white and male privi-
lege in social practices, interactions, and institutions.37 While disparate
impact doctrine did attend to precisely those neutral factors that consti-
tuted and constructed significant headwinds, the prevailing framework
privileged a single axis, bias-based approach. As Crenshaw put it, this
model was decidedly deficient:
This process-based definition is not grounded in a bottom-up
commitment to improve the substantive conditions for those
who are victimized by the interplay of numerous factors. In-
stead, the dominant message of antidiscrimination law is that it
will regulate only the limited extent to which race or sex inter-
feres with the process of determining outcomes. This narrow
objective is facilitated by the top-down strategy of using a sin-
gular "but for" analysis to ascertain the effects of race or sex.
Because the scope of antidiscrimination law is so limited, sex
and race discrimination have come to be defined in terms of
the experiences of those who are privileged but for their racial
or sexual characteristics. Put differently, the paradigm of sex
discrimination tends to be based on the experiences of white
women; the model of race discrimination tends to be based on
the experiences of the most privileged Blacks.
38
Intersectionality then identified the deficiencies of the traditional
model not only to critique the erasure of Black women's experience in
35. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 140, 154, 162 (referencing Black feminism as a challenge
to racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, and economic inequality). This was part of the broader
Critical Race Theory project, which in contrast to traditional models that conceived of race as a
phenomenon entirely external to law, saw law and legal doctrine as an ideological narrative about
what race and racism are. In constructing racism as aberrational, individual and intentionally driven,
antidiscrimination law and models were inherently limited and flawed, and failed to consider the
endemic, structural, and automatic nature of racial subordination. See Introduction to CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiii-xxxii (Kimberld Cren-
shaw et al. eds., 1995).
36. Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 15 1.
37. Id. at 152.
38. Id. at 151.
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antidiscrimination law, but to expose the inadequacy of the traditional
antidiscrimination paradigm in addressing subordination. Notably, these
deficiencies were not confined to law: Antiracist and feminist politics
reproduced the "but for" logic inherent in antidiscrimination law defining
discrimination as a deviation from an otherwise neutral norm on the basis
39
of some singular characteristic, with often devastating consequences.
Thus, women of color were not seen as authentic representatives of an
antiracist agenda, nor were their concerns legible within feminist politics.
Thus, when minority firefighters and their advocates failed to in-
clude the experiences of women of color as part of their response to the
Ricci case, the claim that the fire department's practices constituted dis-
criminatory conduct under Title VII's disparate impact provisions was
weakened. Focusing on the experiences of women of color not only
would have illuminated the exclusionary nature of the city's promotional
policies, it would have created the conditions of possibility for a broader
and more robust coalitional effort among women of all races and men of
color to respond to the litigation. I am not arguing that a more inclusive
narrative about the impact of the department's practices would have
changed the outcome of the case. Instead, I posit simply that a different
framework would have helped contest the presumption that the test com-
ponents, test weighting and ranking were all neutral, fair, and necessary,
which was how the case was cast in the public debate.
B. Ricci-The Missing Data and Analysis
The New Haven Fire Department, like most urban fire departments,
had a long history of racial exclusion.40 After years of litigation and or-
ganizing, the number of minority firefighters began to increase, but the
supervisory positions remained predominately white.41 Thus, at the time
of the Ricci litigation, Blacks were 32% of the entry-level positions in
the New Haven Fire Department but only about 9% of the supervisory
42 4positions. Latinos were 16% of entry-level positions43 and about 9% of
39. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropria-
tions of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402, 416-417 (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992) (describing how in the debate over the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court,
the sexual harassment of Anita Hill was reconfigured as a "high-tech lynching," effectively allowing
him to garner greater support as a victim of racial discrimination, erase Anita Hill as a Black woman,
and secure his appointment (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kimberld Crenshaw, Map-
ping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1990) (describing how feminist antiviolence campaigns and organizing often
fail to consider the position of women of color).
40. See Firebird Soc'y v. Members of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 556 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Black firemen suing New Haven for discriminatory practices in hiring and promotions); Brantley v.
City of New Haven, 364 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005) (Black plaintiff suing New Haven for
discriminatory firing); New Haven Firebird Soc'y v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of New Haven, 593 A.2d
1383 (Conn. 1991) (plaintiffs suing New Haven for discriminatory promotion practices).
41. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 610-11 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
42. A brief filed in support of the Respondents tated:
Of thirty-two officers at the level of captain or higher, there were just three African
Americans and three Hispanics in 2005.
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the supervisory positions.44 These imbalances were the result of prior
selection procedures for supervisory positions that had been held legally
invalid. In 1973, the Firebirds sued the city for a pattern of willful dis-
crimination in hiring and promotion.45 The suit ended in a consent decree
that improved entry-level hiring, but the upper ranks remained mostly
white.46 In two subsequent cases, minorities successfully challenged the
department's promotional policies as violative of civil service procedures
as well.47
When the city sought to fill fifteen vacant supervisory positions, it
hired a professional test developer who constructed two written tests that
were administered to 118 applicants.48 Additionally, all candidates were
given an oral exam, and after both components were scored, the tests
were weighted-60% for the written portion and 40% for the oral por-
tion-pursuant to the union contract, and a composite score was record-
ed.49 While there were Black candidates who had higher written or oral
scores than some white candidates, the weighting produced a list in
which no Black and only two Latino candidates would be eligible for
promotion.50 The city's concern was that given the test's extreme impact,
... According to New Haven's ... EEO-4 data, in 2007, African Americans held 32% of
entry-level positions in the fire department, but only 15% of supervisory positions.
Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 17, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) (footnote omitted); see also
Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
43. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated:
As of 2003, African-Americans and Hispanics constituted 30 percent and 16 percent of
the City's firefighters, respectively. In supervisory positions, however, significant dis-
parities remain. Overall, the senior officer ranks (captain and higher) are nine percent Af-
rican-American and nine percent Hispanic. Only one of the Department's 21 fire captains
is African-American.
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 610-11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. Id. A few years later, in 2009, Slate reported that, "[o]ut of 411 firefighters in the city,
only 50 are Hispanic-12 percent, in a city where there are twice as many Hispanics." Allen &
Bazelon, supra note 14.
45. Firebird Soc'y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 66 F.R.D. 457
(D. Conn. 1975), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975). The Firebird Society of New Haven is an
organization of Black and Hispanic firefighters. It was started in 1971 and was instrumental during
the 1970s in the litigation that resulted in the New Haven Fire Department changing its hiring poli-
cies to increase the number of minority firefighters. They are a member of the International Associa-
tion of Black Professional Firefighters, and their current membership is about sixty firefighters. See
History of The Firebird Society of New Haven, NEW HAVEN FIREBIRDS,
http://www.newhavenfirebirds.com/the-firebird-society-of-new-haven-inorporated-history.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2014); see also Active Members, NEW HAVEN FIREBIRDS,
http://www.newhavenfirebirds.com/active-members.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
46. Id. at 463.
47. See Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 851 A.2d 1113, 1136 (Conn. 2004) (finding that the
practice of using lower ranked white officers to fill positions budgeted for higher rank was unfairly
increasing the number of whites placed into the candidate pool for promotions in violation of civil
service rules); New Haven Firebird Soc'y v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of New Haven, 593 A.2d 1383
(Conn. 1991) (holding that disproportionate promotion of whites to positions not yet vacant was
violative of civil service rules).
48. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562-66.
49. Id. at 564.
50. Id. at 589.
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and that neither the content nor the scoring process could be justified as
valid measures of job-related merit, minority candidates would challenge
the selection process as racially exclusionary and not warranted by busi-
ness necessity.51 The worry was particularly acute because the city,
through its lawyer, was aware that other municipalities had used different
assessment procedures that produced more racially diverse results.
52
The case that the city's practices produced impermissible disparate
impact rested entirely on the underrepresentation of Black and Latino
men in the supervisory ranks: The even more severe underrepresentation
of women of color, both in the fire department as a whole and in the su-
pervisory ranks, was invisible. Out of the 411 firefighters employed by
the city at the time only eleven were women, and of those, seven were
white, four were Black.53 There were no Latinas. None of the three wom-
en who took the promotional exams in 2003 qualified for advancement:
Two failed the lieutenant's exam, and the one who took the captain's
exam passed but was not promoted based on where she fell in the rank-
ings.54 This fact was overlooked in the vast majority of news articles on
the case.55 One notable exception was part of a multi-part series pub-
lished in Slate in which the reporter interviewed Erika Bogan, a Black
woman firefighter and one of the leaders of the Firebirds, the local
branch of the international Black firefighters association.56 Bogan was
outspoken about the way that race mattered in the New Haven Fire De-
partment, noting that race was highly correlated with place of residence:
Many white firefighters resided outside of New Haven in virtually all-
57white suburbs, while Black firefighters tended to live in New Haven, a
majority non-white city.58 Bogan contended that as a result white fire-
fighters related very differently to the neighborhoods they were assigned
to protect:
Bogan says that when black kids peek into the Howard Ave-
nue firehouse, oohing at the trucks, she and her fellow black
51. Id. at 563.
52. Id. at 572-73.
53. See McGinley, supra note 9, at 591 & n.79 (citing chart provided by Victor Bolden,
Corporation Counsel for City of New Haven); Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14 ("There is only one
woman on the Howard Avenue shift with Neal and Heins. Erika Bogan, who is black, is one of I 1
female firefighters in the entire city. (That's a whole different subject.)").
54. See McGinley, supra note 9, at 590-91.
55. See id. at 616-18 (noting the absence of women's stories and testimony about the case).
56. Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
57. Id.
58. New Haven's population is over 50% Black and Latino. New Haven (city), Connecticut,
QuickFacts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/09/0952000.html (last updated Jul. 8, 2014). The city was
also over 50% Black and Latino in 2003 when the dispute in Ricci arose. See New Haven. Connecti-
cut Population. Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, Demographics, Statistics, Quick Facts,
CENSUSVIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/city/CT/New/20Haven (last visited Oct. 25, 2014)
(showing that in 2000, the census reported that the Black population of New Haven was 37% and the
Latino population was 21%).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
firefighters like Mike Neal scoop them up and take them in-
side. But the suburban white guys, she says, ignore the kids.
She said she has also heard them joke on the phone about
"working in the ghetto." "How dare you, when you live in
Madison or Guilford, come in here and take our money and go
back to your communities and talk shit about New Haven?"
she asked.59
Like many municipal fire departments, the number of women
(2.6%) and women of color (0.9%) on the New Haven Fire Department
approached "the inexorable zero."60 Indeed, these numbers were substan-
tially lower than the number of women or women of color in the relevant
labor market-the number of a group qualified and available to perform
a specific job in a particular area.61 According to a national study done in
2008, the expected female representation in firefighting jobs is 17%; the
number for women of color is 5.9%.62 As of 2012, only 3.4% of fire-
fighters are women and only 0.8% of firefighters are women of color.
63
Critics of these disparity analyses have contended that low numbers
simply reflect women's disinterest in firefighter jobs. However, the re-
port points out that the utilization analysis includes adequate controls for
interest: These figures are derived from counting the number of women
in the relevant age group with a high school diploma in the labor market,
and of that number, examining the proportion of women who perform
physically demanding or "dirty" jobs, such as welders, construction
workers, and the like.64 Because women make up about 17% of these
comparable jobs, a reasonable expectation is that they would be a similar
proportion of the firefighting workforce as well. 65 The fact that New Ha-
59. Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
60. See id.; see also McGinley, supra note 9, at 591 (citing chart provided by Victor Bolden,
Corporation Counsel for City of New Haven). The term "inexorable zero" is from Teamsters, in
which the court ruled that the severe underrepresentation-the inexorable zero- created a presump-
tion of discrimination. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir. 1975), vacat-
edsub nom., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
61. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977).
62. DENISE M. HULETT ET AL., A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON WOMEN IN FIREFIGHTING 1-2
(2008), available at http://www.i-women.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/35827WSP.pdf. In 2012,
3.4% of firefighters were women, 7.7% of firefighters were Black, and 9.9% of firefighters were of
Hispanic origin. Nat'l Fire Prot. Ass'n, Firefighting Occupations by Women and Race, NFPA.ORG,
http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/the-fire-service/administration/firefighting-
occupations-by-women-and-race (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
63. HULETr ET AL., supra note 62, at 2; NPFA supra note 62.
64. The study computed the number "of women in the nation's labor force of typical firefight-
er age (20-49) and educational background (high school graduate but no college degree), working
full time in one of 184" professions, which ad similar strength, stamina, and dexterity requirements
as firefighting does. These "occupations include[d] bus mechanics, drywall installers, enlisted mili-
tary personnel, highway maintenance workers, loggers, professional athletes, refuse collectors,
roofers, septic tank servicers, tire builders, and welders." Id. at 1.
65. Id.
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ven's numbers are so low reflects significant underutilization by both
race and gender. 66
While it is obvious why New Haven might not highlight these stark
gender and race disparities, it is less clear why advocates for minority
firefighters did not make more of this sorry record. Even absent knowing
the precise number of women of color in New Haven's relevant labor
market, there is reason to surmise that the percentage of women of color
employed by the New Haven Fire Department would exceed national
estimates because New Haven's population is and historically has been
predominately non-white.67 That would suggest that the underutilization
is even more profound. While the central issue in the case involved pro-
motions as distinct from hiring, the pattern of underutilization would
have had salience in the case and could have strengthened the argument
that the New Haven Fire Department's selection practices were flawed,
and not fair and neutral as Ricci claimed. Indeed, these numbers consti-
tuted a compelling signal that the procedures violated Title VII's dispar-
ate impact provisions. Marc Bendick, an employment economist and one
of the researchers in a national study, has explained the relationship be-
tween underrepresentation and discrimination:
Research has determined that, in fire departments where wom-
en are given fair, equal, non-hostile treatment in recruitment
[and] training,... it is reasonable to expect a fire department's
uniformed firefighters and officers to include about 17% wom-
en.
. . . When a fire department employs women at a rate much
lower than 17% ... that outcome is directly traceable to a de-
partmental culture in which hostility, discrimination, harass-
ment and exclusion operate and are tolerated, implicitly and
explicitly, by departmental leadership.
68
A discussion of why there were so few women, and women of color spe-
cifically, also would have advanced a more robust and compelling narra-
tive about exclusion and subordination would challenge the dominant
view that the disparate impact claims of minorities and women were
simply a form of seeking preferential treatment.
From the vantage point of the city and advocates for minority fire-
fighters, it was critical to explain why the city cancelled the results of the
selection procedures. The experience of women of color was an im-
66. See id.; see also Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
67. See supra note 58 (reporting Census figures).
68. Marc Bendick, Jr., Principal, Bendick & Egan Economic Counsultants, Inc., What Re-
search Tells Us About Women in Firefighting: Testimony before the City Council of N.Y.C. 1-2
(Dec. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.bendickegan.com/pdf/Bendick NY Firefighter-Testimony December 2013.pdf.
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portant part of that explanation. While the dominant narrative was that
the procedures were fair and that the city simply rejected an outcome it
did not like, in fact New Haven's selection processes, like those of many
fire departments, were structured in a way that reproduced gross racial
and gender disparities. Repeated legal challenges demonstrated that
competency was not simply determined by a set of objective criteria
evenly applied, as both physical and written exams had been shown to
include discriminatory and unnecessary metrics.69 Specifically, multiple-
choice tests, like that administered by New Haven, have been critiqued
as an invalid measure of the skills necessary to do the job of captain or
lieutenant, as they fail to identify "leadership skills," "command pres-
ence" skills, and abilities that fire officers must possess.70 Additionally,
the tests were structured around memorization of fire terms and proce-
dures of fire suppression that did not incorporate other aspects of the job
that include emergency medical services, as fire departments have taken
over these tasks, as well as fire safety inspections and investigations.
7'
69. See, e.g., Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1024-25 (1st Cir.
1974) (ruling that the state firefighter's exam, which had an adverse impact on minorities and wom-
en, "was not professionally developed; its content does not appear to be job related; the cutoff score
of 70 is arbitrary; the validation study reveals no correlation to overall measures, either subjective or
objective, and only minimal correlation to two individual objective tasks"); Hayden v. Cnty. of
Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding efforts by the police department to switch
from multiple-choice exams that created substantial underrepresentation of women and minorities to
a new test that was job related and minimized adverse impact on minorities); United States v. City of
New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 238, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013)
(finding that the city's firefighter exam "did not actually test for the job-related abilities they were
intended to test for," "the examinations were written at an unnecessarily high reading level," and
"the chosen cutoff scores for the examinations did not bear any relationship to the necessary job
qualifications"; and further characterizing the city's firefighting policies as "34 years of intransi-
gence and deliberate indifference"); Civil Rights Act Hearings, supra note 30, at 383-84 (testimony
of Brenda Berkman, President, United Women Firefighters). It is also worth noting "that prior to
1972, most police departments and many fire departments never had a physical performance test as
part of their selection criteria." See Event, Taking the Heat: Gender Discrimination in Firefighting,
17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 713, 717 (2009) (remarks by Professor Richard Ugelow).
70. These skills are critical to the successful performance of the supervisory jobs. See Brief of
Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1I, Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) ("Leadership in emergency-response crises
requires expertise in fire-management techniques and sound judgment about life-and-death deci-
sions .... Simply put, command presence is a hallmark of a successful fire officer. Virtually all
studies of fire management emphasize that command presence is vital to the safety of firefighters at
the scene and to the successful accomplishment of the firefighting mission and the safety of the
public." (citation omitted)). However, written multiple choice tests are not good measures of these
skills. See id. at 15 ("It is well-recognized by 1/0 psychologists and firefighters alike that written,
pencil-and-paper tests, while able to measure certain cognitive abilities (e.g., reading and memoriza-
tion) and factual knowledge, do not measure other skills and abilities critical to being an effective
fire officer as well as alternative methods of testing do.") (citing MICHAEL A. TERPAK, ASSESSMENT
CENTER: STRATEGY AND TACTICS 1 (2008) (asserting that "multiple-choice exams are 'known to be
poor at measuring the knowledge and abilities of the candidate, most notably that of a fire of-
ficer"')). The term "fire officer" is used in contrast to the term "firefighter" to refer to higher-ranking
firefighters with supervisory responsibilities over entry-level firefighters. See id. at 10.
71. See McGinley, supra note 9, at 599-600 (describing the changing nature of firefighters'
jobs to include caretaking tasks that many white males denigrate relative to firefighting); see also
Denise M. Hulett, Marc Bendick, Sheila Y. Thomas & Francine Moccio, Enhancing Women's Inclu-
sion in Firefighting in the USA, 8 INT'L J. DIVERSITY ORG. COMMUNITIES & NATIONS 189, 190
(2008) (noting that nearly two-thirds of fire department calls are for medical assistance and that 65%
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While facially neutral, these evaluation procedures were embedded in
and the product of a set of interlocking presumptions about firefighting
as (white) men's work. Disparate impact theory and doctrine is crucial to
illuminating these presumptions, as it places the burden on Title VII em-
ployers to demonstrate that the tests and procedures they use are actually
"merit-selecting.72
C. Women of Color and Firefighting-National Trends and Recent Ex-
amples
In this Part, I situate New Haven's practices in a broader context.
First, I briefly review the history of the amendment to Title VII in 1991
as a way to illustrate the centrality of the experience of women and
women of color to disparate impact law. I also examine the patterns of
employment of women and women of color in the New Haven Fire De-
partment against national data and trends. Finally, I consider recent dis-
putes over hiring and working conditions for minorities and women in
the New York and Los Angeles fire departments to illuminate the inter-
locking character of racism and sexism in this domain.
1. Historical Role of Women in Disparate Impact Doctrine
The exclusion of women and women of color from the Ricci story
and litigation was a particularly problematic omission given the histori-
cal role of women in firefighting in defending disparate impact doctrine.
Brenda Berkman, one of the handful of female firefighters in the Fire
Department of New York, testified in support of the amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct the Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio73 among other decisions in the
1989 term adverse to minority plaintiffs charging discrimination.74 In
Wards Cove the plaintiffs charged both systemic disparate treatment and
disparate impact in connection with Alaskan cannery employment prac-
tices that resulted in a racially skewed workforce in which skilled, higher
paying jobs went to whites, while non-white workers were consigned to
lower paying cannery jobs.75 The Court in Wards Cove ruled against the
plaintiffs because, in the majority's view, the proof did not sufficiently
connect specific employment practices to particular outcomes, effective-
ly raising the standard of proof for disparate impact claims.76
of fire departments have assumed responsibility for emergency ambulance services in their jurisdic-
tion).
72. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1074.
74. Civil Rights Act Hearings, supra note 30, at 385.
75. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642, 648.
76. Id. at 656-57 (reasoning that just as an employer cannot escape liability by demonstrating
that their workforce is racially balanced, a plaintiff cannot support a disparate impact case simply by
showing that there is racial imbalance-they must demonstrate that a specific employment practice
has a disparate impact on the group in question).
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In her testimony Berkman described the barriers she faced in be-
coming a firefighter. Although over 300 women passed the written test,
only 88 took the physical test because of the rumor that no woman had
ever passed it.77 When Berkman failed the exam, she along with several
other women, challenged the physical test because it produced a dispar-
ate impact on women.78 The test was thrown out because there was no
showing of business necessity-that is no showing of the relationship
between performance on the test and performance on the job.79 Berkman
was finally hired pursuant to a court order, but as she testified, "Once
hired, we were denied the ordinary amenities of cooperative firehouse
living and subjected to daily sexual harassment and hazing. This includ-
ed crude sexual comments, obscene graffiti and physical molestation.
'" 80
Two of the women were terminated.81 Berkman and Zeda Gonzales filed
suit over the retaliation and won.82 This proved to be critical evidence
regarding the importance of the disparate impact framework, demonstrat-
ing why it was necessary to correct the Court's decision in Wards Cove.
As Berkman put it, had she litigated her case under the Wards Cove
standard, she would have lost.83 Berkman's and Gonzales's narratives
were crucial to preserving disparate impact doctrine.
2. National Context
New Haven's virtual exclusion of women, and women of color in
particular, from firefighting jobs was part of a broader national pattern.
The National Report on Women in Firefighting, published in 2008, doc-
umented the long history of exclusion of women from firefighting, the
harassment that they faced doing the job, and the fact that this pattern has
been stubbornly resistant to change. Nationwide, women are about 3.7%
of the number of firefighters, and in a significant number of departments
the number of women is even lower.84 The latter group includes both
New York City and Los Angeles,85 cases that I consider here below as
examples of the intersectional discrimination that remained obscured in
Ricci. Other fire departments, such as Minneapolis, San Francisco, Mi-
ami, and Boulder have significantly higher proportions of women (from
13%-17%) and utilization has been closer to actual availability.86 This





82. Id. at 380-81.
83. Id. at 381.
84. See HULErT ET AL., supra note 62, at 1.
85. See id
86. Id. at 2 (listing several metropolitan areas with impressive percentages of women fire-
fighters: Miami-Dade, FL at 13%; Boulder, CO at 14%; San Francisco, CA at 15%; Madison, WI at
15%; and Minneapolis, MN at 17%).
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demonstrates that the exclusionary patterns present in New Haven were
not unique but nor were they inevitable.
The report also documents that the situation for women of color is
quite acute: While women of color would be expected to be about 5.9%
of the profession, according to the figures drawn from the 2000 census,
they constitute only 0.8% of firefighters.87 That means that they are cur-
rently represented at only 13.6% of the expected numbers while white
women are represented at 26% of the expected rate.8 8 Underrepresenta-
tion of women of color is twice that of white women.89 Notably, women
of color also report in interviews that in addition to facing the stereotype
that women
"are not cut out for firefighting" . . . . [S]ome of their white
women colleagues distance themselves from efforts by men of
color to combat racism and improve departmental practices in
areas such as promotions. These circumstances leave women
of color feeling particularly isolated and inadequately support-
ed by either women's or minority employee organizations.
90
Other sociological studies tend to support the view that the experience of
women of color in firefighting remains highly fraught, as racism and
sexism interact to render them particularly vulnerable to discrimination.
9
1
By their own words, they contend that they are unable to identify wheth-
er a negative action was motivated by their racial identity or by their
gender.92
3. New York and Los Angeles Through an Intersectional Lens: Big
Cities, Big Problems
The hiring and promotional records of fire departments in New
York and Los Angeles illustrate the entrenched nature of the sex- and
race-based exclusion. While both cities are very racially diverse, this is
not reflected in their fire departments. Women of color in particular have
not fared well, and the patterns of intersectional vulnerabilities are quite





91. Janice D. Yoder & Patricia Aniakudo, "Outsider Within" the Firehouse: Subordination
and Difference in the Social Interactions of African American Women Firefighters, II GENDER &
SoC'Y 324, 332 (1997) (describing the difficulties facing Black women who are stereotyped as
angry, aggressive, welfare recipients and "beasts of burden" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Like white women, Black women experienced hazing, close supervision, and frequent punishment;
but unlike white women who are perceived as weak, the stereotype of Black women as beasts of
burden increased expectations about the work they were expected to do. Id.
92. McGinley, supra note 9, at 609 (summarizing findings of the studies that it was impossi-
ble for Black women to assess whether they were being discriminated against on the basis of race or
sex, but clearly experiencing the intersectional impact of both).
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intersectional analysis provides a more accurate and compelling account
of discrimination and is a source of important evidence to support the
continued utility of the disparate impact framework. These cases might
offer important examples of why the missing evidence in Ricci regarding
the impact of New Haven's practices on women and on women of color
in particular was such a costly omission.
a. Los Angeles
While Los Angeles is a majority-minority city-29% of the resi-
dents are white-this diversity is not reflected its fire department
(LAFD).93 Specifically, over 50% of the department is white, 31% is
Latino, 12% is Black, and 7% is Asian-American.94 Even more signifi-
cant is the underutilization of women who comprise only 3% of the uni-
formed ranks, the same as in 1995.95
Actions by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) against the LAFD underscore that the employment record with
regard to women is not a function of women's lack of interest in the job
or natural sorting. In 2007, not long after a thirty-year-old federal con-
sent decree proscribing discrimination against women and minorities had
expired, the EEOC intervened following several high-profile harassment
and retaliation cases.96 One involved a Black male firefighter, Tennie
Pierce, who sued for discrimination and retaliation that included charges
that his coworkers had mixed dog food in with his meal.97 Pierce's set-
tlement for $1.4 million was initially approved by the city council and
was later vetoed by the mayor following media controversy over claims
that Pierce had participated in some hazing.98 In another case, Brenda
Lee, a Black lesbian firefighter, won a $6.2 million dollar award in a jury
trial based on charges of repeated harassment and retaliation.99 The ver-
dict was reversed on appeal on technical grounds and remanded.'00 Lee's
93. Michael Finnegan, Ben Welsh & Robert J. Lopez, New LAFD Recruit Class is Nearly All





96. Kerry Cavanaugh & Beth Barrett, Feds Find Evidence LAFD Violates Rights of its Wom-




99. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, No. BC336783, 2007 WL 5506484 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 12,
2007), rev'd, No. B202865, 2010 WL 553022 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2010).
100. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, No. B202865, 2010 WL 553022 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18,
2010), rev'g No. BC336783, 2007 WL 5506484 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 12, 2007). The reversal in
Lee's case was primarily based on an asserted failure to exhaust administrative remedies, so that the
court lacked jurisdiction to consider important aspects of her claim. The verdict was significant,
nevertheless. As one commentator noted:
The 2007 jury decision was reportedly the largest in a line of case settlements involving
discrimination and retaliation against minorities and women within the fire department in
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coplaintiffs, white firefighters who charged they were retaliated against
for attempting to assist her, both won significant awards: $1.7 million in
one case and $350,000 in another.'0° The first Black female firefighter
serving in the LAFD, d'Lisa Davies, also recovered $325,000 in a case
involving charges of discrimination over two decades of service.0 2 The
cases revealed ongoing patterns of racial and gender exclusionary con-
duct-conduct that has resulted in over $16 million in verdicts and set-
tlements against the city since 2005.103
Recent events have disclosed that despite the EEOC investigation
and public denunciations of the department's practices by public offi-
cials, the exclusion of women has continued. In January 2014, the first
recruit class of seventy firefighters in five years is over 60% white and
includes only one woman.'°4 The group does include thirteen sons and
three nephews of current firefighters.'0 5 Reports of nepotism, irregular
procedures, and selective disclosure of applications have resulted in a
decision to temporarily suspend additional recruitment. 
06
Los Angeles. The cases have allegedly cost Los Angeles taxpayers more than $15 million
since 2005. In a 2007 letter to the fire department, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission concluded that there had been a pattern of harassment, discrimination and
retaliation against female and black firefighters, where federal civil rights laws had been
violated.
After allegations of sexual and racial discrimination surfaced in the Los Angeles fire de-
partment, former Fire Chief William Bamattre reportedly retired early, in 2007.
California Court Overturns Female Firefighter's Racial, Gender Discrimination Case, HOWARD
LAW, P.C. (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.howardlawpc.com/lawyer-attomey-2237175.html.
101. Bill Hetherman, LAFD Firefighter Discrimination Case Winding Down, U-T SAN DIEGO
(July 3, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2007/jul/03/lafd-firefighter-
discrimination-case-winding-down/2/?#article-copy.
102. Michael Finnegan & Ben Welsh, Next L.A. Fire Chief's Other Challenge: Race and Sex
Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/0l/local/la-me-fire-
discrimination-20131202.
103. Cavanaugh & Barrett, supra note 96.
104. Finnegan et al., supra note 93.
105. City News Service, L.A. Fire Department Graduates First Class of Recruits in 5 Years,
but No Women Included, L.A. DAILY NEWS (June 12, 2014, 3:51 PM),
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20140612/la-fire-department-graduates-first-class-of-
recruits-in-5-years-but-no-women-included.
106. According to one report, the problems were sufficiently severe that earlier in 2014 the
mayor temporarily suspended the recruitment program:
Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti suspended the city's firefighter recruitment program
Thursday amid concerns about mismanagement and nepotism, including new emails that
show special recruitment workshops were organized for relatives of department insiders.
"I have determined that he Fire Department's recruiting process is fatally flawed," the
mayor said in a statement Thursday.
The action follows a Times report last month that thousands of candidates who passed a
written test were excluded from consideration for a new training class because some of
their paperwork wasn't received in the first 60 seconds of a filing period last spring.
Nearly 25% of the 70 recruits eventually hired were related to LAFD firefighters.
Robert J. Lopez & Ben Welsh, LAFD Recruit Program is Suspended, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2014/mar/20/local/la-me-lafd-20140321.
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b. New York City
New York City's fire department (FDNY) presents one of the most
stark and persistent records of underutilization of women and women of
color in the country. Although the city's overall population is approxi-
mately 30% Latino, 25%-30% Black, 10% Asian, and 51% women,
fewer than 6% of FDNY's 11,000 firefighters are men of color, and
women comprise only 0.3% of the total.0 7 In testimony before the city
Council of New York City, Marc Bendick, the social scientist who was
one of the authors of the national study, pointed out that were women
treated equally as men at FDNY, there would be over 1,800 women ra-
ther than the current number of 100 uniformed personnel (including fire-
fighters and emergency medical technicians).10 8 This record, he opined,
was more than sufficient to establish a prima facie case of gender dis-
crimination against the FDNY. 1°9 For the past six years the city has been
in litigation over its record with regard to race and has recently reached a
settlement. 10
According to the President of the United Women Firefighters,
Sarinya Srisakul, (who is also New York City's first Asian-American
female firefighter) the city's record is a predictable consequence of its
practices of utilizing extra, and arguably illegal, physical tests that make
impose additional requirements even on those candidates who have al-
ready passed the Candidate Physical Ability Test (CPAT)-a test widely
used in departments across the country in physical screening."' She con-
tended, "What is happening is that the Department is forced to use these
entrance standards that promote diversity that they don't agree with, so
they put harder standards in academy to weed them out."" 1 2 This com-
ports with Bendick's testimony that the "outcome [in the FDNY] is di-
rectly traceable to a departmental culture in which hostility, discrimina-
tion, harassment, and exclusion operate."" 
3
What is quite remarkable is that the issues and barriers confronting
women and people of color today so closely mirror the concerns raised
regarding FDNY practices over three decades ago. Berkman's account of
107. Test of Courage: The Making of a Firefighter, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/itvs/testofcourage/diversity3.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
108. Bendick, supra note 68, at 3.
109. Id. at 8.
110. See United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013), rev'g 683 F. Supp. 2d
225 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'g 637 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. City of New York:
FDNY Employment Discrimination Case, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec topics/fdny/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (discussing the settlement).
The settlement calls for new written exams, eliminating nepotism from the personnel board that has
a role in hires, and addressing pay. Mary Emily O'Hara, Bill De Blasio 's Diversity Opportunity, THE
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/12/bill-de-blasio-s-
diversity-opportunity.html.
11I. O'Hara, supra note 110.
112. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Bendick, supra note 68, at 1-2.
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the barriers that were placed in the path of women seeking to enter the
department, and in particular the use of physical screening exams to
weed out candidates, presages, and comports with contemporary allega-
tions.' 14 The fact that the same discredited rationales regarding the suita-
bility of women are in circulation as an explanation for FDNY's record is
quite telling.
Berkman's account also reveals important dimensions of an inter-
sectional framework. While the discourses and logics of race- and sex-
based exclusion are not the same, they are often mobilized in tandem,
and have interactive effects. Berkman's personal narrative reflects a
recognition that a crucial source of support for her throughout her long
ordeal with the FDNY was the Organization of Black Firefighters."5
As this Part demonstrates, the stories of women and of women of
color in particular have been an important part of challenging the exclu-
sionary practices of fire departments across the nation. The fact that they
were omitted from the discussion in Ricci represented a failure to consid-
er the insights offered by an intersectional analysis. This next Part con-
114. Berkman testified before the House Committee on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 regarding
the reason that Wards Cove needed to be corrected, stating:
I took the written test in December of 1977, with 409 other women and over 24,000
men. Almost all of us passed the written test. Although 389 women passed the written
test, only 88 took the physical test because it was rumored that no woman could pass it.
We were required to complete seven tests: a dummy carry, a hand grip, a broad jump, a
flexed-arm hang, an agility test, a ledge walk, and a one-mile run. The rumor turned out
to be accurate: although 7,847 men passed the physical exam, not a single woman passed
it.
I decided to challenge the test because I did not believe that it tested fairly for the skills
needed to be an effective firefighter. The trial court found that the test had a disparate
impact on women. The judge also held that the City failed to prove business necessity,
because the abilities tested by the physical exam were not predictive ofjob performance.
The judge also found that carrying a dummy with no arms or legs was more difficult
than carrying a real person. I was unable to carry the 120-lb. dummy, as were 76 of the
80 women who tried, but at trial I carried my 180-lb. counsel across the courtroom to
show the judge I could carry a live person.
The judge invalidated the physical tests as a violation of Title VII.
... I was ultimately hired in 1982, with 41 other women.
... Once hired, we were denied the ordinary amenities of cooperative firehouse living
and subjected to daily sexual harassment and hazing. This included crude sexual com-
ments, obscene graffiti and physical molestation.
After one year I was terminated, along with Zeda Gonzales, another female firefighter.
We challenged the terminations in court, and the judge held that we had been discharged
in retaliation for playing a prominent role in the lawsuit.
I am here today to express my strong support for the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 1 do not
believe I would have won my case under the principles set forth in Wards Cove ....
If Wards Cove had been decided in 1979, rather than 1989, New York City would proba-
bly still not have a single woman firefighter.
Civil Rights Act Hearings, supra note 30, at 380-81 (statement of Brenda Berkman, President,
United Women Firefighters).
115. Event, Taking the Heat, supra note 69, at 723 (calling the Black firefighters organization
the "biggest single [source of] support").
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siders the seeming hypervisibility of race and gender in the context of
Justice Sotomayor's nomination and the simultaneous masking of racial-
ist and gendered frames and presumptions. The Ricci case figured prom-
inently in this discourse.
II. RICCI, RACE, AND GENDER IN THE SOTOMAYOR NOMINATION
It was very hot in Washington, D.C. during the summer of 2010, but
not just because of the temperature outdoors. The Judiciary Committee
was conducting what had become highly contentious hearings on the
nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court.1 6 Initially,
it did not appear that Sotomayor's candidacy would cause significant
controversy. As Obama's first nominee to the Court, 117 he touted her
"depth of experience" and "breadth of perspective,"'1' 8 implying that the-
se virtues would imbue her with empathy-a quality he had previously
extolled.'19 Implicit, if not explicit, in the initial reactions was a positive
response to the fact that she was the first Supreme Court nominee from
the Latino community.12° That community embraced her as a symbol of
rising political influence notwithstanding her gender identity.12' This
seemed to mark some distance from the representational politics that
rendered Black women less visible and less able than Black men to em-
body antiracist aspirations and be the standard bearers of racial justice.
22
Thus, to the extent that Sotomayor's nomination was celebrated in the
Latino community as representative of racial progress, the story seemed
116. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 11 th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
II 1 shrg56940/html/CHRG- I Ishrg56940.htm.




118. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia
Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-Judge-
Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court.
119. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Justice David Souter (May
1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-justice-david-
souter ("I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people's hopes and
struggles as an essential ingredient for arriving as just decisions and outcomes.").
120. See Baker & Zeleny, supra note 117.
121. Tricia Bishop, A Cause for Celebration: Sotomayor Nomination to High Court Raises
Latino Pride, BALT. SUN, June 29, 2009, at 4A; Joye Brown, Calls of Praise for Sotomayor,
NEWSDAY, July 15, 2009, at A28; Bart Jones, Local Latino Leaders Herald High Court Pick,
NEWSDAY, May 27, 2009, at A05; Kent A. Miles, Local Support for Sotomayor, ATL. J. & CONST.,
May 27, 2009, at A12; Victor Manuel Ramos, Sotomayor's Nomination is Source of Pride for His-
panics in Central Florida, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 27, 2009, at Al 0; Ted Roelofs, 'I am Very
Proud' Hispanic Residents of West Michigan Closely Watch Confirmation Hearings, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, July 14, 2009, at Al.
122. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the Thomas nomination to the
Supreme Court and the fact that Black women were not able to represent the race, while he was able
to gamer support by asserting that the hearings were a "hi-tech lynching").
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to offer a hopeful counterpoint to the problem Crenshaw so powerfully
identified with reference to the issue of Black women and antiracism.123
Yet, the initial celebratory atmosphere proved to be short-lived.
Two lines of attack emerged, in some ways complementing and under-
writing the same message. First, Sotomayor's identity as a Latina that
had been mobilized as a symbol of advancing racial equality became the
mark of bias.124 In a sense, her intersectional identity as a woman of col-
or became an albatross and rendered her hypervisible. Second, the Su-
preme Court's decision reversing her opinion in Ricci became evidence
of her alleged racial loyalty and impeached her assertion of impartiality.
Had she been white and ruled in Ricci's favor, her objectivity likely
would not have been questioned, as her decision would not have disrupt-
ed prevailing expectations. These critiques problematically relied on the
presumptions that her identity as a woman of color made her less likely
to be fair in contrast to whites whose racial identity is affiliated with neu-
trality and objectivity.
This Part considers how Ricci functioned to construct Sotomayor's
identity as a woman of color who was presumptively biased and a "re-
verse racist." Even though Sotomayor ultimately was confirmed by the
Senate, the constraints imposed by the underlying racial presumptions
reproduced an alignment between racial minority affiliations and anti-
white bias. This reinforced arguments subsequently deployed in other
presidential appointment hearings.'25 Of course, the opposition to Presi-
dent Obama's nominees was never short of reasons to support its posi-
tion. However, this particular narrative had great utility in connection
with President Obama's judicial and cabinet appointments. In this sense,
Sotomayor's confirmation is less an illustration of majoritarian power
and is more demonstrative of the imperatives of colorblindness as a legit-
imate litmus test of objectivity and judicial temperament and a presumed
characteristic of whites. Utilizing the tools of intersectional analysis
would have challenged these assumptions. This was crucial in resetting
the terms of engagement around not only Sotomayor's appointment but
in securing political space for future nominees of color.
A. Ricci as Evidence of Sotomayor's Alleged Bias
New Haven had also been sued by the Firebirds several times, a mi-
nority firefighter's organization, over its promotional practices and so it
knew that it faced serious consequences if it failed to have a fair selec-
tion process.126 Accordingly, once it was clear that the city's test and its
123. See discussion, supra Part IA.
124. Peter Wallsten, More in GOP Make Race Focus of Sotomayor Nomination: They Allege
She Wouldn't Be Fair to White Men, BOS. GLOBE, June 1, 2009, at 6.
125. See infra note 142.
126. See generally Firebird Soc'y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. Of Fire Comm'rs, 66
F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
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method of scoring the exam produced hugely racially disparate results-
virtually no Black or Latino would be promoted-the city cancelled the
test results out of concern regarding disparate impact liability., 27 It was
also particularly concerned that it could not demonstrate that less dis-
criminatory alternatives were unavailable.28 Nevertheless, the Ricci
plaintiffs, all white and one Latino, challenged the city's action as unlaw-
ful disparate treatment discrimination. Their theory was that the city's
cancellation of the test amounted to discriminating against white candi-
dates on the basis of race.129 Arguably, this was a novel interpretation of
Title VII-essentially claiming that taking account of the results of the
test by race constituted an illegitimate racial motive.'30 Sotomayor served
on the panel in the Second Circuit that ruled in favor of the city.'
31
Once the Supreme Court reversed that ruling and found for the Ricci
plaintiffs, Sotomayor's ruling was challenged as evidence that her identi-
ty-as a Latina-trumped her willingness to adhere to the law. 132 She
was simply engaged in racial self-aggrandizement. This argument ig-
nored the fact that the Ricci decision reshaped existing doctrine: So-
tomayor's opinion followed what had been the prevailing consensus
about the law before the Supreme Court's decision in Ricci.'33 One can
dispute whether that consensus was correct, but Sotomayor's decision
was grounded in a reasonable reading of the doctrine.'
34
127. A.G. Sulzberger, Bias Suit a Test of Resolve for Hispanic Man, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/nyregion/03firefighter.html.
128. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009).
129. Id. at 563.
130. See id.
131. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd 557 U.S. 557
(2009).
132. See, e.g., Christopher Caldwell, The Limits of Empathy for Sonia Sotomayor, TIME, June
8, 2009, at 32 (describing Sotomayor's decision in the Ricci case as a defense of "racial prefer-
ences"); David Paul Kuhn, Left Dodges Moral Debate on Ricci Case, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (June
30, 2009),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/30/left dodges moral debate on ricci case.htm]
(describing the dissenting opinion in Ricci as "uph[olding] the city's effort to find any means to hold
fast to conventional affirmative action").
133. Paul Bass, Firebirds, NAACP: Ricci Won't Stop Us, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 30, 2009,
5:03 PM), http://newhavenindependent.org/archives/2009/06/thesupreme cou 1.php.
134. See 'Hardball with Chris Matthews' for Monday, July 13, NBCNEwS,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31905856/ns/msnbc-tv-hardball-with-chris-matthews (last updated
July 14, 2009) (quoting Senator Durbin's response to a question Chris Matthews posed regarding
Senator Durbin's opinion of Justice Sotomayor's decision in Ricci: "I think her ruling was the only
ruling that she could have handed down. It reflected 38 years of court decisions. It reflected the trial
court's decision, the appellate panel's decision, and the full appellate court, and she joined in to what
was clearly the precedent. Along came the Supreme Court, and by a 5 to 4 vote, a very close vote,
turned it over and said, We're going to do it differently. How can you hold that against her? I mean,
she was really taking the law as given to her over the years and applying the law to the set of facts
she was given"); Wade Henderson Testifies at Sonia Sotomayor's Confirmation Hearings, WASH.
POST (July 16, 2009 4:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071603085.html ("Judge Sotomayor has participated in
thousands of cases and authored hundreds of opinions, but much of the debate about her nomination
has concentrated on the difficult case of Ricci v. DeStefano. Whatever one may feel about the facts
of this case, we all agree that the Supreme Court, in its Ricci decision, set a new standard for inter-
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Ricci himself was a central witness called before the Judiciary
Committee to testify against Sotomayor's nomination.135 His story of
prevailing over adversity and achieving according to merit-based stand-
ards was largely uncontested. No Black male or female firefighter of any
race testified before the Senate about the egregious and ongoing patterns
of discrimination that had kept New Haven's Fire Department, and its
supervisory structure, predominately white and overwhelmingly male.
This systemic privilege was invisible, outside the purview of commen-
tary.
Moreover, it is also important to note the asymmetrical nature of the
significance ascribed to racial and gender identity. Ricci's racial identity
and that of the Justices in the majority, did not perform similar delegiti-
mizing work nor call into question particular judgments or claims. Put
differently, Ricci's identity as a white male, a class that had historically
and continually benefited from the existing distribution of power and
resources, did not undermine the perceived legitimacy of his arguments.
In contrast, Sotomayor's identity was not only grounds for suspi-
cion: A second line of attack opened up based on the now infamous
comment in which she invoked her own identity at the intersection of
race and gender. In comments in a 2002 keynote speech given to a con-
ference organized by Latino Students on Latinos and Latinas in the judi-
ciary, she stated, "I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the rich-
ness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclu-
sion than a white male who hasn't lived that life."' 3 6 As the crescendo of
criticism swelled, President Obama walked it back for her stating, "I'm
sure she would have restated it."'' 37 Thus, the very life experience
fighting prejudice and discrimination as a Latina that shapes, influences,
and affects viewpoint-experience that conservatives like Clarence
Thomas have repeatedly invoked'38-became something to be disa-
vowed.
preting Title V11 of the '64 Civil Rights Act. Using this one decision to negate Judge Sotomayor's 17
years on the bench does a disservice to her record and to this country."); see also Hayden v. County
of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1998))
(holding that reducing adverse impact on minorities does not equate to reverse discrimination against
whites, stating that "the intent to remedy the disparate impact of the prior exams is not equivalent to
an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants"); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at
82 (noting that "Prior to Ricci, the Court had never held that an employer risks Title VII disparate
treatment liability for failing to use an employment test hat produces racially adverse impact").
135. See Continuation of the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 111 th Cong. (2009),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/continuation-of-the-nomination-of-sonia-
sotomayor-to-be-an-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states-2009-07-16.
136. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002).
137. Obama Calls Criticism of Sotomayor 'Nonsense,' NBC NEWS (May 29, 2009, 6:43 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31004091/ns/politics-white-house/t/obama-calls-criticism-sotomayor-
nonsense/#.U UMY IdXT8.
138. In his autobiography, My Grandfather's Son, Thomas relates his experience as a poor
Black child in a culturally distinct African-American community in rural Georgia who grew up
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B. Ricci's Lingering Effects
Even though these attacks had no impact on Justice Sotomayor's ac-
tual confirmation, they arguably served to undermine the nominee in the
eyes of the broader public. The terms upon which her nomination was
challenged, as Kevin Johnson pointed out, were deeply infected by race
and gender stereotypes about Latinas: She was deemed to lack judicial
temperament.139 Other opponents in Congress asserted that she had "lots
of 'splaining to do," invoking an imagined accent and phrase drawn from
Ricky Ricardo's character on I Love Lucy.'40
Sotomayor's confirmation required her to perform and completely
disavow any meaningful connection with antiracist organizations or
causes. Her affiliations were demonized. The National Council of La
Raza and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund were both called racist
organizations; the National Council of La Raza was called the Latino
equivalent of the KKK. 141 Certainly, while this tactic was not new, the
debate intensified and affirmed those dynamics.
These dynamics and constraints have extended beyond the Justice's
nomination. The relentless political opposition to President Obama has
affected his ability to appoint various officers and cabinet positions, in
part by narrowing the political space in which civil rights advocacy has
operated. 142 At times, as in the case of Justice Sotomayor, even moderate
under segregation and racial subordination. See generally CLARENCE THOMAS, My GRANDFATHER'S
SON 1-28 (2007). Thus, while Thomas is a vocal conservative who endorses colorblindness, he does
so from a racially specific position that draws on what he sees as the lessons from this history about
overcoming racial obstacles. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Prefer-
ences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1174-76 (2008).
139. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First Latina
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. The 'High-Tech Lynching' of a 'Wise Latina'? 20-21, 43-49,
(UC Davis Legal Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 188, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1460932.
140. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Neil A. Lewis, Queries on Abortion and Guns Fail to Break
Judge's Stride, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/us/politics/I 6confirm.html (internal quotation mark omitted).
141. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 139, at 45; Susan Crile, Tancredo Claims Sotomayor in
"Latino KKK,'" HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2009, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/28/tancredo-claims-sotomayor n 208831 .html.
142. Prime examples here would be the unsuccessful nomination of Goodwin Liu to the federal
court of appeals where his liberal credentials became the basis for allegations that he was extremely
radical. See Ed Whelan, Ninth Circuit Nominee Goodwin Liu, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2010,
5:34 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/49270/ninth-circuit-nominee-goodwin-
liu/ed-whelan (describing the nominee as "demagogic" in prior opposition to Alito and as aligned
with "left-wing groups" like the ACLU, the National Women's Center, and the American Constitu-
tion Society). Some of the accusations took on a distinctly racialized tone. See [an Millhiser, Op-ed.,
The Goodwin Liu Nomination: Impaired Judgment, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at 15 (reporting that
Senator Grassley accused Liu of attempting to make the United States be more like "communist run
China" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Liu was subsequently nominated and appointed to the
California Supreme Court. See Maura Dolan, Accolades as Justice Confirmed. Newest Member of
State Supreme Court Had Contentious Federal Nomination, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at I. Another
concem is the derailment of the nomination of Debo Adegbile, former counsel for the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, to be the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's Civil Rights Divi-
sion. See Dahlia Lithwick, Guilt By Association, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2014),
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candidates are opposed as radical extremists. These constraints stand
against the backdrop of a federal judiciary that over the past several dec-
ades has plainly been reshaped in accordance with conservative political
preferences.143 Yet any arguments on behalf of appointments of more
centrist or liberal judges are denounced as efforts to politicize the
courts.44 Certainly, the recent decision to move away from the require-
ment of a supermajority to confirm judicial nominees is a positive
sign,145 but the terms of the debate are still framed by a narrative that
erases the political advocacy and conservative racial preferences that
installed the current bench.
In response, the Obama administration's approach to judicial nomi-
nees has been shaped by conservative resistance: The strategy is to nom-
inate only those persons who will not engender resistance.46 Note that
affiliation with, or even leadership in, the Federalist Society should ap-
parently engender no concerns about ideological orientation or commit-
ments. 147
The framing of Sotomayor as anti-white reinforces the view of the
status quo as race neutral and affirms whiteness as a legitimate baseline.
Bias is defined as seeing race as relevant. Thus what might be thought of
as race attentiveness per se-simply noticing race-is a form of racial
discrimination against whites. This was the Court's position in Ricci. The
distorted debate over the Sotomayor nomination reproduced that same
logic.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/Jurisprudence/20 14/03/debo adegbile-senate-bloc
ksobama_spick to head thejustice department.html (reporting that the "Senate block[ed]
Obama's [nominee] to head the civil rights division because he's fought for civil rights").
143. See Rebecca Adelman & Amanda Haynes Young, Judicial Activism: Just Do It, 24
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 267, 269 (1994); Martin Garbus, A Hostile Takeover, AM. PROSPECT, Feb.
19, 2003, http://prospect.org/article/hostile-takeover; Jamin Raskin, Courts v. Citizens, AM.
PROSPECT, Apr. 16, 2003, http://prospect.org/article/courts-v-citizens; see also Charlie Savage,
Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l0/29/us/29judges.html.
144. See Harold Maass, Is Obama Trying to Stack the Courts with Liberals?, WEEK,
http://theweek.com/articles/463909/obama-trying-stack-courts-liberals (reporting on Republican
accusations to that effect).
145. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger 'Nuclear' Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-
limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/dO65cfe8-
52b6-11 e3-9feO-fd2ca728e67c story.html.
146. This strategy has not been entirely successful. Even nominees who lack any visible politi-
cal commitments have been rejected. See Linda Greenhouse, Op-ed., Rock Bottom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2011 (reporting on the Republicans' successful defeat of Caitlin Halligan's nomination to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals by filibuster even though she was someone whose credentials bore no
"ideological markings").
147. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 143 ("David M. McIntosh, a co-founder and vice-chairman
of the Federalist Society, said the nation's appeals courts were now more in line with a conservative
judicial ideology than at any other time in memory. 'The level of thoughtfulness among sitting
judges on constitutional theory and the role of judges is higher than certainly any other time in my
life,' said Mr. McIntosh, a former Reagan legal team member and Indiana congressman. 'For some-
body who has spent a lot of my life promoting those ideas, it's very encouraging to see."').
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CONCLUSION
The Ricci case, while ostensibly a case about race alone was in fact
a case about multiple mechanisms of exclusion. Indeed, understanding
the way that racial privilege had been constructed and configured in the
New Haven Fire Department required an examination of its gendered
dimensions. The lack of any intersectional perspective that illuminated
these connections deprived those who opposed Frank Ricci's simple sto-
ry of hard work, and colorblind merit of important evidence to challenge
that presupposition. In that sense, while Ricci might nevertheless have
been decided in the same way, the important work of resetting the racial
narrative is performed not only through the actual decision in the case
but in the framing of the debate. In that sense, an analysis of the experi-
ence of women of color as part of and representative of the excluded
class of women offered critical insights into important connections.
While the invisibility of gender was a feature of the debate over the
Ricci case, the hypervisibility of race and gender marked the nomination
and confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Ricci here played a role in helping organize the narrative that she was
biased and, therefore, could not fulfill her duties to remain neutral and
objective like her white counterparts. The rapid mobilization of these
readily available stereotypes illustrates not only the particular vulnerabil-
ity of women of color to bias, but further illuminates one of the central
mechanisms of structural inequality, which is to treat the racially unequal
status quo as neutral and fair. Intersectional analysis in both domains can
yield greater insight hat is valuable in its own right and indispensable in
the context of antiracist and feminist politics, as it can enable greater and
broader coalitional work and additionally, better articulate the operation
of and interrelationship between race and gender subordination.
1150 [Vol. 91:5
